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GETTING PERMISSION
Philip Hamburger*
INTRODUCTION
Institutional Review Boards ("IRBs") are the instruments of a system
of licensing-a system under which scholars, students, and other research-
ers must get permission to do research on human subjects. Although the
system was established as a means of regulating research, it regulates re-
search by licensing speech and the press. It is, in fact, so sweeping a sys-
tem of licensing speech and the press that it is reminiscent of the
seventeenth century, when Galileo Galilei had to submit to licensing and
John Milton protested against it.' Accordingly, it is necessary to examine
the constitutionality of IRB licensing and, more generally, to explore the
dangers of licensing speech and the press. The Supreme Court has come to
understand such licensing merely as a sort of prior restraint.2 Licensing,
however, is a distinctly dangerous type of prior restraint, for it requires one
to get permission.
This inquiry focuses on the various laws that generally impose IRB li-
censing on human subjects research-a range of statutes, regulations, and
common law doctrines here called "the IRB laws." At their center is the
Common Rule, which sets out a federal model for the licensing.3 Surround-
ing it are other laws, federal and state, that give the licensing the obligation
Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For their comments and
advice, I am grateful to many learned colleagues, including: Tom Baker, Caroline Bledsoe, Mike Dorf,
Harold Edgar, Suzanne Goldberg, David Hyman, Jim Lindgren, Jon Merz, and Henry Monaghan; the
participants at the Northwestern University Law Review Conference; Paul Applebaum and the other par-
ticipants at the Seminar Series of the Division of Psychiatry, Law and Ethics, Department of Psychiatry,
Columbia University; and, not least, David Crowley, Caleb Edwards, Charleen Hsuan, Aaron Leider-
man, Jonathan Shapiro, Leanne Wilson, and all of the other participants in the Legal Scholarship Work-
shop at Columbia Law School.
I JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF
UNLICENSED PRINTING, TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644). Galileo sought a license to print for
his Dialogue in 1630 and was punished by the Inquisition in 1633-in part because he obtained the li-
cense without explaining to the licenser that he had earlier been warned not to advocate his ideas. For
details, see infra note 190.
2 See infra text accompanying note 22.
3 The Common Rule has been adopted by seventeen federal agencies and departments, and for the
sake of convenience, this article cites the Health and Human Services promulgation of the Common
Rule at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2005).
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of law.4 Under this system of laws, universities and other research institu-
tions establish IRBs to review human subjects research, and consequently
most teachers and students must get permission from an IRB before they
conduct any such research. There are other uses of IRBs-notably, under
FDA regulations-but it is the more general use of IRBs to license human
subjects research under the IRB laws that requires immediate attention.5
The danger of the IRB laws is evident from their practical implications
for teachers and students who do human subjects research. Such persons
need permission to begin their research; they need permission to continue
the research; they need permission to observe, ask questions, talk, or take
notes; indeed, they need permission to use data received from other schol-
ars, to analyze much already published data, and to share, disclose, or oth-
erwise publish significant elements of what they learn.6 Sometimes they are
denied permission altogether. More typically, they are partly denied per-
mission in a process by which IRBs withhold consent unless researchers
modify their plans. Although an IRB can thereby require a researcher not to
engage in some types of physical contact, it more typically interferes with
the researcher's words-for example, by refusing permission unless he
agrees not to ask, say, look at, write down, keep records of, disclose, or oth-
erwise publish what the IRB does not want him to ask, say, etc.7 In such
4 See infra Part I1.C.
5 See infra text accompanying note 40.
6 For details of how IRBs require individuals to get permission, see infra Part II.A and Philip Ham-
burger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards, 2004 SuP. CT. REV. 271, 290-306. The New
Censorship article argues that the IRB laws unconstitutionally require licensing of speech and the press
but that the doctrines of the U.S. Supreme Court have diminished the clarity of the Constitution's obsta-
cles to licensing and thus have emboldened the government to impose IRBs and have left academics and
universities without the confidence to resist. Id. at 277-81, 351-54. This Article further develops the
basic point that the IRB laws unconstitutionally require licensing of speech and the press. Other argu-
ments about the unconstitutionality of the IRB laws are left aside here-as are related federal attempts at
licensing of speech and the press, such as the federal coordination of editorial policies at scientific jour-
nals and "Privacy Rule," 45 C.F.R. pts. 160 & 164, promulgated under the Heath Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 2021-31 (1996).
7 For details, see infra Part I.A and Hamburger, supra note 6, at 301-06. Advocates of IRBs are
apt to say that IRBs do not license publication, but the reality of the licensing does not bear this out. Al-
though IRBs focus most of their demands on the informed consent forms, they use their modification of
these forms to get researchers to commit to not disclosing what the IRB considers private information,
and as IRBs take an astonishingly broad view of what should be private, the IRBs in this way directly
bar publication of perfectly ordinary information. See infra text following note 71; infra Part II.B.3.
IRBs also sometimes deny researchers permission to ask questions or to record or disclose the answers,
and although this sort of interference is less common than that relating to names and identifying infor-
mation, the two are inextricably linked, for an IRB will allow more "sensitive" questions if it is confi-
dent that the researcher will not learn or at least will not publish the identity of the persons questioned.
Thus, if a researcher wants to publish the names of the persons he is interviewing, he will face more se-
vere scrutiny of his questions. For example, if a student wants to interview or survey members of the
Ku Klux Klan, the IRB can force the student to chose between censorship of any names and other identi-
fying information and censorship of the other information the student can learn or publish. See infra
note 70 and accompanying text.
Getting Permission
ways, IRBs censor the entire range of observation, inquiry, recording, talk-
ing, writing, and publishing protected by the First Amendment, and far
from making a single outrageous assault on this Amendment, IRBs modify
or censor well over 100,000 research proposals every year in the United
States and stifle countless others that get abandoned or never get started.
As a result, IRBs bar important avenues of research---even in fields involv-
ing techniques no more dangerous than observation, reading, asking ques-
tions, and printing.
Although IRBs raise many constitutional questions, the central prob-
lem is their licensing of speech and the press. The IRB laws are frequently
justified as a means of protecting human subjects, but there are many legal
mechanisms that could be used to limit injury to human subjects without
running into constitutional obstacles, and it accordingly is all the more re-
markable that the federal government responded with a system of licensing
speech and the press. This is something the First Amendment once em-
phatically forbade, and even though the Supreme Court today reduces this
prohibition to a mere presumption against prior restraints, the Court at least
considers the presumption distinctively heavy.8 The licensing therefore is
the foremost constitutional issue, and thus notwithstanding that the IRB
laws probably collide with First Amendment doctrine on content discrimi-
nation, vagueness, and overbreadth, these usual suspects are put aside here
in order to concentrate on the more basic problem.9
Rather than confine itself to the surface of the Supreme Court doctrine,
this constitutional inquiry about licensing under the IRB laws must dig a lit-
tle deeper, to reach some aspects of licensing that have largely fallen from
view-in particular, to observe that licensing laws require one to get per-
mission. It is no longer entirely clear from Supreme Court doctrine that li-
censing is a distinct problem, and, as already hinted, licensing therefore
usually gets subsumed within the more general problem of prior restraints."
8 The Court has said that "[t]he presumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of
protection broader-than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties." Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975). See also infra text accompanying note 29.
9 Another relevant doctrine would be the procedural limitations on licensing enunciated in Mary-
landv. Freedman, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
10 See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648
(1955). Vincent Blasi observes that "[tihe Court no longer asks whether a challenged procedure
amounts to the equivalent of a licensing system," but instead inquires about "[p]rior restraint." Vincent
Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11, 12 (1981). The
tendency to reduce licensing to a type of prior restraint can also be observed in case books, as when
Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and Tushnet deal with licensing in a brief note entitled Licensing as Prior Re-
straint. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1103-06 (4th ed. 2001).
This argument about permission and individual authority resonates with that made by Vincent Blasi
about the relationship between the First Amendment and the character required of citizens. Vincent
Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character: From Milton to Brandeis to the Present, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 61 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
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Licensing laws, however, stand apart from other restraints because they
require individuals to get permission and thereby deprive individuals of
their authority, and this has a range of political, social, and individual dan-
gers. The political danger is most obvious-that such laws deprive indi-
viduals of their authority in relation to government. By requiring
individuals to get permission for their use of language, licensing laws sup-
plant the authority of individuals with that of government in the very
mechanism through which individuals form conceptions of themselves as a
people and by which they act, both individually and as a people, to author-
ize and control their government. This political risk is only one of the dan-
gers of having to get permission to speak or print, but it is already enough
to suggest the importance of recognizing that licensing requires one to get
permission. Once this requirement is understood--especially once its im-
plications for the political authority of individuals is understood-the First
Amendment's distinctively strong bar against licensing can begin to make
sense.
It may be thought that licensing laws are dangerous only when they fo-
cus on political opinion, which would be reassuring with respect to the IRB
laws, for they require the licensing of speech and the press merely in the
pursuit of scientific knowledge. The First Amendment, however, barred li-
censing of speech or the press without regard to subject matter and without
regard to distinctions between opinion and knowledge. In fact, such licens-
ing is politically dangerous in undermining individual authority not only as
to political opinion, but as to all sorts of opinion and knowledge-the clear-
est illustration being scientific knowledge. Opinion cannot easily be segre-
gated from knowledge, and politics cannot be understood apart from deeper
truths, whether in religion, science, or something else, and thus not only
when applied to political opinion but also more profoundly, if less immedi-
ately, when applied to matters such as scientific knowledge, the licensing of
speech or the press inverts the relation of individuals to government. Even
beyond this political danger, the licensing of speech or the press as to scien-
tific knowledge is perilous because, in threatening individual authority, it
impedes the development of the sort of knowledge that underlies so much
of modern society and its blessings. Indeed, such licensing undermines the
sense of authority individuals need to make their own judgments about
truth, which can matter for reasons that rise above political and social satis-
Blasi, however, defends the extension of the prohibition against licensing to a prohibition against injunc-
tions, thus generalizing from licensing to prior restraint, and therefore although he recognizes the threat
to individual authority from the requirement of having to get permission, he does not as sharply distin-
guish the severity of this danger as he might have. Id. at 72-85. Alexander Meiklejohn argues from the
authority of the people, but in a self-consciously open-ended way he suggests that:
The Framers could not foresee the specific issues which would arise as their "novel idea" exer-
cised its domination over the governing activities of a rapidly developing nation .... In that sense,
the Framers did not know what they were doing. And in the same sense ... we do not know what
they were doing, or what we ourselves are now doing.
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 264.
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factions. The full range of these political, social, and individual dangers of
licensing scientific speech or the press were already becoming apparent in
the time of Galileo, and they are no less evident in the era of IRBs.
The modem debates as to whether the Supreme Court should develop a
constitutional right of research therefore largely miss the point: Rather than
need a newfangled right, academics simply need the old-fashioned freedom
of speech and the press. Scientific knowledge consists of hypotheses, theo-
ries, or general statements, which get formulated and published in dizzying
abundance by individuals so that others can test their generalities and find
errors, and it will be seen that when the IRB laws require the licensing of
research, they candidly require the licensing of attempts to develop this sort
of "generalizable knowledge"-the knowledge that can be reduced to gen-
eralizations. This imposition of licensing on attempts to develop generali-
zations, whether spoken or printed, is the licensing of speech and the press,
which the First Amendment once flatly forbade." What is therefore needed
in response to the IRB laws is not the creation of a right of research, but
rather a recognition of the freedom from licensing that Galileo lacked and
the First Amendment clearly secured.
This study examines the unconstitutionality (in Parts I and II), the justi-
fications (in Parts III and IV), and finally the dangers of scientific licensing
(in Part V). First, it will be seen that the First Amendment prohibits the li-
censing of speech or the press-meaning at least the licensing of verbal
language, whether spoken or printed, whether as to opinion or knowledge,
and regardless of subject matter. It will be seen, moreover, that this prohi-
bition makes sense, for in requiring individuals to get prior permission, such
licensing threatens the authority of individuals in their relation to govern-
ment, which at a minimum has political dangers. Second, although the IRB
laws regulate research, and although they appear to do so only through con-
ditions on federal research grants, they actually regulate research by directly
licensing speech and the press, and they impose this licensing with the obli-
gation of law-thus leaving little room to escape the conclusion that the
IRB laws conflict with the First Amendment. Third, although IRBs get jus-
tified as a means of enforcing a fiduciary duty on researchers as a profes-
sion, the IRB laws are particularly dangerous precisely because they impose
such a duty on researchers-a duty that even includes imperfect duties.
Fourth, notwithstanding that IRBs get justified as a means of preventing
harms to human subjects, it will be seen that human subjects research is not
particularly harmful, and that IRBs clearly cause far more harm to individu-
als and society than they prevent-all of which leads to concerns that the
IRB laws were adopted not so much in response to empirical evidence of
harm as in response to popular fears and anxieties about researchers. Fifth,
I I As will be seen below, early licensing laws focused on printing rather than just publishing, and
therefore the modem emphasis on publishing tends to reduce the freedom of speech and the press. See
infra text accompanying note 16.
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it is necessary to put to rest any lingering thoughts that the IRB licensing is
not dangerous because it focuses on scientific knowledge rather than politi-
cal opinion. It is true that the IRB laws license the use of speech and the
press in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, but this is no less dangerous
now than it was in the time of Galileo.
In sum, although the unconstitutionality of the IRB laws should be evi-
dent enough when one stands on the narrow constitutional point about li-
censing, it becomes all the more disturbingly clear when one extends one's
vision across the landscape of modem life out toward the wide horizons of
scientific knowledge. Modem politics, modem society, and the freedom of
individuals to make their own judgments about truth, all depend on the au-
thority of individuals in their use of verbal language, spoken and printed, as
to all sorts of matters-not least, scientific knowledge-and by licensing
the use of speech and the press in the pursuit of such knowledge, the IRB
laws threaten the individual authority on which all these political, social,
and individual blessings depend. The IRB laws thus illustrate the danger of
requiring permission for speech or the press, and they thereby reveal the
need to restore the First Amendment's barrier against licensing.
I. LICENSING
Nothing was more severely forbidden by the First Amendment's guar-
antee of speech and the press than licensing-the requirement that one get
permission before speaking or using the press-and this proscription was
fortunate. 2 There are many possible threats to the freedom of speech and
the press, and the danger from licensing therefore has come to seem less
significant than it did in the eighteenth century-even to the point that the
Supreme Court tends to allude not to licensing, but rather to a broader range
of "prior restraints," which it subjects to a mere presumption of unconstitu-
tionality. The Court, however, thereby comes close to losing sight of the
distinctive character and danger of licensing.13 Licensing laws essentially
require one to get permission, and this requirement of getting permission
makes licensing a particularly serious threat to the authority of individuals
in relation to government. Accordingly, although the First Amendment's
unequivocal prohibition of licensing has slipped below the surface of Su-
preme Court doctrine, the old prohibition against licensing remains vitally
important, and it needs to be brought back into view.
A. The First Amendment's Prohibition on Licensing
The First Amendment's guarantee of speech and the press most cen-
trally prohibited the licensing of speech and the press. First Amendment
ideals have expanded beyond such licensing to include other methods and
12 See infra text accompanying note 19.
13 See infra text accompanying note 26.
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objects of restraint, and as a result the once absolute prohibition on licens-
ing of speech and printing has become a mere presumption. Even the no-
tion that licensing is a distinct danger gets lost amid the broader categories
of prior and post-publication restraints. Nonetheless, just below modem
doctrine one can observe the hstorical and conceptual core of the freedom
of speech and the press, which remains the freedom from licensing speech
or the press-a freedom from having to get permission for the use of verbal
language, whether spoken or printed-and this still should be considered
absolutely forbidden.
Historically, the speech-and-press guarantee of the First Amendment
forbade at least the licensing of speech and the press. It provided that
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press."' 4 When the First Amendment was adopted in 1791, the freedom of
the press was widely understood to include a freedom from the licensing of
the press.'5 Although historians tend to assume this was a freedom from the
licensing of publication, it was more basically a freedom from the licensing
of the press-meaning the licensing of printing-this being the sort of li-
censing that had prevailed in England and elsewhere in the seventeenth cen-
tury and that Americans in the eighteenth century most clearly sought to
avoid. 6 Although the freedom of the press may have included more, it is
not clear from the historical evidence what else it encompassed. Some
scholars emphasize potentially broader conceptions of the freedom, but they
tend to rely on later evidence, and they do not dispute that the First
Amendment was understood at least to include a freedom from licensing. 7
The freedom of speech (beyond the context of Parliamentary debate) was
less fully elaborated, but the First Amendment evidently was written on the
assumption that the freedom enjoyed as to speech was the same as that en-
14 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15 The evidence from the period up through 1791 reveals that the freedom of speech and the press
was ordinarily understood as a freedom from licensing. LEONARD LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS, chs. VII-VIII (1985). A broader understanding of the freedom of speech and the press only
seems to have become more widely accepted during the debates around the Alien and Sedition Acts at
the very end of the century. Id. at ch. IX. For an early eighteenth-century English claim of freedom of
the press from seditious libel prosecutions, see Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Sedi-
tious Libel and the Control of the Press, 37 STAN. L. REV. 661, 743-44 (1985). For a somewhat similar
claim from the 1780s, see LEVY, supra, at 209. Scattered early claims of this sort, however, do not dis-
place the evidence assembled by Levy about the more ordinary understanding of the freedom.
16 That the seventeenth century licensing centrally concerned printing rather than publishing is clear
from A DECREE OF STARRE-CHAMBER, CONCERNING PRINTING, sig. B2[r], § II (London, Robert Barker
1637); An Act for Preventing the Frequent Abuses in Printing Seditious Treasonable and Unlicensed
Books and Pamphlets and for Regulating of Printing and Printing Presses, 1662, 14 Car. II, c. 33, §2
(Eng.). In contrast, publication-in the sense of sharing a writing with a third party-was a requirement
of the law of libel, including the law of seditious libel. Hamburger, supra note 15, at 702. For one of
many possible illustrations of how the licensing of the press has come to be reduced to a matter of publi-
cation, see the quotation from Chief Justice Hughes in the text accompanying infra note 2 1.
17 See, e.g., JAMES MORTON SMITH, FREEDOM'S FETrERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDITION LAWS AND
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 424-30 (1956).
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joyed as to the press, for the Amendment employed the same word "free-
dom" for each. 8 The sort of speech or the press thus protected from licens-
ing appears to have been at least verbal-in the sense that it was of the sort
that could be spoken or read aloud in one language or another. Today, the
First Amendment's guarantee against laws that establish licensing for such
speaking or printing may seem extremely narrow, but this was the freedom
of speech and the press that the First Amendment most clearly protected in
1791.
On the old assumption that freedom of speech and of the press was a
relatively narrow freedom from licensing, the Supreme Court once could
speak about the freedom as if it were absolute. 9 William Blackstone and
some early American judges generalized about licensing as a "previous re-
straint," and, following their usage, Justice Holmes explained the federal
and state guarantees of freedom of speech and the press in utterly unquali-
fied terms:
[T]he main purpose of such constitutional provisions is "to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other govem-
ments," and they do not prevent the subsequent punishment of such as may be
deemed contrary to the public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as
well to the false as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well
to the true as to the false.20
In short, other governments had imposed systems of licensing, and far from
being subject to government interests, the freedom from this sort of prior
restraint extended to false as well as true publications. Even after the Su-
preme Court expanded the First Amendment freedom of speech and the
press, Chief Justice Hughes could still acknowledge the bar against licens-
ing without qualifying it:
The struggle for the freedom of the press was primarily directed against the
power of the licensor. It was against that power that John Milton directed his
assault by his "Appeal for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing." And the liberty
18 In this sense, the First Amendment's use of the word "freedom" (like its use of the words "relig-
ion" and "thereof') anticipates a Wittgensteinian observation that the repetition of the word would intro-
duce another word or at least another meaning.
19 This is obviously not an attempt to revive the position of Justice Hugo Black, who loosely dis-
cussed a much broader conception of the freedom of speech and the press as an absolute and who thus
confirmed in the minds of many commentators that there are no absolutes in law. For a summary of the
debate, see Meiklejohn, supra note 10.
28 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (citations and emphasis omitted). Incidentally, it
should be noted that although Holmes acknowledged much room for subsequent punishments, his words
about "the main purpose" did not entirely reject the possibility of constitutional limits on such punish-
ments. Some earlier judges, incidentally, were more precise-as when Chief Justice M'Kean of Penn-
sylvania said of his state's constitution that it barred "any attempt to fetter the press by the institution of
a licenser." Respublica v. Oswald, I U.S. (1 Dall.) 319, 325 (Pa. 1788).
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of the press became initially a right to publish "without a license what for-
merly could be published only with one."21
This old freedom appeared absolute.
Gradually, however, the freedom of speech and of press has come to be
understood more broadly, and at least on the surface this appears to be en-
tirely an expansion of the liberty protected by the First Amendment. For
example, twentieth-century scholars and judges have reconceptualized the
freedom from licensing-so that what once was a freedom from having to
get permission has become a freedom from prior restraints in general-this
being a move that reaches injunctions.22 Even more ambitiously, the schol-
ars and judges have extended the freedom of speech and the press to include
a freedom from post-publication restraints.23 Having thus expanded upon
the prohibited method of regulation, they have also broadened the prohib-
ited object of regulation to include not only the verbal language tradition-
ally associated with speech and the press, nor only the full range of
communication that can be done by oral and printed means, but also a wide
range of other expression, including that done through conduct-such as
nude dancing and the burning of flags and crosses.24
Not surprisingly, this expanded definition of the freedom has led to
qualifications about access to the freedom. The enlargement of a right can
be a mixed blessing, for sometimes "more is less"-this being the dynamic
by which a broadened freedom can seem to require diminished access. 5
21 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (citation omitted). He added: "While this
freedom from previous restraint upon publication cannot be regarded as exhausting the guaranty of lib-
erty, the prevention of that restraint was a leading purpose in the adoption of the constitutional provi-
sion." Id. at 451-52 (citation omitted).
22 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Hamburger, supra note 6, at 283. This move was
probably unnecessary in Near, but it would matter in later cases on injunctions in which the underlying
laws did not so clearly establish a system of licensing through the courts.
23 Near, 283 U.S. at 283-84.
24 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (cross burning); United States v. Eichman, 496
U.S. 310 (1990) (flag burning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning); Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (nude dancing). The Court outlined its test for expressive con-
duct in United States v. O'Brien:
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction of al-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). Such a law must be narrowly tailored, but it does not have to be the least
burdensome "imaginable." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 797 (1989) (citation omitted).
25 Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835 (2004); see also Vincent Blasi, The Patho-
logical Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 452-59 (1985); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 654 n.140 (1980); William P. Marshall,
Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking 'Rethinking State Action,' 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558, 567-68
(1985). The More is Less article observes this dynamic in evolving conceptions of the free exercise of
religion. When the Justices expanded their understanding of this right to include a right of exemption
from general laws, they introduced qualifications explaining how a sufficiently compelling government
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Optimistic generalizations about the extent of a right are popular in an indi-
vidualistic society such as the United States, but they tend to lead judges to
qualify access to the right in terms of a balancing of interests. As valorized
in the logic of legal realism, the right is nothing more than an individual in-
terest, which can be outweighed by a sufficiently important government in-
terest-thus reducing constitutional prohibitions to mere presumptions.
In this manner, the expansion of the freedom of speech and the press
has led to judicial qualifications. The expanded periphery of the freedom-
whether as to prior restraints, post-publication restraints, or various forms
of non-verbal expression-has seemed plausible only because it has been
accompanied by caveats preserving the interests of government. Although
in theory it might have been possible to confine the application of these ca-
veats to the expanded portions of the freedom, the necessity of generalizing
about freedom of speech and the press has made it almost inevitable that the
caveats would cut into the core-the freedom from licensing. Put simply,
to defend the expanded sphere of the freedom, scholars and judges have had
to generalize about the freedom as a whole, and they thus have ended up
carving out government interests not only from the expanded periphery but
also from the historic core. Whereas the Supreme Court once could speak
about licensing without qualification, it soon had to explain-as when it
expanded the freedom to protect against injunctions-that "the protection
even as to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited."26 Such qualifica-
tions were all the more necessary when the Court extended the freedom to
post-publication restraints.27 The Court thus diminished the prohibition
against licensing into little more than a presumption that becomes the start-
ing point for a judicial evaluation of government interests. In justification,
it sometimes is said in a knowing tone that no right is absolute and that all
rights are subject to government interests. Yet this is only true of the free-
dom of speech and the press because of the expanded definition of the free-
dom. It may be satisfying to know that the qualifications protecting
government interests have made it plausible to expand the freedom at its pe-
riphery, but at the same time these qualifications have rendered the once ab-
solute freedom from licensing merely part of a broader freedom that is
conditional on the claims of government.
interest could justify "substantial infringement" of the right-thus rendering a previously unqualified
right dependent upon the needs of government. Hamburger, supra, at 859 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
Justice Kennedy vigorously protested against this sort of development in the freedom of speech and
the press. Id. at 888-89 (citing Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-28 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
26 Near, 283 U.S. at 716. The case could have avoided its conclusion about the conditional charac-
ter of the freedom by recognizing that the case really concerned licensing in the disguise of an injunc-
tion. Instead, however, the Court began to propose a freedom from prior restraints, including not only
licensing laws but also injunctions.
27 As the Court explained in R.A. V., "[e]ven the prohibition against content discrimination... is not
absolute." 505 U.S. at 387.
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Fortunately, the historical and conceptual core of the freedom of
speech or the press has not been entirely forgotten. Although the Supreme
Court discusses licensing in terms of prior restraint and thus does not ac-
knowledge the distinctive danger of licensing, it at least recognizes that
prior restraint is a peculiarly serious problem and that licensing is the para-
digmatic example of prior restraint.28 The Court draws upon the historic re-
jection of licensing to declare forcefully:
The presumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of protec-
tion broader-than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal pen-
alties. Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break
the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.29
With licensing as the central exemplar of what is most severely forbidden,
the Court concludes that "prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.""
A brief survey of licensing in the United States confirms that although
the federal and state governments can adopt a wide variety of licensing
laws, the Supreme Court has never heard and rejected the argument here
about the constitutional freedom from licensing laws that single out verbal
speech or the press. For example, it is true that the states license the prac-
tice of medicine, law, and accounting-professions that involve much talk-
ing and printing-but they do so because these professionals undertake to
act for their clients and thereby assume fiduciary duties. In fulfilling these
duties, the professionals act, speak, and exercise judgment on behalf of oth-
ers, but they are licensed on account of their fiduciary role, not their speech
or the press. Of course, a government can make a law that refers to verbal
speech and the press when licensing the use of its money or other property,
for the freedom of speech and the press was prototypically the sort of right
that could be enjoyed in the absence of government, and therefore, unless a
government uses its distribution of property to regulate, its failure to subsi-
dize cannot be an abridgment of the freedom of speech or the press. In con-
trast, the government cannot allude to verbal language when imposing
constraints through licensing. Thus, it is dubious whether a law can allude
to verbal language when licensing the use of common space or property
(such as the airwaves), when licensing the use of public property that has
been dedicated to common use (such as the sidewalks or a park), or when
distributing funds from a special assessment (such as student fees at a pub-
lic university). To be sure, a licensing law can specify decibel levels and
28 For example, in Near, the Supreme Court argued from the example of "[t]he struggle in England,
directed against the legislative power of the licenser," which "resulted in renunciation of the censorship
of the press." 283 U.S. at 713 (footnote omitted). See also the quotation in note 21.
29 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975).
30 Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
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limits on crowding-whether as to common or private property-but it
ought not specify verbal language. As it happens, the Supreme Court has
allowed licensing of radio broadcasts and demonstrations in ways that in-
clude the licensing of verbal language, but the point about verbal language
was never raised in such cases, and the Court thus has never directly ad-
dressed it.3 The Supreme Court, in fact, has only circled around the issue.3"
In Freedman v. Maryland, for example, the Supreme Court permitted lim-
ited licensing of movies, in which pictures and voices were conjoined on a
single tape, but this licensing was aimed primarily at the pictures, and it is
improbable that the Court would uphold a law requiring licensing of audio
tapes, as this would be a law that specified verbal speech as the basis for li-
censing.33 Admittedly, the Securities Act of 1933 could be understood as
authorizing licensing (for it uses its prohibition on the sale or transportation
of securities to obtain SEC licensing of registration statements), but the Su-
preme Court has not squarely evaluated this, and it seems doubtful that any
one such exception should be understood to vitiate the First Amendment's
core prohibition against licensing. 3
4
Thus, just below the surface of Supreme Court doctrine, one can dis-
cern the remnants of the traditional bar against licensing of speech or the
press. The expansion of the freedom of speech and the press has reduced
the unequivocal prohibition against licensing to a mere presumption against
prior restraints, but the absolute prohibition against licensing remains the
intellectual core of the freedom, and as now will be seen, this prohibition
against licensing remains of vital importance.
B. The Threat to the Authority of Individuals in Relation to Government
Scholars tend to consider licensing an obsolete danger-as if the bar
against licensing were an old fashioned restriction, which has become ir-
relevant in the modern world-and even when scholars try to understand
why there might be a particularly severe presumption against licensing, they
tend to focus on the dangers of "prior restraints" rather than the dangers of a
system requiring one to get permission.35 As a result, the perils of licensing
tend to get lost amid the broader but less clear-cut dangers of prior re-
31 Of course, the federal licensing of verbal language on the airwaves and the municipal licensing of
such language in demonstrations has come to seem constitutionally plausible in part because the Court's
doctrines have rendered any post-publication restraint implausible.
32 The federal government's licensing of classified information might be thought to conflict with
this conclusion. The licensing laws examined here, however, are regulations rather than conditions on
purchases. See infra Part II.C. 1; see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding agree-
ment of CIA employee with the agency to get permission before publishing about its activities).
33 380 U.S. 51 (1965). For more recent decisions that apply modified versions of Freedman's pro-
cedural requirements to the licensing of sexually oriented or adult businesses, see City of Littleton v.
Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); FW/PBS, INC. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
34 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (2000).
35 See infra notes 36-37.
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straints. Once licensing is understood, however, not merely as a sort of
prior restraint, but as a requirement that one must get permission to speak or
print, its dangers become more sharply defined, and the most obvious of
these is the political threat: Licensing of speech or the press, considered as
a requirement that one get permission, undermines the authority of indi-
viduals in relation to government.
At the outset it must be noted that the authority of individuals dis-
cussed here is not an authority independent of law or otherwise beyond the
duties owed to others. On the contrary, it is an authority ordinarily subject
to moral duty and legal regulation, but free from licensing. In the model of
society and government assumed by American constitutions, individuals
consent to join civil society and submit to civil government, and thus, at
least in theory, individual authority and legal obligation are entirely com-
patible. The consent that reconciles individual authority and legal obliga-
tion, however, occurs not once, but repeatedly, whether in elections or
continuing submission to government, and it thus depends upon the persis-
tence of individual authority under government and its regulations. Far
from a dangerous, extra-legal authority that might be claimed against an or-
dinary regulation of injury, this continuing authority is merely the basic, re-
sidual authority of individuals that can be assumed to remain in them even
after the formation of government and its imposition of laws prohibiting in-
jury. Such is the authority threatened by licensing-especially the licensing
of speech and the press.
If viewed merely as a type of prior restraint, licensing has obvious
dangers, but these have not seemed dramatically greater than the dangers
from post-publication restraints. Some scholars, such as Thomas Emerson,
emphasize the distinctive dangers of prior restraints, especially licensing:
A system of prior restraint is in many ways more inhibiting than a system of
punishment: It is likely to bring under government scrutiny a far wider range
of expression; it shuts off communication before it takes place; suppression by
a stroke of the pen is more likely to be applied than suppression through a
criminal process; the procedures do not require attention to the safeguards of
the criminal process; the system allows less opportunity for public appraisal
and criticism; the dynamics of the system drive toward excesses, as the history
of censorship shows.36
Notwithstanding these concerns, other scholars doubt whether prior re-
straints should be more strongly prohibited than post-publication restraints.
As put by Paul Freund, "it will hardly do to place 'prior restraint' in a spe-
cial category for condemnation," for even under prior restraints, "the judi-
cial sanction takes its bite" after the fact.37 Thus, when licensing is merely
36 THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 506 (1970).
37 Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAND. L. REV. 533, 537, 539 (1951).
Echoing this complaint about the doctrine of prior restraint, a leading First Amendment casebook ob-
serves: "Although the historical origins of the doctrine are clear, its analytical and functional underpin-
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considered another sort of prior restraint, its distinctive danger is not apt to
stand out, and although prior restraints still are more emphatically barred
than post-publication restraints, the difference has become one more of de-
gree than of kind.
Licensing, however, differs from the other sort of prior restraint, in-
junctions, because it requires individuals to get permission-because it
permits rather than prohibits. Most laws protect individuals from harm by
prohibiting the harm and allowing either public or private remedies after the
fact. Licensing, in contrast, prohibits generally, and then selectively per-
mits what otherwise is forbidden. Thus, prototypically, whereas law pro-
hibits injury, licensing permits what is not injurious, and, by treating
conduct as unlawful unless permitted, it reverses the ordinary presumption
of liberty-the presumption that, in the absence of a law prohibiting injuri-
ous conduct, individuals are free. 8
The legal realist will still protest that the penalty for failing to get per-
mission comes after the fact and that therefore a licensing law is really just
another post-publication restraint. This, however, ignores the obligation of
the law, which requires one to get permission. By focusing on remedies for
breach of law rather than the underlying obligation of law, the legal realist
gains some insight into judicial reasoning at the risk of entirely missing the
obligation of law felt by individuals who must live under it. They experi-
ence the law not merely as the physical force inflicted by the judiciary for a
breach, but more typically and immediately as the obligation of the rules
enacted by the legislature. In this sense, what are misleadingly called "post-
publication restraints" are laws that oblige individuals to avoid inflicting in-
jury, and licensing laws are the laws that oblige individuals to get prior
permission before doing what is not injurious. Hence, the worry about li-
censing laws. By imposing an obligation to get permission, such laws de-
prive individuals of the freedom they are presumed to have in the absence
of laws prohibiting injury.
Far from being merely an abstract ideal, this presumption of liberty
underlies the very spirit of independence and responsibility that typifies
nings are often puzzling, at best." GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 125 (2d ed.
2003); see also Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441-43 (1957). More generally, a simple
notion of prior restraint has come into disrepute. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJuNCTION 68-74
(1978); Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); Blasi, Toward
a Theory of Prior Restraint, supra note 10, at 14; John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint,
92 YALE L.J. 409 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
38 Of course, this presumption, like any model, is rather stylized-as is the associated notion of in-
jury. Nonetheless, the presumption remains a useful point of reference, which should not be a surprise,
for the history of the presumption is a large part of the history of modem law and political theory. Ac-
cording to the theory, individuals enjoy freedom already in the absence of civil government, and they
consensually form civil society and government for limited purposes. See, for example, JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690), not to men-
tion innumerable early American pamphlets, newspaper articles, and sermons.
Getting Permission
Americans, who enjoy a free society not only in governing themselves po-
litically but also in governing themselves under law-in judging for them-
selves the lawfulness of their actions and how to conduct themselves
morally within the bounds of law. This freedom under law, unburdened by
any need to get prior permission, is essential to the American experiment in
self-governance. In a free society, each individual ordinarily reaches his
own conclusions about his conformity to law and morals, and in this sense
each individual is, in the first instance, his own judge, having the freedom
and the responsibility to decide for himself and at his own risk how the law
applies to him and how he should enjoy his freedom within the law.
Licensing, in contrast, leaves individuals in need of permission and
thereby inculcates a sense of dependence on government in basic judgments
about what conduct is lawful and moral. The government, in effect, treats
individuals as too incompetent or corrupt to judge for themselves, and in the
course of relieving individuals of the responsibility to make their own deci-
sions about their conformity to law and morality, it divests them of their au-
thority to make such judgments.
By forcing these internal judgments into an external forum, all licens-
ing-not merely that of speech or the press-tends to undermine the capac-
ity of a people to govern themselves, whether personally or politically.
America itself is an experiment that relies far more upon the capacity of in-
dividual Americans to judge and obey than upon the power of government
and its judges to adjudicate and force them. This internal judgment of
Americans is part of the self-government by which Americans spare them-
selves the need for severity from their external judges and government. By
judging and restraining themselves, moreover, Americans can internally
conform to external demands, whether from government or a higher power,
with a sense of their own responsibility-with a sense of self-rule rather
than subservience. This internal adjudication and restraint is the most basic
self-government, and in the daily exercise of this internal governance, indi-
viduals qualify themselves for the responsible exercise of external self-
government.
Although the authority of individuals thus can be threatened by licens-
ing in general, it is more seriously threatened by the licensing of speech and
the press. Notwithstanding the general danger of licensing, it will be seen
that there are circumstances that justify this mode of regulation. By the
same token, there is at least one instance in which licensing is so dangerous
that it can never be justified: when the law licenses speech or the press. A
law imposing this sort of licensing combines a singularly dangerous method
with a peculiarly sensitive object, and it therefore was absolutely forbidden.
Such licensing deserves a constitutional barrier because, at the very
least, it undermines the relation of individuals to government in matters of
speech and the press and thus poses a political danger. In a republican sys-
tem of government, the authority for government comes from the people
and thus ultimately from individuals, but licensing of speech and the press
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reverses this relationship, for in requiring individuals to get permission, this
licensing suggests that individuals can use language to formulate their
knowledge and opinions, including those about government, only with the
authority of government. Ordinarily, individuals can judge for themselves
what they should say or print, and if they thereby unlawfully injure other
individuals or the government, they must pay a penalty afterward for their
misuse of their freedom. In contrast, under licensing laws, individuals first
must get permission, and in matters of speech and the press, this is apt to
impress the people with a sense that their knowledge, ideas, opinions, and
arguments depend for their authority upon government, rather than that
government depends for its authority upon the knowledge, ideas, opinions,
and arguments of the people.
Thus, by requiring individuals to get permission, the licensing of
speech or the press dispossesses an independent people of their individual
authority and renders them subservient in the very mechanism-language-
by which they establish and control their government. Language is the cen-
tral means by which individuals build up their understandings of themselves
and their society-of themselves as human beings and as a people, of their
capacity to govern themselves morally and politically, and of their govern-
ment and the limitations on it. With language, they thus construct their
identities, their social relations, their morals, their politics, and their consti-
tutions. Accordingly, for government to require them to get permission be-
fore they use language is to turn the entire edifice upside down. One of the
distinctive blessings of a society such as the United States is that the cen-
tralized authority of government rests on the deeper authority of the people
and ultimately the diffused authority of myriad individuals. Licensing of
speech or the press most clearly has to be forbidden because it inverts this
structure-because it makes individuals dependent on government for the
very instrument by which they form themselves as a people and establish
and restrain their government.
II. IRB LICENSING
The IRB laws unconstitutionally create a system of licensing speech
and the press. These laws purport to impose licensing on "research," but in
fact impose it directly on speech and the press. They do so, moreover, not
only through conditions on grants, but also directly by obligation of law. It
is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that the IRB laws run up
against the First Amendment.
This conclusion may initially seem improbable on account of a pair of
misunderstandings: that the IRB laws regulate "research" rather than
speech or the press, and that they impose IRBs through conditions on re-
search grants rather than the obligation of law.39 The IRB laws, however,
39 For such assumptions, see, for example, Protecting Human Beings: Institutional Review Boards
and Social Science Research, ACADEME, May-June 200 1, at 55, 58-59; John A. Robertson, The Law of
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candidly regulate research by imposing licensing on speech and the press,
and they do so both through conditions and by direct obligation of law.
Thus, the usual reassuring assumptions-that IRBs merely concern research
and that they only are imposed through conditions on grants-turn out to be
distractions from the underlying and utterly unconstitutional realities.
A. The Structure of the IRB Laws
Before reaching the constitutional issues, one must observe the struc-
ture of the IRB laws. Put simply, the federal government imposes a system
of licensing, and research institutions and their IRBs carry it out.
It cannot be overemphasized that the IRB laws under consideration
here are those that generally concern human subjects research. There are
other laws that rely on IRBs, but they do so for more specialized purposes
and therefore are not part of this inquiry. For example, FDA regulations re-
quire the use of IRBs, but not for the general regulation of human subjects
research.4" This distinction will eventually become important when it is ob-
served that the harms from FDA drug trials have nothing to do with the
constitutionality of the IRB laws. More immediately, the distinction means
that the licensing structure that needs to be understood here is that which
focuses on universities and other research institutions, not that which con-
centrates on the development of new drugs.
Institutional Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 507, 509 (1979); NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
78-80 (1978) [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N, REPORT]. The National Commission recognized that "the
requirement of prior review and approval by an IRB" might "violate[ ] constitutional rights of academic
freedom and free inquiry," but it then applied the Court's weakened doctrines on licensing to conclude
that the government may "regulate ... the methods used in ... research, in order to protect interests in
health, order and safety," and it observed that the Court's spending doctrine gave Congress even greater
freedom, for "[w]here the IRB system is imposed on researchers as a condition of ... receipt of research
funds, the same constitutional limitation will not apply." NAT'L COMM'N, REPORT, supra, at 78-79.
Even as to research the federal government did not fund, the Commission observed that the matter "has
not yet been definitively settled," and that the courts would probably "permit regulation of nonfunded
activities when reasonably related to the purpose of the federal spending." Id. at 77; see also Ham-
burger, supra note 6, at 351-52.
40 The FDA uses IRBs to license research on unlicensed drugs and devices, which otherwise are
generally barred from being introduced into interstate commerce. Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 355(a) & (f), 360(e) & (g). Although the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the associated
regulations raise constitutional questions similar to those discussed here, these problems could easily be
avoided with modest changes so that the exemptions would apply to any use of the drugs and devices,
not just in research.
Another specialized use of IRBs appears in the HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 6, which relies on
IRBs and "Privacy Boards" to license sharing or otherwise publishing specified health or scientific in-
formation. Although the Privacy Rule does not generally concern human subjects research and therefore
is not at issue here, it evidently is subject to the same constitutional objection as the IRB laws.
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Conditions on federal research grants are the most visible mechanism
by which the federal government imposes IRBs.4 The federal government
awards its grants for the human subjects research conducted by particular
scholars, but it channels its grants through universities and other institu-
tions. Before making even one grant for one professor, it requires an insti-
tution generally to provide an "assurance" about the conduct of human
subjects research at the institution, whether by faculty, students, or other
personnel.
An initial commitment required in the assurance concerns ethical prin-
ciples. Each institution receiving federal funds must first have assured the
government that all human subjects research at the institution, regardless of
its source of funding, will be conducted in accord with a statement of ethi-
cal principles. Although in theory an institution can propose its own state-
ment of ethical principles, the government asks institutions to adopt its
statement, the Belmont Report, which thus becomes the government's de-
fault standard for the licensing.42 The government, in fact, has hardly ever
accepted an alternative statement of ethical principles, and almost all insti-
tutions therefore take the hint and agree to the Belmont Report. The very
notion of a single, institutional statement of ethical principles is rather as-
tonishing, because individual researchers necessarily adopt different ethical
principles--depending on their different views and depending, for example,
on whether they are testing blood or questioning a Klansman. Nonetheless,
universities are required to commit that all research done by their personnel
on human subjects will comply with a uniform statement of ethical princi-
ples approved by the government.
A second commitment binds each institution to adhere to the Common
Rule, which sets the basic standard for licensing under the IRB laws.43 It
acquired its name because it was adopted by seventeen federal agencies and
departments, and it outlines how each institution must establish one or more
IRBs and how each IRB must license human subjects research. The federal
government initially asks each institution receiving grants for human sub-
41 For the conditions, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.101(a) (2005). The regulations refer to human subjects re-
search "supported" by the government so as to include even research that gets only the most minimal
support, such as the loan of a book. The current authorizing statute states, in part:
The Secretary shall by regulation require that each entity which applies for a grant,... for any
project or program which involves the conduct of biomedical or behavioral research involving
human subjects submit . . . assurances . . . that it has established (in accordance with regula-
tions... ) a board (to be known as an "Institutional Review Board") to review biomedical and be-
havioral research involving human subjects conducted at or supported by such entity in order to
protect the rights of the human subjects of such research.
42 U.S.C. § 289(a) (2000).
42 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(b)(1) (2005); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., FEDERALWIDE
ASSURANCE (FWA) FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS FOR INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES (2006) [hereinafter FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE], available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/
humansubjects/assurance/filasur.rtf.
43 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2005).
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jects research to commit that it will comply with the Common Rule for all
such federally funded research at the institution." In addition, however, the
government asks each such institution to commit to the Common Rule for
all other human subjects research, and although this further commitment is
said to be "[o]ptional," it has not always really been optional.45
Other commitments get made in other ways. Supplementing the assur-
ance are the "Terms of Assurance," which add conditions that are too de-
tailed for the assurance form. The Terms of Assurance are incorporated by
reference to the assurance form, and the government thereby can use the
Terms to clarify what it expects. 46 The government, moreover, can refuse to
accept an assurance, and it often has withheld its acceptance of an institu-
tion's assurance until the institution commits itself to additional require-
ments.47
Institutions meet their assurances primarily by establishing IRBs,
which then license human subjects research in accord with the Common
Rule. Although the IRBs conduct the licensing, the institutions must re-
main involved in at least two ways. First, the institutions must ensure that
their IRBs adhere to the Common Rule and other government expectations.
Second, the institutions must ensure that all of their students, faculty, and
other personnel submit to the IRBs.
The scope of the IRB licensing of human subjects research is apparent
from the Common Rule's definition of a "human subject." He or she is "a
living individual about whom an investigator (whether professional or stu-
dent) conducting research obtains (1) Data through intervention or interac-
tion with the individual, or (2) Identifiable private information."'48 This
definition covers at the very least (1) invasive procedures and (2) the read-
ing of medical records. In addition, however, it includes perfectly ordinary
inquiry-as when, for example, a law professor studies tax law (1) by talk-
ing with an IRS official or a tax practitioner or (2) by reading publicly
available court records. The former is an interaction that produces data, and
the latter reveals what IRBs consider "[i]dentifiable private information"-
on the ground that it is "information which has been provided for specific
purposes by an individual and which the individual can reasonably expect
will not be made public." '49 Thus, a human subject is not merely the object
44 FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE, supra note 42.
45 Id. For the pressures to make the optional commitment, see infra text accompanying note 95.
46 FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE, supra note 42; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., TERMS
OF THE FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE (FWA) FOR INSTITUTIONS WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (2006),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/assurance/filasurt.htm [hereinafter TERMS OF ASSURANCE].
47 See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 95.
48 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(f) (2005).
49 Id. This example is based on all too many instances in which professors, including law profes-
sors, are required to get prior permission, are reprimanded and asked to apologize for having failed to
get permission for earlier articles, or are told that they will be prevented from publishing already ac-
cepted articles unless they convince the IRB that the research would have received permission.
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of some ghastly invasion of his body, but also someone whose voluntary
conversation or public legal records are a matter of interest to the re-
searcher. This very Article, for example, is based on extensive consulta-
tions with all sorts of researchers who do not want to be identified (lest their
IRB or university learn of their complaints and penalize them). It is also
based on information that IRB members reveal about themselves in com-
munications with researchers (such as orders to researchers that they stop
inquiry or requests that they modify their research so as not to disclose or
publish, etc.). This Article thus relies both on data obtained through "inter-
action with the individual" and on "[i]dentifiable private information."
Any research on human subjects must ordinarily get prior permission
from an IRB. As summarized by the Terms of Assurance, "all human sub-
ject research" must "be reviewed, prospectively approved, and subject to
continuing oversight and review at least annually by the designated
IRB(s)," and the IRBs "have authority to approve, require modification in,
or disapprove the covered human subject research."5 IRBs rarely go so far
as to disapprove research, for they can fully control what is done through
modifications, and they require modification of approximately 80% of all
research that is submitted for approval.5'
Although the Common Rule exempts some research from the require-
ment that human subjects research get IRB "approval," even this exempt re-
search needs prior permission. The government uses its guidance to
supplement the requirements of the Common Rule, and OHRP-the Office
for Human Research Protections at HHS--"recommends" that institutions
prevent "the investigator" from "determin[ing]" for himself "whether pro-
Even the study of published data sets, such as census data, are human subjects research to the extent
that researchers can discern the identity of persons covered by the data. Thus, when the IRB Guidebook
suggests that work on census data need not be subject to IRBs, it carefully refers to "anonymous U.S.
Census data." OFFICE FOR PROTECTION FROM RESEARCH RISKS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: THE INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD GUIDEBOOK
ch. V, pt. A (1993) [hereinafter IRB GUIDEBOOK].
IRBs can publish general determinations that research on some types of information, such as census
data and other publicly available data sets, are exempt, but because OHRP "recommends that institu-
tions" prevent "the investigator" from "determin[ing]" for himself "whether proposed research is exempt
from the human subjects regulations," IRBs feel obliged at the very least to have researchers "register"
their research on such data sets with the IRB-so that the IRB can intervene if it wishes. OFFICE FOR
HUMAN RESOURCE PROTS., DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE ON WRITTEN IRB
PROCEDURES § D(l) (July 11, 2002), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/guidance/irbgd702.htm
[hereinafter GUIDANCE ON WRITTEN IRB PROCEDURES]; see also IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra, at ch. I, pt.
C. For the "registration," see, for example, the registration requirement of the University of Chicago,
Social & Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, Policy on Public Use Data Sets, http://
humansubjects.uchicago.edu/sbsirb/publicpolicy.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
50 TERMS OF ASSURANCE, supra note 46, at pt. 5.
51 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 345 & n. 172.
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posed research is exempt from the human subjects regulations."52 As a re-
sult, IRBs typically expect researchers to submit their proposals for exempt
research to the IRB. Exempt research thus gets reviewed more quickly than
other research, but it equally needs to get permission.53
The standards by which IRBs review research proposals are very open-
ended. The central standard is the Common Rule's requirement that the
"[r]isks to subjects" must be "minimized" and that the risks must be "rea-
sonable in relation to anticipated benefits, if any, to subjects, and the impor-
tance of the knowledge that may reasonably be expected to result."54 This
requirement that IRBs evaluate the importance of the knowledge-
meaning, the knowledge that will be published-is an early hint of the de-
gree which this review of research is really licensing of speech and the
press. More generally, it will be seen that this federal standard for permit-
ting or suppressing research leaves IRBs much discretion, including a free-
dom to consider the local standards of their institutions. As OHRP tells
IRBs, "[t]he risk/benefit assessment is not a technical one valid under all
circumstances; rather, it is a judgment that often depends upon prevailing
community standards and subjective determinations of risk and benefit."55
Finally, individual teachers and students must comply with the de-
mands of their IRB because of a range of pressures. Universities warn of
"serious consequences" for personnel who fail to conform to the demands
of the IRB, and administrators sometimes are helpful enough to clarify that
noncompliant researchers can be fired.56 IRBs, however, do most of their
52 GUIDANCE ON WRITrEN IRB PROCEDURES, supra note 49, at § D(I); see also IRB GUIDEBOOK,
supra note 49, ch. I, pt. C. For an illustration of how OHRP also uses assurances to impose this re-
quirement, see infra note 108.
53 IRBs can list some categories of research-for example, the study of publicly available data
sets-so that they will be considered exempt without specific review, but IRBs tend to require that re-
searchers "register" such research with the IRB-so that the IRB can intervene if it wishes and so that it
has a record of the research in case the government inspects the IRB. See, e.g., supra note 49. Although
federally organized registration of research is not quite as worrisome as federal licensing, it is not ex-
actly reassuring.
Some research is eligible for "expedited review," but this is simply the truncated review that does
not require a meeting of all of an IRB's members. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (2005).
54 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 (a)(l)-(2) (2005). The Common Rule adds:
In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider only those risks and benefits that may re-
sult from the research (as distinguished from risks and benefits of therapies subjects would receive
even if not participating in the research). The IRB should not consider possible long-range effects
of applying knowledge gained in the research (for example, the possible effects of the research on
public policy) as among those research risks that fall within the purview of its responsibility.
Id. at § 46.11 l(a)(2).
55 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. Ill, pt. A.
56 University of Chicago, Social and Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board, Frequently
Asked Questions 8, http://humansubjects.uchicago.edu/sbsirb/faq.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006). At a
meeting held by the Northwestern University IRB, when a representative of the IRB referred to such
consequences, a law professor asked what would happen if she went ahead without approval, and was
told that there would be disciplinary action at the highest levels and severe sanctions. The IRB represen-
tative also said that nonconforming students could have their diplomas withheld and that faculty might
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own enforcement. According to OHRP, "[w]hen unapproved research is
discovered, the IRB and the institution should" not only "act promptly to
halt the research" but should also "address the question of the investigator's
fitness to conduct human subject research."57 If it finds him unfit (even if
merely for failing to ask for prior permission), the IRB can prevent him
from doing other research on human subjects. 8 More typically, an IRB will
simply take into account a researcher's prior "'virtue"' or "track record" of
cooperation with the IRB when making decisions about his proposals. 9
The researcher, moreover, has no recourse against the IRB, because its pro-
ceedings are secret, and there is no appeal.60 In these circumstances, re-
even be dismissed. This account comes from a conversation I had with Professor Cynthia Bowman
from the Northwestern University School of Law on December 10, 2004.
57 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. I, pt. D. Strikingly, it adds: "Beyond the obvious need to
protect the rights and welfare of research subjects, the credibility of the IRB is clearly at stake." Id.
58 Almost no one consulted for this Article or my prior article on IRBs was willing to be cited by
name, lest their IRB consider them uncooperative. The repercussions feared by such persons include the
possibilities that their IRB will subject their future research to extra scrutiny, that it will deem them not
"fit" to do research, and that it will seek to have them fired-a threat that high level administrators
sometimes make explicit. The unwillingness of academics to provide information except anonymously
is also noted by at least one journalist who has written on the subject. Cary Nelson, Can E. T. Phone
Home, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 30, 35 (2003). Even anonymous stories (about ruined research or
about threats from IRBs) must be cited in publications such as this without the sort of detail that would
allow identification, and this is one of the reasons there are relatively few textured accounts of how the
licensing system actually works.
Indeed, the oldest independent IRB in the country declares: "IRBs have the authority to approve, re-
quire modifications to, or disapprove the proposed study protocols and consent forms for research,
which will involve human subjects. In addition, IRBs must review and approve or disapprove the inves-
tigator for the research." Press Release, Western Institutional Review Board, WIRB First Independent
to Achieve Accreditation for Work Safeguarding Rights of Human Research Subjects (May 1, 2003),
http://www.wirb.com/shell.php?content=content/foot-wirb news-archive.
59 As Robert Levine explains,
many IRBs take the investigator's "virtue" into account in making decisions about protocols. For
example, Shannon and Ockene report on their IRB's disapproval of a low risk protocol based, in
part, on the fact that the investigator had a poor relationship with the IRB .... In the same paper,
they report their IRB's approval of a high risk protocol; one important factor was that the investi-
gator had "an excellent track record in terms of trustworthiness, exemplified by his willingness to
report immediately any problem in research by notifying the appropriate people." Moreover,
"within the medical center... he was perceived to be skilled and trustworthy."
ROBERT J. LEvINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 27 (2d ed. 1986).
60 In many ways, the procedures of IRBs come very close to the old inquisitorial process. Like in-
quisitorial courts, an IRB can proceed on its own information or that submitted by an informer. For ex-
ample, in addition to reviewing submitted proposals, an IRB will sometimes collect information about
violations by surveying the publications of its institution's faculty to determine whether they have con-
formed to the licensing regulations. Supplementing their own efforts, IRBs also make clear that they are
open to receiving complaints from anonymous informants, who sometimes abuse the system to accuse
their academic or political enemies of violating IRB requirements. Whatever the source of its informa-
tion, the IRB then proceeds to act both as prosecutor and as judge. In its prosecution, moreover, the IRB
seeks the confession and reformation of the accused. It investigates by demanding information from the
accused researcher, who is often not told about the details or range of the accusations. Such requests for
information are part of a broader pattern in which researchers must report their own failures to comply
with IRB requirements, and a failure to report oneself is in itself a violation. When the accused re-
Getting Permission
searchers hesitate to defy their IRB, lest they risk their future research and
their careers. Most fundamentally, researchers recognize that IRB licensing
is authorized by law, and although it may be doubted whether the govern-
ment in imposing the IRB system is really acting in accord with law, re-
searchers tend to submit to the licensing because the law apparently
requires them to do so.
B. The Licensing of Speech and the Press
The primary constitutional problem with this system is that the IRB
laws expressly impose licensing on speech and the press. The laws are said
to concern research rather than speech or the press, and on this assumption
it is often casually taken for granted that the IRB laws are merely regula-
tions of conduct. The IRB laws, however, regulate research by expressly
imposing licensing on speech and the press-indeed, on verbal language-
and these laws therefore are of the sort most centrally and severely forbid-
den by the First Amendment's guarantee of speech and the press.
1. The Irrelevancy of Doctrines from the Periphery.-In examining
how the IRB laws license speech and the press, one must keep in mind that
the Supreme Court's doctrines from the periphery of the freedom of speech
and the press are not necessarily applicable to the core freedom from licens-
ing. In particular, the Court's doctrines on the speech-conduct distinction,
content neutrality, and different subjects of expression (which were devel-
oped to manage questions about injunctions, post-publication restraints, and
a broadly defined expression) are not necessarily useful guides as to what
laws license speech or the press. One could attempt to use the judicial doc-
trines from the periphery to show that the IRB laws license speech and the
press, but on the whole the application of these doctrines to the central
question of licensing introduces more confusion than clarity. They were
formulated to define and thus delimit an otherwise expansive freedom of
speech and the press, and they therefore must be viewed with caution when
applied to the previously unqualified core freedom from licensing.
The Supreme Court's doctrines on speech and conduct are not really
designed to sort out laws on speech from those on conduct. The Supreme
Court sometimes understands the First Amendment to forbid laws restrain-
ing conduct (such as flag-burning) and sometimes understands the Amend-
ment to allow laws restraining speech and the press (such as defamation and
fraud), and the Court therefore cannot simply distinguish laws on speech
from those on conduct. Instead, it must distinguish between speech and
conduct within a broader analysis that cuts across any speech-conduct dis-
searcher is responding to the IRB's investigation, he is usually advised that he can minimize the damage
to his research and his career by showing remorse and being submissive. In contrast, he risks harsher
treatment if he denies the accusation, hires a lawyer, or otherwise seems defensive, for this is taken as a
lack of cooperation and respect for the IRB. In these circumstances, the safest course of action is usu-
ally confession, for this is apt to be considered a sign that one will be compliant in the future.
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tinction. Thus, its doctrine distinguishing speech from conduct is designed
to feed into the more expansive analysis in which neither speech nor con-
duct has any ultimate significance-in which conduct sometimes is pro-
tected as speech, and speech sometimes is not protected. It therefore cannot
be assumed that the Court's doctrines on the speech-conduct distinction are
really designed to sort out which laws license speech or the press.
In fact, the Court developed its doctrines on conduct, content neutral-
ity, and different subjects of expression at the periphery of the freedom of
speech and the press, and thus far from being a measure of when a law li-
censes speech or the press, these doctrines endanger the core freedom from
licensing. When the Supreme Court extended the First Amendment to pro-
tect against injunctions and post-publication restraints, let alone when it ex-
panded speech to mean expression, the Court had to explain that some
injunctions and post-publication restraints that directly targeted speech and
the press (including the laws on defamation and fraud) were nonetheless
constitutional, and this made sense, for to the extent the Constitution no
longer strongly distinguished among different methods of regulation, the
Court had to distinguish among different types and uses of speech. Yet it is
one thing to make an expansive freedom plausible by devising doctrines
that cut back on it at the outer edges; it is quite another to apply such doc-
trines to an already limited core freedom. In this way, the Court's doc-
trines, which were necessary to prevent the expanded portion of the
freedom from obliterating familiar and valuable laws, have ended up weak-
ening the core freedom from licensing. In particular, the Court's doctrines
have come to suggest that laws licensing speech or the press can sometimes
be constitutional-especially if the laws mention conduct, are' content neu-
tral, or do not concern expression of political or other public significance.
These doctrines from the periphery, however, have no place in the core
freedom from licensing, and thus, for example, although conduct can some-
times mask the after-the-fact regulation of speech or the press, it cannot
mask the licensing of speech or the press. Talking creates noise, writing
uses pencils, and printing uses machinery, but although it generally is con-
stitutional under the First Amendment to make laws licensing noise, lead,
and machinery to prevent their harms, it is quite another matter to make
laws licensing the creation of noise while talking, the use of pencil leads for
writing, or the operation of machinery for printing.61 Perhaps some laws
penalizing such things could be constitutional, but not laws licensing them,
for such laws would require licensing of verbal language, and it is simply
not plausible that the government can escape the prohibition against licens-
ing speech and the press merely by adjusting the laws so that they also refer
to conduct. Thus, the government can make a law licensing driving; but it
cannot make a law generally licensing public speaking, oral interviews, or
61 The English licensing laws, for example, included provisions licensing printing presses. DECREE
OF STARRE-CHAMBER, supra note 16, at sig. C3[v], §VII (1637).
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written surveys; nor can it legitimize any such law by turning it into a law
that licenses driving in order to distribute surveys or in order to attend an
interview or speaking engagement. A licensing law's allusion to conduct
cannot cloak its allusion to verbal language.
Similarly, although content neutrality can sometimes protect a post-
publication restraint from constitutional challenge, it cannot preserve a law
licensing speech or the press. The English licensing laws of the seventeenth
century, whether those of the Star Chamber or of Parliament, centrally pro-
hibited any printing without a license, and although such provisions were
content neutral, they were the model of what the speech and press clause of
the First Amendment forbade.62 Thus, even if content neutrality is a useful
measure for post-publication restraints, it cannot justify a law that requires
licensing.
Nor can the non-political subject of expression give legitimacy to a law
licensing speech or the press. Today, in the expanded sphere of freedom of
speech and the press, it often seems necessary to distinguish among various
injunctions and post-publication restraints by examining the subject matter
of the expression at stake, it being commonly assumed, for example, that
political expression is more valuable than other expression. The seven-
teenth-century licensing laws, however, both in England and in Italy, re-
quired permission for all kinds of printing, whether poetic, academic,
scientific, or political, and far from being concerned primarily with political
expression, the pre-eminent critics of the licensing laws, Milton and Locke,
emphasized the danger to academic inquiry, including not only the licensing
of what scholars could print but also the implications for what they could
read.63 Against the background of these content-neutral licensing laws and
the not merely political protest against them, the First Amendment did not
distinguish among different subject matters or forms of speech or the press.
Thus, even if a licensing law focuses on poetic, social, academic, or scien-
tific words, it still violates the freedom of speech and the press. Perhaps
ideas about political expression are useful for sorting out which injunctions
and post-publication restraints are permissible, but they can only diminish
the freedom from licensing.
Of course, beyond the narrow sphere of licensing laws, a law can ex-
pressly regulate conduct, verbal language, or some combination thereof,
without necessarily being a law that abridges the freedom of speech or the
press. For example, as already noted, a law can expressly impose at least
some post-publication restraints on verbal fraud or defamation and not vio-
late the First Amendment. Yet this does not mean that a law can constitu-
tionally license speech or the press to prevent fraud or defamation, and this
62 Id. at sig. B2[r], §11.
63 For Milton, see, for example, quotations cited in infra note 195. For Locke, see John Locke,
Common's Resolutions on the Licensing Bill (1695), reprinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 619 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds., 1937).
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holds even if the law refers to conduct as well as verbal language, even if it
is content-neutral, and even if it refers to poetry rather than politics.
Thus, to preserve the core freedom from licensing speech or the press,
the doctrines that were developed to define the expanded periphery must be
kept away from the core. In particular, the Supreme Court doctrines on the
speech-conduct distinction, on content neutrality, and on different subjects
of expression have no place within the core and should not be allowed to
mask the violation that occurs when a licensing law specifies or otherwise
targets verbal language. The Court's doctrines are necessary to determine
the boundaries of the freedom that expands out to injunctions, post-
publication restraints, and non-verbal expression, but precisely because
these doctrines were designed to qualify protection at the periphery, they
are a threat to the freedom of speech and the press when applied to the un-
qualified, core freedom from licensing.
2. How the IRB Laws Target Speech and the Press.-How then do
the licensing provisions of the IRB laws target speech and the press? The
answer begins with "research" but quickly becomes more specific.
The Common Rule establishes licensing of "research," and perhaps
this alone would be unconstitutional-not necessarily because of some
newly-minted right of research, but more simply because the Common Rule
adopts the modem conception of scientific research. In the modem ideal of
research, individuals must seek hypotheses, theories, or other general
statements and then must publish these so they can be tested by other indi-
viduals. In the course of testing the prior statements and showing them to
be erroneous, these other individuals seek and disseminate their own theo-
ries, which refine or even reject those which came before, and scientific re-
search thus is a continuing process of proposing and publishing theories or
general statements. Accordingly, when the Common Rule establishes li-
censing of "research," it would seem to impose licensing on attempts to
formulate theories or general statements, whether spoken or printed, and it
would even seem to impose licensing on the publication of these state-
ments. In both ways, the Common Rule apparently requires licensing of
speech and the press.
Yet such analysis of the word "research" in the Common Rule need not
remain speculative, for the Common Rule defines "research" in terms of
verbal statements, and the Common Rule thus leaves no doubt that it di-
rectly establishes a system of licensing speech and the press. The Common
Rule adopts the modem, scientific conception of research and therefore re-
cites that "research" means "a systematic investigation ... designed to de-
velop or contribute to generalizable knowledge."' Already when focusing
on "research," the Common Rule imposes licensing on inquiry, and by
specifying that "research" is an "investigation" designed to produce "gener-
64 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2005).
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alizable knowledge," the Common Rule clarifies that it imposes licensing
on inquiry with intent to learn. Indeed, by using the phrase "generalizable
knowledge," the Common Rule imposes licensing on inquiry with intent to
learn such knowledge as can be reduced to hypotheses, theories, or general
statements. As already suggested, scientific knowledge ultimately consists
of such generalizations, and thus in singling out the pursuit of "generaliz-
able knowledge," the Common Rule directly imposes licensing on account
of attempts to produce the generalizations that constitute scientific knowl-
edge.
Not content with this candid reference to scientific generalizations or
theories, the government asks institutions to acknowledge that "generaliz-
able knowledge" means what is expressed. When universities and other in-
stitutions qualify for federal grants by assuring the federal government that
they will impose IRBs on their personnel, the government also asks the in-
stitutions to commit to "the ethical principles" stated in the Belmont Report,
which explains that "the term 'research' designates an activity designed to
test an hypothesis, permit conclusions to be drawn, and thereby to develop
or contribute to generalizable knowledge (expressed, for example, in theo-
ries, principles, and statements of relationships)."65 This echoes the words
of the regulation that would become the Common Rule, and rather than
merely give an unconstitutional interpretation to a constitutional law, it ex-
plains-what is clear enough from the words of the Common Rule-that
the Rule requires licensing of attempts to develop or contribute to knowl-
edge "expressed" in theories or statements.
As if this were not bad enough, in the scientific model adopted by the
Common Rule, "generalizable knowledge" is publishable knowledge. The
government is careful not to mention the word "publication" in its formal
definition of research, but both the government and IRBs recognize the
conventional understanding that scientific or generalizable knowledge is
that which can and should be published. A report of a committee of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health ("NIH") provides a convenient overview. Be-
cause the Common Rule defines "research" in terms of what is "designed"
to produce generalizable knowledge, the IRB representatives consulted by
the NIH committee "agreed that an activity would be considered research"
and thus would be subject to IRBs "if the investigator plans to publish the
findings."66 Beyond this basic situation, it appeared to the committee that
65 FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE, supra note 42; THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192, 23,193 (Apr. 18, 1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT]. As will be
seen later, an institution can attempt to get the government to accept another statement of ethical princi-
ples, but the Belmont Report clearly is the default standard. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
66 COMM. ON THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BDS. IN HEALTH SERVS. RESEARCH DATA
PRIVACY PROT., DIV. OF HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED., PROTECTING DATA PRIVACY IN HEALTH
SERVICES RESEARCH 53 (2000).
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IRBs adopt different understandings of the phrase "generalizable knowl-
edge"-some IRBs concentrating on intent to publish, and others looking
beyond intent toward actual dissemination:
Some IRBs interpret this phrase to cover only projects in which the investiga-
tor intends to publish the results, whereas others interpret the phrase as cover-
ing projects whose results are disseminated beyond the department or unit
conducting the study, for example, dissemination through oral presentations at
scientific or other professional meetings.67
A third, more typical, interpretation asks more generally whether the
knowledge will be publishable, and it is this approach that the committee
uses in its own analysis. This approach often gets discussed when IRBs de-
cide whether to claim jurisdiction over Quality Assurance and Quality Im-
provement studies on the ground that they are "research," for although these
studies are primarily designed to improve care for patients, they sometimes
come to have broader implications and thus give rise to publishable infor-
mation. In these circumstances, even if not designed to produce generaliz-
able knowledge, a study must get licensed. As the NIH committee
observes, "projects that start as QA or QI may turn out to be publishable
and then require IRB approval."68 Thus, not only does the Common Rule
impose licensing on the pursuit of "generalizable knowledge," but also this
knowledge is widely recognized to mean what is designed to be "pub-
lish[ed]" or is "publishable."69
In fact, under the Common Rule, IRBs enjoy authority to require re-
searchers to get prior permission for the full range of observing, reading,
talking, asking, writing, printing, and publishing involved in research. IRBs
typically force scholars either to avoid asking sensitive questions or to
avoid learning and publishing the identity of the persons about whom in-
formation is collected (including both the persons asked and those they talk
about). IRBs often impose this choice even when researchers only study
persons through published records, such as census data or court records.
Faced with a difficult choice between censorship as to one sort of informa-
tion or another, a biological or social sciences researcher will usually forgo
67 Id. at 43.
68 Id. at 43 n.3.
69 For another illustration that "generalizable knowledge" means what is designed to be published,
one need only consult the National Science Foundation, which poses the question: "Does research con-
ducted as a classroom exercise count as human subjects research?" It answers:
The Common Rule defines research as "a systematic investigation, including research develop-
ment, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizeable knowledge" (§
102.d)
This includes activities which are intended to lead to published results .... Classroom exercises,
involving interactions with human participants, which are part of an educational program, and are
not designed to advance generalizable knowledge, are not covered by this regulation.
National Science Foundation, Frequently Asked Questions and Vignettes, http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/
policy/hsfaqs.jsp (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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collecting or publishing the information about the identity of his subjects,
and a humanist writing a biography will usually give up learning or publish-
ing other information.0 IRBs frequently even require researchers to protect
the privacy of subjects by destroying their research notes and other data-
thus ensuring that the research cannot be replicated and that the underlying
information cannot be shared or reused for other projects. To make matters
worse, when an IRB learns that human subjects research has been accepted
for publication but has not yet been published, it sometimes will tell the au-
thor not to publish, unless he first persuades the IRB that the research
would have been given permission.7 ' All of this is direct suppression of
speech and the press under authority of federal law.
As it happens, IRBs often impose their limits through informed consent
forms. Informed consent will shortly be considered on its own terms, but
already here it must be noted that IRBs typically limit what a researcher can
ask, say, disclose, or otherwise publish by denying him permission until he
agrees to put these restraints in his informed consent form. IRBs therefore
claim that they usually only modify consent forms, not research or its publi-
cation. This, however, is little more than an attempt to fly under the radar,
and it cannot disguise the reality of the licensing. The use of consent forms
to specify licensing restrictions does not diminish the blatant interference
with speech and the press.
Incidentally, even if the IRB laws did not expressly refer to verbal lan-
guage, their "content discrimination" would reveal that in reality they re-
quire licensing of speech and the press. Although content discrimination is
a familiar element of First Amendment doctrine, it can also be understood
more simply as a reality check-as a means of looking beyond the formal
requirements of the law to discern whether in reality it requires licensing of
speech and the press-and thus even if the IRB laws were silent about
"generalizable knowledge," their discrimination would reveal that they ac-
tually required licensing of speech and the press. 72  Imagine that the IRB
70 In many social science surveys, the identities of the persons studied do not need to be published,
but the IRB will often go so far in protecting the subjects from any disclosure or publication that they
prevent the researchers from learning the identity of the persons surveyed, thus preventing follow up in-
quiries and reducing the efficacy of the study.
71 For example, the University of Illinois IRB took this approach to a professor of literature who had
an article accepted in the Kenyon Review. See infra note 116. An IRB at another major university re-
cently gave such a warning to a law professor. For other examples, at George Washington University
and the University of Pittsburgh, see Hamburger, supra note 6, at 303 n.86. Although such incidents
have occurred with some regularity, researchers are too afraid of the IRBs to complain, and others take
the censorship for granted. As Harold Edgar and David Rothman observe about the George Washington
incident, "a committee established pursuant to federal law directed academics not to publish their re-
search, and no widespread discussion of First Amendment implications has ensued." Harold Edgar &
David J. Rothman, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond: Future Challenges to the Ethics of
Human Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489, 499 (1995).
72 For the conventional use of the term "content discrimination," see Simon & Schuster v. Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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laws applied not to scientific "research" or "investigation" by institutional
researchers, but to journalistic investigation by newspaper reporters. Rather
than IRBs, the laws would require NRBs-Newspaper Review Boards-
and each newspaper reporter would have to get permission from his news-
paper's NRB before beginning any investigation. In imitation of an IRB,
the NRB would be composed of fellow journalists and at least one commu-
nity member, and it would require each journalist to submit a list of his
questions and other investigative plans. It could deny him permission to
ask about or publish matters it considered too "sensitive," that might put a
"human subject" at risk of undefined legal, economic, or psychological
harms, or that otherwise offended "prevailing community standards and
subjective determinations of risk and benefit."73 For example, it could deny
him permission to investigate and publish his results if there were "a risk
that the group to which the subject population belongs will be stigma-
tized."74 The NRB could also require the journalist not to inquire about or
publish the names of his "human subjects" or any other identifying informa-
tion; it could demand that he not share any information with fellow journal-
ists unless he got further permission from the NRB; it almost certainly
would insist that he destroy any identifiers in his notes and any audio re-
cordings of interviews after his initial use of these materials. In justifica-
tion, the government would. observe that "research is a privilege, not a
right" and that journalistic investigations carry the risk of legal, social, re-
putational, and emotional harms for their human subjects.75 This targeting
of journalistic investigation by journalists would probably be a form of un-
constitutional content discrimination even if it were only the basis for post-
publication restraints.76 Here, more seriously, where the content discrimina-
tion-the targeting of research by institutional researchers-is the basis for
licensing, the discrimination provides a further indication that in reality the
IRB laws impose licensing on speech and the press.
Similarly, if one were to continue to doubt whether the IRB laws im-
pose licensing on speech and the press formally, the overinclusiveness of
73 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. III, pt. A.
74 This language comes from my own conversations with IRB members.
75 For the astonishing government claim that "research is a privilege, not a right," see supra note
112, and Hamburger, supra note 6, at 353. For the variety of harms, see infra note 145 and accompany-
ing text.
76 Some advocates of IRBs aspire to extend the licensing to journalism, and already in the early
1980s, John Robertson-who had served as an advisor to the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research-concluded that
Social scientists thus are treated no differently from journalists. Both are subject to employer con-
straints .... [B]oth are subject to restrictions attached to grants of public funds. If the govern-
ment gave grants to newspapers to foster investigative reporting, it could, as it does with human
subject research funds, condition them on reporters having a publisher's ethics committee approve
their investigative techniques.
John A. Robertson, The Social Scientist's Right to Research and the 1RB System, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 356, 363 (Tom L. Beauchamp et al. eds., 1982).
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the IRB laws would reveal that they do so in reality." For example, by es-
tablishing the licensing of human subjects investigations designed to pro-
duce generalizable knowledge, the Common Rule includes a vast amount of
research in the social sciences and the humanities, including literary, reli-
gious, historical, and legal inquiry. Although IRBs once tended to shut
their eyes to much of this merely verbal research, they increasingly recog-
nize that it comes within the Common Rule and therefore must be licensed.
IRBs, for instance, now often tell law professors that they need permission
before they can proceed with their research--even if their research consists
solely of reading court records or talking to judges, lawyers, or business-
men.78 It might be thought that such instances merely illustrate what is
called "mission creep," and that if such excesses are not required by law,
they are not relevant. Yet as the federal government recently acknowl-
edged, the licensing of mere talk is required by the Common Rule. Histori-
ans in 2003 asked the federal government to exempt "oral history," which is
interviewing for historical purposes, but the federal government correctly
answered that oral history was necessarily covered if it was done systemati-
cally for generalizable knowledge.79 In this manner, the law inescapably
requires licensing of entire fields of inquiry that consist of mere speech and
the press.
Even in the biomedical sciences and the scientific side of the social
sciences, the IRB laws require licensing for research that consists of noth-
ing more than speaking and printing. For example, when an epidemiologist
or social scientist seeks to ask questions in a survey-whether he is putting
the questions to government officials or to the general public-he usually
must first submit his questions to the IRB for permission so that the IRB
can soften or remove "sensitive" questions, so that it can require that the re-
searcher not ask for or publish identifying information, and so that it can
77 Rather than a direct application of the Supreme Court's overbreadth test, this is simply an attempt
to discern whether a law that formally does not constrain speech or the press is, in reality, such a law.
The degree of overbreadth that matters in Supreme Court doctrine remains elusive precisely because
overbreadth often serves as a reality test rather than an independent limitation on the government. A
hint of this can be observed when the Court in Virgina v. Hicks explains that "[r]arely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or
to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or demonstrating)," 539 U.S. 113, 124
(2003)--to which one might add research.
78 For example, one such professor was told that he needs prior permission to analyze any court re-
cord when it contains identifying information, such as names. The name of the professor cannot be pub-
lished here, for like almost all persons who need IRB approval, he must worry that if the IRB thinks he
has been complaining, it will deem him uncooperative and will review his research more severely, thus
preventing him from doing his work. As it was, because he had already published some articles based
on court records, he was advised by the IRB administrator to apologize and show that he was contrite.
79 See Oral History Ass'n, Oral History Excluded from IRB Review, http://omega.dickinson.edu/
organizations/oha/orgirb.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2006); Linda Shopes & Donald Ritchie, Exclusion
of Oral History from IRB Reviews: An Update, http://www.historians.org/PersPerspectives/lssues/
2004/0403/0403newl .cfm (last visited Nov. 9, 2006).
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place restrictions on any transfer and use of the responses, such as by de-
manding that they be destroyed after several years.8" Epidemiologists and
social scientists have long been careful with the information they collect,
but they now must get permission for merely verbal inquiry, and they often
do not get it. Thus, when some scholars recently sought to survey federal
officials about other federal officials, the scholars first had to get permis-
sion from the IRB, which barred them from asking about or publishing the
identify of the officials who responded." Both in the humanities and in the
sciences, the Common Rule is so expansive that it inevitably requires li-
censing of entire fields of research that consist of nothing more than speak-
ing and printing; and this is the sort of overinclusiveness that should reveal
even a law ostensibly licensing conduct to be, in fact, a law licensing
speech and the press.
This sort of reality check, however, is unnecessary, because the IRB
laws expressly impose their licensing on verbal language. It has been seen
that these laws explicitly require licensing of attempts to produce "gener-
alizable knowledge," which is recognized to mean what can be "expressed"
in scientific theories or general "statements." In this way, as is widely ac-
knowledged, the laws even require licensing of what a person "plans to
publish."
One might still protest that much research, particularly medical re-
search, includes conduct as well as speech and that some of this conduct can
be dangerous. If one is worried about drug testing, however, one should
remember that the FDA regulations and their use of IRBs for drug testing
are not at stake here.82 If one is concerned about other intrusive medical
and biological research, one should keep in mind that this would remain
subject to other methods of regulation-ranging from negligence law to
penalties on particular types of procedures. Even licensing of particular
types of procedures would be possible, as long as it did not focus on re-
searchers or research. In short, the objection here is not against regulation,
but merely against a single unconstitutional method of regulation.
Some commentators concede the First Amendment problems with
IRBs in the humanities and social sciences but rely on doctrines about con-
duct, content neutrality, and political expression to insist that the IRB laws
remain constitutional for medical and biological research--or at least for
such research as requires physical intervention. From this perspective,
medical and biological research involves more conduct than humanities and
social sciences research, thus making it lawful if it is content neutral. This,
however, misses the constitutional point. Just as the First Amendment's re-
ligion guarantee focuses on a particular subject matter, so the Amendment's
80 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. II, pt. A.
81 As in most such cases, the identity of the researchers cannot be published, lest the IRB deem
them uncooperative and therefore subject their future research to more rigorous scrutiny.
82 See supra note 40.
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speech and press guarantee focuses on a particular method of regulation, li-
censing. For other methods of regulation, conduct, content neutrality, and
different subjects of expression offer useful distinctions that can perhaps
justify a law. Licensing, however, is another matter. Under the First
Amendment, a law that singles out speech or the press for licensing should
be considered unconstitutional even if it also mentions or concerns conduct,
even if it is content neutral, and even if it concerns an allegedly low value
subject.83
It is therefore irrelevant that much research involves conduct, for this
cannot avoid the constitutional problem that arises when the law singles out
verbal language for licensing. The Supreme Court's doctrines from beyond
the core freedom from licensing often attempt to distinguish speech from
conduct by looking at the regulated behavior, but the First Amendment's
bar against licensing focuses on the law itself and whether it specifies or
otherwise targets speech or the press. A law can in some circumstances
specify speech or the press as the object of a penalty, but it cannot specify
speech or the press for licensing, and only the introduction of doctrines
from the periphery have led to doubts about this. Thus, the confusion as to
whether the Common Rule has the effect of regulating speech or conduct is
really a conceptual confusion-one that has arisen from the Supreme
Court's doctrines on the periphery and that now threatens to undermine the
core freedom from licensing.
To get some clarity about this, one need only consider, again, the no-
tion of a Newspaper Review Board. If the government imposed NRB li-
censing on investigative journalism, the law would be unconstitutional even
if much of the investigation involved conduct. For example, the NRB could
deny the journalist permission to make observations or take photographs in
places where people do not clearly expect to be studied (such as a restau-
rant); the NRB could bar him from becoming a Klansman as a means of
studying the Klan (which is not a fictional example of what journalists do);
it could prevent him from testing people for their racism; it could even pre-
vent him from asking members of the public to test and give their evalua-
tion of lawful consumer goods-particularly things that an NRB would be
apt to consider sensitive or risky, such as condoms, tampons, pregnancy
tests, hair dryers, or automobiles. Of course, all such conduct can be sub-
ject to some after-the-fact penalties, but the element of conduct obviously
would not lend constitutionality to a law that required journalists to get
prior permission from an NRB before doing an investigation designed to
generate generalizable or otherwise publishable knowledge. This would be
licensing of speech and the press.
83 As to how some laws licensing use of government property can be distinguished, see supra text
accompanying note 31.
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3. Infonned Consent.-Nested within the IRB system-not unlike a
little Russian doll-is yet another licensing system, with the benign name,
"informed consent." Although this Article concentrates on the licensing
conducted by IRBs, the informed consent requirement of the Common Rule
reveals yet further licensing of speech and the press-licensing done by in-
dividuals under the auspices of IRBs.
This informed consent under the Common Rule is very different from
the informed consent familiar from the practice of medicine. To avoid
committing a battery, doctors and others frequently have reason to seek
consent, and when doctors get this consent from their patients, they occa-
sionally have reason to provide their patients with some information. The
Common Rule, however, requires researchers to go through a much more
detailed and formal informed consent process with their human subjects,
and this creates a peculiarly democratized licensing, in which researchers
must get written permission from individuals even before reading about
them or asking them questions. Whereas a journalist or other individual can
put questions to a subject without first proffering a legal document for sig-
nature, a researcher must first supply a printed warning about the risks of
talking with the researcher and must get a signed consent form. Before-
hand, moreover, the researcher must submit the proposed warning and con-
sent form to the IRB for review, so that the IRB can make sure that the
human subject will be sufficiently admonished about the dangers of talking
with the researcher.
Of course, upon being asked to sign a highly detailed, printed legal
document, many persons simply refuse to talk to researchers. One need
only imagine how forthcoming a public official, corporate officer, or
Klansman is apt to be after he is warned in writing by a historian or political
scientist about the legal, economic, emotional, and reputational risks of par-
ticipating in an interview.84 Informed consent thus is as dangerous a mode
of licensing as IRBs. Although the consent ultimately comes from the indi-
viduals with whom the researcher hopes to communicate, it is another level
of licensing, in which the researcher is forced to get prior permission not
merely from the IRB but also from any member of society to whom he
wishes to speak or submit questions.
This democratized licensing may seem salutary. Certainly, as a means
of avoiding a battery, consent is an elegant method by which a doctor or a
researcher can avoid some types of liability and some ethical problems.
Where a doctor has a fiduciary duty to a patient, moreover, he has a duty to
supply the patient with enough information to make a decision in his best
interest. It is no coincidence, however, that doctors judge for themselves
84 These examples are hardly gratuitous-two of them being close to the author's own research.
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the amount and sort of information they should give their patients.85 Nor is
it an accident that doctors judge for themselves even whether to get in-
formed consent, for only they are in a position to weigh their desire to pro-
tect themselves against their judgment about the competence of their patient
and how much information he can handle. At least among doctors who are
not doing research, informed consent is not a system of licensing, and this is
a reminder that even for purposes of informed consent, the government
cannot constitutionally establish a system requiring individuals to get per-
mission before speaking or printing.
In fact, the democratized character of the licensing in the Common
Rule's informed consent requirement illustrates how completely IRBs con-
solidate centralized legal force and local social force. In a republic, where
government is responsive to the concerns of the people, the government's
imposition of licensing is likely to threaten individual authority with the
combined force of government and popular opinion; and certainly after
popular anxieties about research led to the adoption of the Common Rule,
the government not only required researchers who studied human subjects
to get permission from IRBs but also required them to get signed permis-
sion from those whom they studied-even if only to observe them in public
or to talk to them about politics.86 In this democratized manner, everyone
became a licenser with the power to stop an academic from asking trouble-
some questions, and the law thus requires researchers to get layers of fed-
eral and social permission-initially from the IRB, which is expected to
enforce both federal and "community" standards, and then from the human
subjects, who impose their own, individual versions of the communal stan-
dards.87 Informed consent thus completes the gauntlet of national, local,
and personal permission.
In sum, the IRB laws regulate research by imposing licensing on
speech and the press. The Common Rule directly imposes IRB licensing on
the pursuit of "generalizable knowledge"-knowledge that can be "ex-
pressed" in general theories or statements-and as if this were not enough,
it is widely recognized that this means licensing of what is designed to be
"publish[ed].""s Under the authority of the Common Rule, IRBs regularly
prevent individuals from asking or publishing about the identity of a human
subject or whatever else the IRBs consider "sensitive" or offensive to
"community standards." 9 Reinforcing these conclusions about the direct
imposition of licensing on speech and the press, the Common Rule singles
85 Indeed, doctors are not clearly obliged to get informed consent for psychotherapy and other pro-
cedures not requiring contact. For psychotherapy, see THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM,
CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 160 (2000).
86 Along the same lines, IRBs are required to include at least one community member selected for
his or her sensitivity to community sentiments.
87 See text accompanying supra note 55.
88 See supra notes 66-69.
89 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. Ill, pt. A.
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out for licensing the research conducted by institutional researchers, which
is like targeting the research done by investigative journalists. The Com-
mon Rule, moreover, is so overinclusive that it imposes licensing on entire
fields in which inquiry consists of little more than the use of verbal lan-
guage. Last but not least, the Common Rule requires informed consent of a
sort in which not only IRBs but also individuals act as licensers-even
merely as to conversation. The Common Rule thus clearly imposes licens-
ing on speech and the press, and this leads to the next question: whether the
government imposes this licensing with the obligation of law.
C. The Obligation of Law
Contrary to widespread assumptions, both the federal and state gov-
ernments impose the IRB licensing with the obligation of law, and by bring-
ing the force of their laws to bear on behalf of the licensing, they collide
with the federal and state guarantees of freedom of speech and the press.9"
Proponents of IRBs tend to assume that the IRB system is constitutional be-
cause it is merely a condition of federal research grants.9 This, however, is
another of the casual assumptions that has given legitimacy to the system of
licensing. In fact, both the federal government and the states have given the
licensing the obligation of law.
1. Conditions on Spending.-The surface mechanism with which the
federal government imposes the Common Rule on researchers is by making
the use of IRBs under the Common Rule a condition of federal research
grants. The federal government tends to emphasize this enforcement
mechanism, for this method has at least the potential to appear lawful. Yet
this use of conditional grants to establish IRBs goes far beyond ordinary
spending conditions, and it is therefore probably unconstitutional even un-
der the Supreme Court's rather amorphous doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. More to the point here, this use of conditions on spending illus-
trates how the Court's own doctrine on spending opened up an opportunity
for Congress to evade the First Amendment. The Court's spending doctrine
gave the IRB laws at least a superficial appearance of legitimacy, and al-
though, in fact, the IRB laws probably run afoul of the Court's doctrine on
spending and unconstitutional conditions, the role of the Court's spending
doctrine in creating an end run around the First Amendment suggests that it
is necessary to look beneath the Court's doctrines in search of such law as
still can be discerned below. It is an argument that appears in more detail
elsewhere, but even in summary form it should suffice to suggest why the
90 For the remarkably casual, even cursory, constitutional arguments of the proponents of IRBs, see
sources cited supra note 39.
91 See, e.g., supra note 39.
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government's use of conditions to impose the IRB laws must be considered
unconstitutional. 92
The mechanism by which IRBs become conditions on federal research
grants appears at first glance to be perfectly constitutional. The federal
government has no enumerated power over medicine, research, speech, or
the press, and the First Amendment prohibits the government from abridg-
ing the freedom of speech or of the press.93 The First Amendment's guaran-
tee of speech and the press, however, does not limit the federal
government's spending, including its granting of money or other privileges,
and it is therefore often taken for granted that the federal government can
require IRB licensing under the Common Rule as a condition of its grants
for human subjects research. On such assumptions, as has been seen, the
federal government channels its grants for such research through universi-
ties and other institutions, which are eligible for the grants only after giving
the government an assurance that they will adhere to the Common Rule and
thus will use IRBs for all federally supported human subjects research.94
The federal government, however, has used its conditions to do much
more than get assurances as to the research it funds. More ambitiously, it
has used its funding of some human subjects research as leverage to get as-
surances of IRB licensing for all such research. To this end, it pressured in-
stitutions in the late twentieth century to give assurances that they would
follow the Common Rule and thus use IRBs for all human subjects re-
search, regardless of its source of funding. The government pressured insti-
tutions into giving this additional assurance in various ways: by not giving
them any other option on the assurance form, by threatening institutions
that their grants would be at risk, and, most forcefully, by holding up accep-
tance of assurances that only extended to federally funded research.95 Not
surprisingly, these pressures led most research institutions to assure the fed-
eral government that they would impose the Common Rule's IRB licensing
on all human subjects research, including that which was without federal
funding.96
92 See Hamburger, supra note 6, at 314-27, 332-33.
93 U.S. CONST. art. 1; U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
94 42 U.S.C. § 289 (2000); see also Hamburger, supra note 6, at 324.
95 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 328-29. The AAUP has stated: "While the rule does not prescribe
the content of a statement of principles, a university is plainly under considerable pressure from the gov-
emnment to apply its procedures to all human-subject research." Protecting Human Beings, supra note
39, at 60.
96 At one point, according to persons who were in a position to know, all but about five of the insti-
tutions that needed Multiple Project Assurances-the general, ongoing type of assurance necessary for
any major research institution-assured OHRP that they would comply with the Common Rule in li-
censing of all human subjects research, not merely that which was funded by the government. Ham-
burger, supra note 6, at 329 n. 137. As of the end of 2005, however, 164 institutions that have given an
assurance about complying with the Common Rule have opted to provide this assurance only as to fed-
erally funded research. Research on Human Subjects: Academic Freedom and the Institutional Review
Board, ACADEME, Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 95, 99. [hereinafter AA UP Report II]. The former number may
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The federal government ordinarily need not worry about the speech
and press guarantee of the First Amendment when it places limitations on
its purchases, but it cannot so clearly escape the First Amendment when it
uses conditions on its spending as a means of regulation. Under traditional
understandings of the First Amendment speech and press guarantee, condi-
tional spending is not unconstitutional, because it is not an abridgment of
freedom. Yet when the spending becomes, in reality, an instrument of regu-
lation or constraint, then the courts should recognize the reality that Con-
gress may be using its power to spend to get around the constitutional limits
on its power to regulate.97
The Supreme Court has not elaborated its doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions with any clarity, but the Court's expansion of federal power-
especially its acknowledgment of a federal spending power-gives the task
particular urgency. The First Amendment bars laws abridging or constrain-
ing the freedom of speech or the press, and Congress therefore long used its
traditional enumerated powers, such as its power "[t]o raise and support
armies," to purchase what it needed without fear of running afoul of the
First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and the press.98 Increas-
ingly, however, Congress spends with few limitations, for the Supreme
Court has legitimized a general Congressional spending power. In the
1780s, Gouveneur Morris and some others hoped that the Constitution
would give the federal government a general spending power, but the Con-
stitutional Convention emphatically rejected this position and drafted the
Constitution to make clear that Congress could only spend through its enu-
merated powers and that these did not include a general power to spend.99
have been disseminated by the government to discourage institutions from opting out. More certainly,
the government since December 2000 has made clear to institutions that they can opt out. See infra note
108 and accompanying text. Of course, none of this means that the institutions can escape the ethical
principles condition. Nor, as will become apparent, does it mean that they can avoid using IRBs for
human subjects research not funded by the government. It does not even mean that they ordinarily can
avoid using IRBs that meet the standards of the Common Rule for such research. Instead, it only means
that they have not assured the government they will comply with the Common Rule for the research not
funded by the government, and this spares them the duty to report violations in such research. See infra
note 108 and accompanying text.
97 This theory as to how the doctrine ideally should be understood is laid out in Hamburger, supra
note 6, at 314-21, which draws the distinction between purchase and regulation from Lynn Baker, Con-
ditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1962-78 (1995). This sort of uncon-
stitutional conditions issue obviously can be distinguished from the equal protection style equality or
public forum questions, which arise when government allocates access to public property or common
space.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
99 The first paragraph of Section 8 of Article I grants a single power, in which the allusion to spend-
ing is only a limitation on the power to tax. This conclusion, although no longer widely recognized, is
evident from the text: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ..... Id. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 1. There might have been a spending power here if there had been a semi-colon or the word
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Nonetheless, in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court acknowledged a
general spending power, and Congress uses this power not merely to pur-
chase goods and services but also to impose regulation."'
This matters for IRBs because when the spending is really a means of
imposing regulation, and when this regulation violates the First Amend-
ment, the courts should recognize the Congressional overreaching, and
should hold it unconstitutional. It once might have been plausible for the
Supreme Court to assume that it should not delve into questions about what
purchases really are regulations, for when the Bill of Rights was adopted, it
was clear that the Congress could spend through its enumerated powers,
and yet the Bill of Rights did not in most clauses bother to limit more than
legal constraints-what the First Amendment, for example, calls laws
"abridging" the freedom of speech or the press. Now, however, the Su-
preme Court has given Congress a general spending power-not to mention
other expanded powers-and if the Supreme Court thus can expand Con-
gressional power in a way that allows Congress to make an end run around
much of the Bill of Rights, then the Court also has the power and the duty
"and" after the word "Excises," and therefore to find a general spending power here is to assume that the
Constitution inadvertently has a comma where it was meant to have a semi-colon or conjunction.
As it happens, it is unusually clear that this comma was not intended to be anything else. The his-
tory of the spending power is recounted in Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (Or the President's
Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article , Section 8,
Clause I of the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81 (1999). Although he notes it
only in passing, there was a surreptitious attempt to create a separate spending power by adding a semi-
colon after the word "Excise." Id. at 105. On September 4, 1787, the Committee of Eleven reported to
the Convention a draft of what became Section 8, which read: "The Legislature shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare of the United States." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 493 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911) [hereinafter 2 RECORDS] (Journal, Sept. 4, 1787). On September 12, the Committee on Style
reported a version of this paragraph, and the next day it distributed a printed version of its report. 3
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION app. a, cccxliv at 457 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (memoirs of
John Quincy Adams). In this printed report, however, there was not a comma, but a semi-colon after the
word "excises"--so that "to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of
the United States" became an additional power, conjoined to the power to tax, rather than merely a limi-
tation on it. 2 RECORDS, supra, at 594 (Report, Sept. 12, 1787). The Convention, however, recognized
this alteration and rejected it. At stake was simply the addition and removal of a single dot above a
comma. Rarely has so much rested on so small a point.
Its importance was recognized in early debates about the Constitution. For example, in 1798, Albert
Gallitin told the House of Representatives
he was well informed that those words had originally been inserted in the Constitution as a limita-
tion to the power of laying taxes. After the limitation had been agreed to, and the Constitution was
completed, a member of the Convention, (he was one of the members who represented the State of
Pennsylvania [i.e., Gouverneur Morris]) being one of a committee of revisal and arrangement, at-
tempted to throw these words into a distinct paragraph, so as to create not a limitation, but a dis-
tinct power. The trick, however, was discovered by a member from Connecticut, now deceased,
and the words restored as they now stand.
3 RECORDS, supra, at app. a, cclxxxi at 379 (Albert Gallatin in the House of Representatives, June 19,
1798).
100 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
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to elaborate the limits of its expanded vision of Congressional power in a
way that protects the Bill of Rights. In short, whatever one thinks in the ab-
stract about a doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the Court has ex-
panded federal spending power in a way that facilitates evasion of the
enumerated rights, and the Court therefore has a duty to confine this power
to the extent necessary to protect these rights.10
The government's imposition of the IRB licensing system through
conditions on government grants therefore does not clearly escape the First
Amendment's guarantee of speech and the press. To be precise, although
the federal government can place conditions on its purchases, it should not
be able to use its grants to impose a system of regulation that abridges the
freedom of speech and the press. It would be bad enough if the government
merely took advantage of the large number of its grants to impose licensing
of speech and the press on the research it supports, for even this would foist
an unconstitutional form of regulation on a wide swath of academics. As it
happens, however, the government has leveraged its grants to impose IRB
licensing even on the research it does not support, and it thus all the more
clearly is not merely limiting its purchases, but imposing regulation-in this
instance, a regulation that unconstitutionally controls research by licensing
speech and the press.
Lest the unconstitutionality be unclear, consider once again the exam-
ple of Newspaper Review Boards; but this time imagine that the govern-
ment systematically funded newspapers on the condition that journalists get
permission from NRBs before beginning their investigations. The govern-
ment would argue that it sought the NRB licensing simply as a condition of
its grants. Yet even if the government sought NRB licensing only for the
journalistic investigations it funded, its conditions would justifiably be con-
sidered unconstitutional if it used the sheer number of its grants to trans-
form its spending into a means of regulation-if it spread its funding
around in a way that gave its purchases a regulatory effect. If, moreover,
the government leveraged its funding of some investigative journalism to
impose NRB licensing on all investigative journalism, it would all the more
clearly be using its spending, in reality, as a mode of regulation-a regula-
tion that would violate the First Amendment. 2 Thus, as illustrated by
101 The emphasis here is on the spending power, as this is the power that advocates of IRBs tend to
rely upon. Obviously, however, the argument here applies to any expanded Congressional power to
spend-for example, under an expanded commerce clause power.
For purposes of discerning when mere spending amounts, in reality, to the obligation of law, it is
important to remember that what matters is not any punishment or coercion, but merely the obligation of
law. For example, even if a statute imposed no fine, imprisonment, or other penalty, it would be uncon-
stitutional if it required licensing of newspaper articles.
102 In Stanford v. Sullivan, a U.S. district court even held a single condition in a single research
grant unconstitutional because it required the researchers to get permission before publicly discussing
their results; otherwise, "the result would be an invitation to government censorship wherever public
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NRBs, it is necessary to examine the government's spending on research-
spending that is tied to the use of IRBs-to determine whether, in reality, it
is regulatory. Otherwise, the federal government would be able to use its
Court-created spending power to purchase its way around most of the Bill
of Rights.
The Supreme Court has yet to clarify the constitutional limitations on
spending, but it has noted that although Congress has a spending power,
"other constitutional provisions may provide an independent bar to the con-
ditional grant of federal funds." In South Dakota v. Dole, the Court denied
that this "'independent bar limitation' is "a prohibition on the indirect
achievement of objectives which Congress is not empowered to achieve di-
rectly."1"3 More recently, however, in United States v. American Library
Association, Inc. and Rumsfeld v. F.A.I.R., the Court has said that "the gov-
ernment may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his
constitutionally protected ... freedom of speech even if he has no entitle-
ment to that benefit"-a point that the Court in Rumsfeld expounds as to
universities."0 The Court thus occasionally reveals at least a vague under-
standing of the underlying problem.
The Supreme Court's doctrines gave legitimacy to the government's
use of spending as a means of regulation, and the Court therefore is largely
responsible for the peril that the government can use such spending to
evade almost all constitutional limits, including the Bill of Rights. The
Court thereby has left academics to suffer for three decades under a mas-
sive, seventeenth-century style system of licensing. Accordingly, even if
the government's use of spending to impose regulation were not ordinarily
subject to the freedom of speech and the press, the Court that created a fed-
eral spending power has an obligation to prevent this power from being
used to sidestep the First Amendment.
2. Negligence Law.-The obligation of law behind IRBs is not lim-
ited to conditions on government grants, for the federal government also co-
opts state negligence law. The federal government has carefully inculcated
the impression that IRB licensing is the professional standard for research,
funds flow, and.., thus.., an enormous threat to the First Amendment rights of American citizens and
to a free society." 773 F. Supp. 472, 478 (D.D.C. 1991).
103 483 U.S. at 210. At the same time, the Court said that:
[W]e think that the language in our earlier opinions stands for the unexceptionable proposition that
the power may not be used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds conditioned on invidiously discrimi-
natory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exer-
cise of the Congress' broad spending power.
Id. at 210. To this, one might add that a grant of federal funds conditioned on the licensing of speech or
the press by a state university also would be unconstitutional.
104 Rumsfeld v. F.A.I.R., 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1307 (2006); United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539
U.S. 194, 210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of Cmm'rs, Wabaunsee Cry. v. Umbehr, 513 U.S. 668, 674 (1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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and it has thereby brought the obligation of state tort law to bear on institu-
tions that fail to adopt IRB licensing. Thus, even if an institution only gives
an assurance that it will use IRB licensing for federally funded research, the
institution still must worry about civil judgments under state negligence law
if it fails to apply the licensing to all human subjects research."0 5
An early hint of the potential for relying on the force of negligence law
came in 1978 from the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects. According to the Commission's Report and Recommendations,
"[i]n negligence per se jurisdictions, violation of IRB rules could be taken
as evidence of negligence," and "[i]n other jurisdictions, the widespread use
of IRBs in the research community may create a standard of care for the
conduct of all research."'0 6 In other words, if the federal government could
use its funding to make the use of IRBs widespread, it gradually could es-
tablish the use of IRBs as the standard of care for all research, even if not
funded by the federal government. Although the Commission's immediate
focus was the liability of researchers who fail to get permission from an
IRB, the risk of liability obviously would also fall on any institution that
failed to impose IRBs on human subjects research, regardless of the source
of funding, and this was the implication that would become particularly
significant." 7
So successful was the federal government in elevating IRB licensing as
the standard of care that it eventually was able to switch from relying on
conditions on grants to relying on state negligence law. The federal gov-
ernment in the late twentieth century pressured institutions to assure the
government that they would apply the Common Rule to all human subjects
research, even if not federally funded, but by 2000, the government's condi-
tions on its grants had made IRB licensing the accepted standard of care for
purposes of negligence. Negligence law even seemed to require IRB licens-
ing in conformity with the Common Rule. The government could therefore
afford to relax its efforts. Accordingly, it altered its assurance form to make
clear that for research without federal funding, the assurance about comply-
ing with the Common Rule was merely "[o]ptional." 1° Some institutions
105 Some states also use statutes to give legal obligation to the IRB laws. These statutes deserve
careful study, for they directly require researchers to get permission from IRBs, and their requirements
will probably be of growing significance. They are not a focus of this inquiry, however, because they
are not uniform and have not been adopted in many states, and thus, unlike state negligence law, they
are not currently central to the overall structure of the IRB laws.
106 See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH, DHEW PUBLICATION NO. (OS) 78-0008, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 86 (1978).
107 See id.
108 Office of Human Research Prots., U.S. Dep't of Health Human Servs., Step-by-Step Instructions
for Filing a Federalwide Assurance for Institutions Within the United States, Item 4(b) (June 6, 2005),
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubjects/assurance/filasuri.htm; see also Hamburger, supra note 6, at
329. The government, however, still exerts its power, and when institutions seek to avoid giving assur-
ances as to non-federally funded research, they can be required to beef up their assurances with licensing
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responded by dropping their assurances as to such research, but they of
course continued to require IRBs for all human subjects research, regardless
of its funding, lest they run afoul of what by now had become the standard
of care." In other words, the federal government only conceded that assur-
ances as to non-federally funded research were "[o]ptional" when the use of
IRBs no longer seemed optional under state tort law." Although the fed-
rules not required by the federal regulations-as when the government required the University of Chi-
cago under its old assurance to provide an assurance that their researchers will not simply treat exempt
research as exempt but will first ask their IRBs whether it really qualifies as exempt: "All human sub-
ject research which is exempt under Section 101(b)(l-6) or 101(i) will be conducted in accord with ...
this Institution's administrative procedures to ensure valid claims of exemption." Univ. of Chi., Multi-
ple Project Assurance of Compliance with DHHS Regulations for Protection of Human Research Sub-
jects, at pt. 1II.B (on file with author). For the significance of this, see infra text accompanying note
180.
19 Apparently as of late 2005, there were 164 institutions that assured the HHS of their compliance
with the Common Rule only for federally funded research. See supra note 96.
A 2001 AAUP report explains the difficult of applying a lower standard of licensing for research that
is not federally funded:
Consider the following: a privately funded research project is carried out at a university, one of
the human subjects claims to have been harmed by the research, and the subject sues the univer-
sity. Consider further that the university's IRB does not review research that is not funded by the
government. The litigant will almost certainly argue that the university's failure to review pri-
vately funded research while it reviews government-funded research is proof that it acted unrea-
sonably. Conversely, if the university's IRB has approved the research, the university will cite
that fact as evidence of its reasonableness in permitting the research to go forward. Whatever the
merits of these arguments, the university's legally prudent course of action, so the lawyers will ad-
vise, is for its policy to apply to all research on human subjects, irrespective of the source of fund-
ing. An aversion to legal risks may also help explain the actual decision of IRBs, to the extent that
they seek to protect the institution (and perhaps themselves as well) from lawsuits that allege mis-
treatment of human research subjects.
The Report adds that "no university is likely to want to explain to either the government or the public
why its commitment to avoid harming the human subjects of research is limited by the source of funding
for the research. This prospect is even less attractive as IRBs expand their authority in response to con-
cems that the government must do more to protect human research subjects." Research on Human Sub-
jects, supra note 96, at 55, 60. On a related question, see Roger L. Jansson, Researcher Liability for
Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78
WASH. L. REV. 229 (2003).
110 The courts have not had opportunities to make broad statements about IRBs and their licensing
as the standard of care, because all universities now have IRBs, and universities appear to settle the suits
brought against them for research that did not get IRB permission. Nonetheless, the role of the Common
Rule as the standard of care is clear enough from the cases on informed consent. A presidential council
reports:
Most courts addressing the question have held that the standards for informed consent set forth by
the Common Rule and FDA's human-subject protections constitute the relevant standard of care,
the breach of which may be considered actionable. Two courts have gone farther: one holding
that the researcher must disclose any conflicts of interest, and another holding that parents are le-
gally incapable of subjecting their children to any risks in nontherapeutic research.
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, REPRODUCTION AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE REGULATION OF
NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 116-17 (2004) (citing Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793
P.2d 479, 486 (Cal. 1990); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 846 (Md. 2001)).
One result is that "research institutions must increasingly take a conservative approach to granting
licenses for social research because IRB approval is one criterion for determining whether the university
is culpable, with the researcher for harm to subjects." Lauren H. Seiler & James M. Murtha, Federal
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eral government continues to require IRB licensing for federally funded re-
search as a condition of its grants, it can now rely more substantially on
state negligence law to get universities to license speech and the press as to
all human subjects research, regardless of the source of its funding.
The federal government thus has co-opted the obligation of state negli-
gence law to impose licensing, and the result is as unconstitutional as if the
federal government had acted under federal law. Whether under state con-
stitutions or under the First Amendment (as applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment), a state law inflicting civil penalties for not impos-
ing a licensing system is subject, at the very least, to an emphatic presump-
tion of unconstitutionality. Indeed, it should be considered utterly
unconstitutional.
3. Delegation.-More, however, needs to be said, for might not the
delegation of the licensing to universities and other institutions somehow
insulate the licensing from constitutional critique? Put another way, is there
not a distinction between a law requiring individuals to get licenses from
the government and a law penalizing institutions that fail to impose the li-
censing on their personnel? The distinction matters, but in ways that may
be unexpected.
Sociologically, the delegation allows the government to establish li-
censing of a sort that otherwise might not be possible in a free society. In
such a society, government cannot easily license most speech or the press
directly, for it is apt to have difficulty exerting enough control over the
populace, and in particular it is vulnerable to resistance from independent
institutions, such as universities. The government, however, can largely
avoid this problem by delegating the licensing to the very institutions that
might otherwise resist. This was the solution the English government
adopted in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, in a Star
Chamber decree of 1637, the English government required officials of the
church, the stationers company, and the universities to license books-the
university and church officials having special jurisdiction over books "of
Divinity, Phisicke, Philosophie, [and] Poetry. ''". Similarly, in twentieth-
Regulation of Social Research: Is "Prior Review" Posing a Threat to Academic Freedom?, 53
FREEDOM AT ISSUE 26, 29 (1979). For example, when Columbia University was sued for the deceptive
research conducted by a business school professor who never bothered to consult an IRB, the University
dramatically increased the reach and severity of its IRB licensing so as to eliminate any laxity, even in
fields such as law, which only engage in verbal research. The University warned: "Conducting human
subjects research without appropriate training and review could have serious consequences." E-mail
from Alan Brinkley, Provost, & Executive Vice President for Research to Faculty, Administrators, and
Students at Columbia University's Momingside Campus (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with author). OHRP
itself uses the threat of liability to pressure IRBs to evaluate research methodologies: "Research that is
conducted so poorly as to be invalid exposes subjects and the institution to unnecessary risk." IRB
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. I.B.
III A DECREE OF STARRE-CHAMBER, CONCERNING PRINTING § III, at B3 (July 11, 1637). For a
similar provision later in the century, see An Act for Preventing the Frequent Abuses in Printing Sedi-
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century America, the federal government could not simply require all indi-
viduals studying human subjects to submit to federal licensers. It could,
however, force the universities to license their own personnel."
2
Rather than escape constitutional scrutiny, this delegated licensing is
squarely within the range of what the First Amendment forbade. Delega-
tion, not least to the universities, was a prominent element of seventeenth-
century English licensing, and because this English licensing was the pri-
mary model of what the First Amendment most clearly prohibited, the dele-
gation of licensing to IRBs actually confirms the unconstitutionality of the
present day licensing laws. Of course, government mechanisms for getting
cooperation have changed, and whereas government in the seventeenth cen-
tury relied on Star Chamber decrees and acts of Parliament to get the uni-
versities and other institutions to participate, it must now evade the First
Amendment and therefore must rely on unconstitutional conditions and
state negligence law. Nonetheless, government again is in the business of
requiring universities to license academic work, and rather than confine it-
self, as in the past, to requiring the universities to license printing, govern-
ment now additionally requires them to license any pursuit of generalizable
knowledge-even if merely by talking, writing, observing, recording, and
publishing.
To make matters worse, the delegation, as in the seventeenth century,
subjects individuals to layers of central and local standards. Although it is
well known that licensing standards tend to be vague, delegated licensing
allows an array of vague standards, and the federal government has taken
full advantage of this opportunity. The federal government explains that its
standards for IRBs only are a minimum and that IRBs are free to enforce
tious, Treasonable, and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets, 14 Car. II, c. 33, § 2 (1662). For a history of
the legal mechanisms the English government used to control the press in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, see generally Hamburger, supra note 15, at 661 (1985) (providing an analysis of the different
options available to the government for controlling printing).
112 Delegation is not the only way in which the modem licensing echoes that of the past. For the re-
ligious element, see supra note 60 and infra note 148. In addition, just as the English government in the
seventeenth century relied on the Stationers Company to ensure that imprimaturs appeared at the front of
books, the government today can rely on the editors of academic journals to refuse to publish articles in
which the authors do not state that their research had IRB permission. See Hamburger, supra note 6, at
303-04. Even more insidious is the education program. The English government in the seventeenth
century attempted with considerable success to persuade academics and printers that licensing served the
public good, and similarly today, the federal government engages in a large scale education project to
induce cooperation-the effect being to make academics believe that they should accept the censorship.
It may have been in these educational programs that the government popularized the slogan, "Research
is a privilege, not a right." Certainly, as noted by Richard O'Brien, the notion that research is a privilege
turns up in one of the government's educational films from the mid-1980s. Richard M. O'Brien, The
Institutional Review Board Problem: Where It Came From and What to Do About It, 15 J. SOCIAL
DISTRESS AND THE HOMELESS 23, 33 (2006). For more about this astonishing slogan, see Hamburger,
supra note 6, at 353.
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additional local standards that reflect "community" values."3 Although this
appears to leave some freedom for institutional variation, it becomes a
mechanism for IRBs to act under the color of federal and state law in im-
posing local prejudices that further restrict individual freedom."4 The
Common Rule even requires that at least one IRB member be a community
member and that all IRB members be chosen for their "sensitivity to ...
community attitudes."" 5 On some IRBs, this is conveniently taken to mean
the inclusion of local policemen or at least individuals who feel confident
they can call on the police to assist in enforcement." 6 Like a local sheriff
wearing a federal badge, IRBs thus swagger with all the pretensions of fed-
eral power and all of the petty oppression of local bullies." 7 Jack Katz
113 The Common Rule defines "IRB approval" as "the determination of the IRB that the research
has been reviewed and may be conducted at an institution within the constraints set forth by the IRB and
by other institutional and federal requirements." 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(h) (2005). Thus, as explained by
OHRP, an IRB must make "a judgment that often depends upon prevailing community standards and
subjective determinations of risk and benefit. Consequently, different IRBs may arrive at different as-
sessments of a particular risk/benefit ratio." IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. III.A. Much re-
search has established the variability of IRB determinations. See, e.g., Jon Mark Hirshon et al.,
Variability in Institutional Review Board Assessment of Minimal-Risk Research, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY
MED. 1417 (2002); Thomas 0. Stair et al., Variation in Institutional Review Board Responses to a Stan-
dard Protocol for a Multicenter Clinical Trial, 8 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 636 (2001); Mary Terrell
White & Jennifer Gamm, Informed Consent for Research on Stored Blood and Tissue Samples: A Sur-
vey of Institutional Review Board Practices, 9 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 1 (2002).
114 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. Ill, pt. A.
115 Each IRB, according to the Common Rule, is required to
be sufficiently qualified through the experience and expertise of its members, and the diversity of
the members, including consideration of race, gender, and cultural backgrounds and sensitivity to
such issues as community attitudes, to promote respect for its advice and counsel in safeguarding
the rights and welfare of human subjects.
45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2005). To this end, at least one member of each IRB must be unaffiliated with
the institution that established the IRB, and this member is expected to stand up for the "perspective" of
the "local community." IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. I, pt. B. For this membership require-
ment, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d). Community members even form a majority of the members of at least
one leading university's IRB.
116 The most prominent of the various academic institutions known to have included a police officer
is Northwestern University. Although on the IRB roster (for panel E) he is described simply as being
associated with the University's Center for Public Safety, he is its director, which is an anodyne way of
saying he is the chief of the Northwestern police department. See Northwestern University Office for
Research, Institutional Review Board Members, http://www.research.northwestern.edu/research/oprs/
irb/boardMembers/ (follow "Panel E Members" hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 17, 2006). In addition to
the IRBs that include police officers, there are IRBs that assume they can rely on the police. When
David Wright-an African American professor of English at University of Illinois, Champaign-
Urbana-wrote a literary essay and got it accepted for publication, "the IRB chair threatened to prevent
publication of the article if Wright didn't withdraw it from the Kenyon Review, and even to contact the
police." E-mail from Dennis Baron to Philip Hamburger (Oct. 20, 2004) (on file with the author).
Baron was then the Chair of the English Department. For further details of the incident, see David
Wright, Creative Nonfiction and the Academy: A Cautionary Tale, 10 QUALITATIVE INQUIRY 202
(2004); Hamburger, supra note 6, at 303.
117 For an earlier use of the sheriff metaphor, see Thomas A. Huff, The IRB as Deputy Sheriff: Pro-
posed FDA Regulation of the Institutional Review Board, 27 CLINICAL RES. 103 (1979).
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documents that IRBs have repeatedly imposed their local political preju-
dices on researchers, and they can do so all the more successfully precisely
because they enforce local moral prejudices with the authority of law-
indeed, both state and federal law." 8 The combination of legal force and
local prejudice was bad enough in the West in the nineteenth century, and
although the bureaucratic version of this combination in modern universi-
ties is less violent, it is no less stifling.
The Supreme Court has given hints that it recognizes the danger that
the federal government will use its funding and other mechanisms to dele-
gate regulation that the government itself could not constitutionally impose.
In Rust v. Sullivan, family planning agencies accepted federal funding on
the condition that the doctors who worked for them would not counsel abor-
tions." 9 The Supreme Court upheld this condition but at the same time sug-
gested it would not have sustained such a condition on employees where
they were acting independently of the funded institutions-the preeminent
example being the independence of academics from their universities.2 0
The Court's position cannot be taken to mean that academics have greater
constitutional freedom than other Americans. Rather, for long standing cul-
tural reasons, the faculty and students of academic institutions are presumed
to be independent of their institutions within the sphere of their academic
freedom, at least in the absence of clear contractual provisions to the con-
trary. "' Thus, whereas the doctors in Rust v. Sullivan were presumed to be
agents of their employers when acting for them, professors and students
cannot be presumed to be agents of their institutions while within the realm
of their academic freedom, including their research. Accordingly, although
the government can use conditions on funding to limit the messages it pur-
chases from family planning agencies, it cannot use conditions on its fund-
ing of academic institutions to limit what is said or printed by students and
faculty, for on account of the independence of these individuals, the condi-
tions would amount to a delegated regulation, and being a regulation
abridging the freedom of speech and the press, it would be unconstitutional.
How much of this the Court in Rust really understood is unclear, but the
Court recognized enough to observe that "the university is a traditional
sphere of free expression so fundamental to the functioning of our society
that the Government's ability to control speech within that sphere by means
of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is restricted
by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment."' 2
118 Jack Katz, Address at the Northwestern University School of Law Symposium: Censorship and
Institutional Review Boards (Apr. 7, 2006). For other examples, see Research on Human Subjects, su-
pra note 96, at pt. 1.
119 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
120 Id. at 200.
121 Hamburger, supra note 6, at 341 n.162.
122 500 U.S. at 200. The Court has frequently made such statements about the distinctive freedom
enjoyed in universities, most recently in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
101:405 (2007)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
One need only add that this misuse of conditions is all the more emphati-
cally restricted by the Amendment's prohibition against licensing.
Delegation thus does not excuse, but rather clarifies the constitutional
problem. The delegation of licensing to universities invites local prejudice
and is part of what the First Amendment historically forbade. Moreover,
when the federal government uses conditions on its spending to get univer-
sities to license their personnel, it is all the more clearly using its spending
power as a means of regulating the individuals, thus obtaining through sur-
rogates the sort of regulation it cannot impose directly. Far from insulating
government, the devolution of the licensing to surrogates confirms that in
pressuring universities with conditions and legal liability, government is
making them instruments for imposing regulation-in this instance, an un-
constitutional kind of regulation, the licensing of speech and the press.
To summarize, the IRB laws directly require a system of licensing
speech and the press, and nothing is more clearly or emphatically forbidden
by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech and the press.
Licensing is very different from other methods of controlling speech or the
press because it requires individuals to get permission, and in thus under-
mining the authority of individuals in their use of language, it inverts the
authority of the people in their relation to government. Such licensing
therefore deserves the First Amendment's unequivocal prohibition, and the
government's imposition of IRBs is a sad reminder of what is apt to happen
when the absolute character of this barrier is forgotten. By lowering the
barriers against licensing and spending, the Supreme Court inadvertently
created an opening for the licensing of speech and the press, and the gov-
ernment therefore felt free to introduce a system of licensing unparalleled in
England or America since the seventeenth century." 3 Nonetheless, even
under the Constitution's diminished prohibition against licensing-what the
Court treats as a mere presumption-it is difficult to discern a justification
for the IRB laws, as will now become apparent.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY
The IRB laws are sometimes justified as the means of enforcing a fidu-
ciary duty. Just as doctors owe their patients a Hippocratic duty, so re-
searchers, it is said, owe their human subjects an equivalent duty.
Yet far from being a government interest that could overwhelm the
constitutional prohibition (or at least presumption) against licensing of
speech or the press, the attribution of a fiduciary duty to researchers, as if
they were professionals, only confirms the constitutional problem. Re-
searchers are not professionals, and the government attributes a fiduciary
duty to them as a class on account of their attempt to produce "generaliz-
123 For the way in which the Supreme Court's doctrines on licensing and spending gave the federal
government confidence it could impose IRBs and deprived academics of any confidence they could re-
sist, see Hamburger, supra note 6, at 277-81, 351-54.
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able knowledge." To make matters worse, the particular duties attributed to
researchers under the IRB laws are imperfect duties, which go far beyond
what doctors owe their patients, and which are not of a sort normally con-
sidered compatible with the freedom of speech or the press. In the end,
therefore, far from justifying the IRB laws, the claim about a fiduciary duty
reveals that the IRB laws encounter constitutional problems not only on ac-
count of their method, licensing, but also on account of the substantive du-
ties they impose.
Rather than coincidental, this danger from the substantive duties im-
posed by IRBs illustrates a risk that is apt to arise in any system of licensing
speech or the press. A system of licensing, as is well known, can function
without a clearly stated substantive standard.'24 Accordingly, by relying on
a licensing system, such as that established by the IRB laws, government
can surreptitiously impose heightened substantive duties, even imperfect
duties, that otherwise would encounter political and constitutional obsta-
cles.
A. The Fiduciary Duty of Researchers
The federal government uses IRBs to impose a fiduciary duty on re-
searchers in relation to their human subjects-as if researchers were like
doctors in relation to their patients. It is doubtful, however, whether a fidu-
ciary duty can be imposed on a class on account of their desire for "gener-
alizable knowledge."
The fiduciary duties of professionals, such as doctors and lawyers,
arose from the historic practice of these persons to sell the use of their
judgment, speech, and conduct, which they voluntarily undertook to use on
behalf of their clients. Physicians and lawyers thus became members of
discrete professions, with their own group standards about the ways in
which they should, almost literally, use parts of themselves-their minds,
tongues, and hands-for those whom they assisted. Today, the fiduciary
duty of a professional remains a duty to act on behalf of another, and it still
arises from the professional's voluntary undertaking-prototypically in ex-
change for money-to exercise his judgment, speech, or conduct on behalf
of his client.
Researchers, in contrast, act for themselves rather than those they
study, and they thus are generally free to act on their own, without being
members of a professional group. Many of them could seek professional
salaries by undertaking professional, fiduciary duties-in particular, by sell-
ing their professional judgment, speech, and conduct to their clients. In-
stead, they keep their freedom to think, speak, and act to their own
satisfaction, and this is a freedom not merely from a fiduciary duty to a cli-
124 See Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 655
(1955).
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ent, but also from any professional duty to a group whose professional stan-
dards define the sort of judgment, speech, and conduct that can be sold by
its members. Although academic organizations sometimes attempt to enun-
ciate professional standards, they do so without any binding hold on schol-
ars or on students, and dissenting academics and students thus remain
entirely free to take their own approaches to research. In sum, academics
and students generally act for themselves as individuals rather than for oth-
ers as part of a profession.
Nonetheless, by means of IRBs, the federal government imposes a pre-
viously absent researchers' duty on students, academics, and other person-
nel at research institutions. This federal fiduciary duty is convenient for the
federal government in managing its research grants, but it is ominous for re-
searchers. Even for academic doctors and lawyers who do research on hu-
man subjects, the duty of researchers is a penalty on research, for it gives
them a fiduciary duty to persons who are not their patients or clients. More
broadly, it penalizes all sorts of scientists and humanists who never have
had clients, but who study human subjects-whether in the lab or in the li-
brary-and thus get penalized on account of their curiosity, on account of
their desire for "generalizable knowledge."
The central events that seemed to justify holding human subjects re-
searchers accountable in this manner have become notorious under the
names of Nuremberg and Tuskegee. At Nuremberg, the Allies in World
War II tried the doctors who had performed hideous experiments on their
prisoners in concentration camps. At Tuskegee, the Public Health Service
conducted a study that became symbolic of the idea that American doctors
had equal potential for evil. The Nazi tortures and the American study ob-
viously were very different, and it is by no means clear how either explains
the necessity for licensing rather than after-the-fact penalties. Nonetheless,
Nuremberg and Tuskegee are often mentioned in the same breath as proof
that IRBs are necessary to prevent researchers from harming their human
subjects.
The study at Tuskegee deserves particular attention because it illus-
trates the very real dangers of research in American society, and because
the federal government, in its attempt to justify its imposition of a fiduciary
duty on researchers, ended up misrepresenting what happened at Tuskegee.
Beginning in the early 1930s, the federal government's Public Health Ser-
vice attempted to study the course of untreated syphilis in black men in
Macon County, Alabama-who had an unusually high rate of infection.'25
The researchers apparently screened out men who had been infected rela-
tively recently and who thus had a good chance of benefiting from the con-
temporary treatment (with rather toxic arsenical injections). The
125 Thomas Benedek, The "Tuskegee Study" of Syphilis: Analysis of Moral Versus Methodologic
Aspects, in TUSKEGEE'S TRUTHS: RETHINKING THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY 213, 218-19 (Susan M.
Reverby ed., 2000).
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researchers then tracked the other men to study the development of their
syphilis.'26 Although the researchers were doing research, they held them-
selves out to be providing at least some medical care: They were physi-
cians who worked for the Public Health Service, they relied on a nurse to
conduct follow up examinations, and they induced the men to participate by
offering them checkups.121 Penicillin became generally available for civil-
ians after World War II, but notwithstanding that it had come to be recog-
nized as a more effective cure for syphilis than arsenical injections, the
researchers did not give the infected men penicillin. Nor did they inform
them that penicillin might be of help. By the time penicillin became avail-
able, most of the men probably were beyond the benefits of the drug and
were no longer contagious. Even so, penicillin probably could have helped
at least some of them, but the doctors apparently reasoned that access to
penicillin would have undermined the value of the study. 128 The details of
the Tuskegee study became widely known in 1972 through an article in the
New York Times, and ever since, the study has been the most notorious il-
lustration of the physical and moral dangers of human subjects research.
More than research, however, occurred at Tuskegee. What happened
there involved a breach of a fiduciary duty, for the study was carried out
largely under the guise of offering medical care. Tellingly, not only the
Tuskegee study, but also many other notorious twentieth-century studies
(such as some of the military's radiological tests and the hepatitis study at
Willowbrook) involved a combination of health care providers and gov-
ernment.
Even the standard academic article cited for the dangers of human sub-
jects research-Henry Beecher's famous 1966 article-turns out to concern
mostly medical research by doctors on patients in government institutions.
Beecher purported to publish 22 cases of unethical "[h]uman experimenta-
tion," but he frankly limited his study to research by doctors on their pa-
tients.'29 Although he did not say as much, his evidence also pointed to
government. Three of the experiments examined by Beecher were done in
England or the Philippines and therefore cannot be taken as evidence of
American research. 3 ° Of the 19 remaining, American cases, at least 14 ap-
pear to have included patients in government institutions, ranging from the
126 According to the first director of the study, "we treated practically all of the patients with early
manifestations and many of the patients with latent syphilis." Id. at 220.
127 Id. at 221,225.
128 According to Benedek, "[tihe available treatment might have exerted a definitely beneficial ef-
fect on the prognosis of only 12.5% of the subjects." Id. at 232. As it happens, "virtually all subjects
who were alive in 1973 had outlived the life expectancy of their non-syphilitic peers[.]" Id. at 229.
129 Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966).
130 For a list of the 22 experiments, with citations, see DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE
BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF How LAW AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING, 263-
65 (1991). An examination of the published articles reveals that two of the cases, Beecher's numbers 15
and 19, were English. In addition, number 3 turns out to be a Filipino study.
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Army to public hospitals or clinics, such as those at NIH. As might be ex-
pected, many of the doctors in these 14 cases were public employees or had
public funding.' 3 '
Thus, the preeminent exemplars of unethical human subjects research
tended to show not a single problem with human subjects research as a
whole, but rather two narrower, overlapping problems. One problem cen-
tered on the research conducted in government institutions or under the au-
thority of government; the other arose in research done by doctors on
persons who had reason to think they were patients. This concentration of
the most egregious instances of misconduct should not, perhaps, be a sur-
prise, for government is sheltered from market and legal pressures, and doc-
tors have difficulty studying their own patients without running up against a
severe fiduciary duty that does not burden other researchers. Of course,
there were misfortunes in research that did not involve government or doc-
tors, and of course research in general has its risks, but the most sobering
examples of research misconduct seemed to center on government and doc-
tors.'32 Indeed, in the preeminent examples-ranging from Nuremberg and
Tuskegee to the cases studied by Beecher-the two areas of difficulty over-
lapped. Doctors acting under government authority or studying individuals
within the care of government failed to live up to the duties that might ordi-
narily be expected of such professionals or as to such dependents.
The attempt to establish a fiduciary duty for human subjects research-
ers took its most concrete form in the late 1970s in the Belmont Report.'33
Produced by a national commission, this report is the central statement of
the fiduciary duty that IRBs impose on human subjects researchers. When
an institution seeks to qualify for federal funding, the government asks the
institution to provide an assurance "that all of its activities related to human
131 These were cases numbers 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, and 22. See Rothman, su-
pra note 130, at 263-65. (In at least three of these cases-numbers 4, 8, and 13-not all of the patients
were in public institutions.) Rothman focuses on the capacity of the patients for informed consent and
observes: "In almost all of the 22 protocols, the subjects were institutionalized or in some other situa-
tion that compromised their ability to give free consent." David J. Rothman, Ethics and Human Ex-
perimentation: Henry Beecher Revisited, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1195, 1198 (1987).
Beecher presumably omitted citations to his 22 cases to protect the researchers, who were his human
subjects, but he thereby left his readers ignorant of essential data that, if published, would have revealed
the degree to which his evidence did not clearly support his thesis. Like the suppression of data by
IRBs, this sort of omission of personal details, which precludes replication, is simply incompatible with
the serious conduct of scientific inquiry, and in this instance it has given supposedly scientific legiti-
macy to three decades of licensing.
132 After examining the usual complaints about the dangers of researchers, Richard O'Brien notes:
"Closer analysis shows that government researchers have been responsible for almost all of the abuse of
human subjects .... Logically, these data could only be used to support a human subjects protection
program that had academic[s] ...doing prior review of all government research not the other way
around." Of course, however, "[t]his obvious conclusion did not stop government regulators." O'Brien,
supra note 112, at 26.
133 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65.
101:405 (2007) Getting Permission
subjects research, regardless of the source of support, will be guided by the
ethical principles in the ... Belmont Report." '134 An institution can propose
another statement of ethical principles, but apparently few institutions have
tried this, for they recognize that the Belmont Report is the government's
preferred standard for research.'35 Accordingly, when the government
presses universities to maintain the severity of their licensing, it almost al-
ways can refer to the Belmont Report as the standard to which they must
comply.'36 The Belmont Report thus is the government's benchmark for sat-
isfactory licensing under the IRB laws, and it can serve this function be-
cause it expounds a general fiduciary duty for all human subjects
researchers.
To justify the imposition of a fiduciary duty on such researchers, the
federal government-as illustrated by the Belmont Report-glosses over
the degree to which Nuremberg and Tuskegee involved government re-
search and medical personnel.'37 The Belmont Report has to rely on Nur-
emberg and Tuskegee, for these are the preeminent moral anchors in
arguments that researchers have a fiduciary duty, but the Report has to pre-
sent these exemplars of misconduct in ways that avoid acknowledging that
they more clearly illustrate the already familiar duties of government to
those under its control and of medical personnel to patients. 3 '
134 FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE, supra note 42.
135 See id.
136 For one of innumerable examples, see Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Compliance Oversight
Coordinator, Div. Human Subject Prots., to Daniel R. Masys, Institutional Official for Human Subjects,
Univ. of Cal., San Diego (Jan. 8, 2002), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrmletrs/YR02/janO2c.pdf. The let-
ter responds to the publication of details of what appears to have been a Quality Improvement study, and
although the letter acknowledges that there was "no evidence that a systematic prospective clinical tr[ial
was performed" and that thus the publication was not based on human subjects research, it quotes the
Belmont Report to admonish the University. In fact, the letter was part of the government's attempt to
get universities to expand their understanding of human subjects research to include what might other-
wise be considered "innovative therapeutic interventions." Id. For further details of this letter, see infra
note 180.
137 The Nuremberg Code examined how medical experiments on human beings should "conform to
the ethics of the medical profession." THE NUREMBERG CODE: TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 181-82 (1949). For
a discussion of Tuskegee, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
138 Already in its fourth sentence-the Belmont Report states: "During the Nuremberg War Crimes
Trials, the Nuremberg Code was drafted as a set of standards for judging physicians and scientists who
had conducted biomedical experiments on concentration camp prisoners." BELMONT REPORT, supra
note 65, at 23,192. Later, in its discussion of the principle of justice, the Report alludes to Nuremberg
and Tuskegee as part of the historical foundation for understanding "research involving human sub-
jects":
[T]he exploitation of unwilling prisoners as research subjects in Nazi concentration camps was
condemned as a particularly flagrant injustice. In this country, in the 1940s, the Tuskegee syphilis
study used disadvantaged, rural black men to study the untreated course of a disease that is by no
means confined to that population.
Id. at 23,194.
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This sleight of hand has not been without cost-one disadvantage be-
ing a misunderstanding about what was wrong about the Tuskegee Study.
The Belmont Report's version of Tuskegee raises questions as to whether
the researchers there violated any duty to their subjects, and on the Report's
assumption that the Public Health Service officers at Tuskegee owed the
duty of researchers, there has been some doubt as to whether they clearly
violated any duty that was acknowledged at the time.'39 Of course, if it is
recognized that the researchers were doctors and others who held them-
selves out as offering health care, then the breach of a Hippocratic and fidu-
ciary duty is obvious. The Belmont Report, however, overgeneralizes about
Tuskegee in terms of a general duty of researchers, and it thus leaves room
for doubts as to what went wrong there.
The Belmont Report's misleading overgeneralization from the exam-
ples of Nuremberg and Tuskegee has an even more serious consequence: It
justifies the government's attempt to give researchers, as a profession, a fi-
duciary duty. For example, after initially relying on Nuremberg and Tuske-
gee as iconic illustrations of how researchers can endanger their human
subjects, the Belmont Report argues that researchers should maximize bene-
fits and minimize risks, and in support of this position it points to the Hip-
pocratic principle that a doctor should "do no harm." The Belmont Report
then self-consciously "extend[s]" this medical principle "to the realm of re-
search," and although there had long been suggestions that doctors had a
moral obligation to follow their Hippocratic duty when doing medical re-
search-even perhaps when doing research on subjects who were not pa-
tients-the Belmont Report extends this medical duty to all researchers
doing any human subjects research, whether medical, biological, or behav-
ioral." °  Thus, the misleading overgeneralization about Nuremberg and
Tuskegee-that these were examples of how men failed to adhere to their
duty as researchers-becomes the justification for treating researchers as if
they have a fiduciary duty akin to that of doctors to their patients. From
this perspective, IRBs do not interfere in inquiry or speech, but simply pro-
tect human subjects from breaches of the fiduciary duty that researchers, as
a profession, owe their human subjects.
Yet researchers are not professionals. Doctors and lawyers voluntarily
assume their fiduciary duties by undertaking to speak, think, or act for oth-
ers. The IRB laws, however, impose a federal fiduciary duty on research-
139 Hence, some of the revisionism about Tuskegee-although even according to the revisionist lit-
erature, there came a time when the researchers were clearly denying information and care that could
have significantly helped at least some of the men. Thomas G. Benedek & Jonathon Erlen, The Scien-
tific Environment of the Tuskegee Study of Syphilis, 1920-1960, in 43 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MEDICINE I
(1999); Benedek, supra note 125; Richard A. Shweder, Tuskegee Re-Examined: A Cultural Antropolo-
gist Offers a Counter-Narrative to the Infamous Story of U.S. Government Scientists Allowing Black
Men to Suffer from Untreated Syphilis, SPIKED, Jan. 8, 2004, http://www.spiked-online.com/Printable/
0000000CA34A.htm.
140 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at 23,194.
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ers, not because they volunteer to speak, think, or act on behalf of others,
but because they seek to satisfy their curiosity-in particular, because they
systematically seek generalizable knowledge through the study of human
subjects.
The federal attribution of a fiduciary duty to researchers is evidently
yet another penalty on the class academicus for inquiring with intent to
learn-for doing what otherwise is lawful with a desire to develop scien-
tific, publishable generalizations-and thus rather than justify the constitu-
tionality of the licensing, the attribution of the fiduciary duty raises further
constitutional questions. The government's requirement that each univer-
sity or other institution commit to the "ethical principles" in the Belmont
Report for "all... human subjects research, regardless of the source of sup-
port," leverages government grants to obtain a general ethical regulation of
all human subjects research, and because the government thus imposes a fi-
duciary duty on individuals on account of their being at research institutions
and their seeking "generalizable knowledge," this condition is of dubious
constitutionality under the First Amendment. 4 ' Even worse, the federal
government's ambitious conditions have made the imposition of a fiduciary
duty so widespread that state courts have begun to assume that it should be
enforced by the law of negligence, and thus not only under federal law, but
also under state law, interactions with fellow human beings that otherwise
are examined under the general duty of care now are penalized with a se-
vere fiduciary duty-not because the persons who initiate the interactions
have voluntarily undertaken any professional duty, but rather because they
are members of the inquisitive class and seek generalizable or publishable
knowledge. Once again, it is doubtful whether this is constitutional. 42
More broadly, the government's use of licensing to impose the fiduci-
ary duty on researchers reveals a further danger of licensing speech or the
press. The federal government probably would have had difficulty in
openly legislating a fiduciary duty for persons who never undertook to act
for others, and it would have had even more difficulty enforcing such a duty
in the courts, where the constitutional objections would have become mani-
fest. The government, however, has had no difficulty enforcing this fiduci-
ary duty through licensing, for licensing laws can leave the duties they
enforce largely unelaborated. The fiduciary duty of human subjects re-
searchers thus suggests a largely unexamined danger of laws that license
speech or the press: Such laws offer government an opportunity to impose
heightened duties that it could not otherwise adopt or enforce without run-
ning into political and constitutional obstacles.
141 FEDERALWIDE ASSURANCE, supra note 42.
142 See Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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B. Imperfect Duties
The fiduciary duty that the government imposes on researchers in-
cludes "imperfect" duties, which are of a sort that is apt to conflict with the
First Amendment. These imperfect duties thus confirm that the attribution
of a fiduciary duty to researchers does not so much solve the constitutional
problem as exacerbate it. More generally, the imperfect duties corroborate
the observation that licensing of speech and the press too easily can become
a means of enforcing duties that otherwise would be recognized as uncon-
stitutional or otherwise inappropriate.
"Imperfect" duties are moral duties that are not enforced by law, but
this is only the beginning of a definition.43 It traditionally was thought that
if legal or "perfect" duties had to be based on consent, and that if a people
could not reasonably consent to duties that were not clearly and generally
stated, then imperfect duties were those that could not be formulated with
the clarity of rules-a conclusion that will be seen to give special signifi-
cance to licensing as a means of enforcing imperfect duties.'" More gener-
ally, imperfect duties could be considered those that cannot be legally
enforced without intruding on the authority of individuals to make their
own moral judgments. For example, although the duty of care is actionable
at law as a perfect duty, the duties of charity, generosity, and kindness are
not. In short, these imperfect duties cannot easily be reduced to enforceable
rules of law and in any case cannot be imposed by law without undermining
the freedom and moral authority of individuals, and because of this inde-
terminacy and intrusiveness, imperfect duties are particularly dangerous for
the freedom of speech and the press.
Nonetheless, the federal government uses IRB licensing to burden re-
searchers with a fiduciary duty that extends so far as to include imperfect
duties. In asking universities to give assurances that they will adhere to the
ethical principles of the Belmont Report, the government gets universities to
commit to taking "[m]any kinds of possible harms ... into account," in-
cluding "risks of psychological harm, physical harm, legal harm, social
harm and economic harm," and "[w]hile the most likely types of harms to
research subjects are those of psychological or physical pain or injury, other
possible kinds should not be overlooked."'45 The National Science Founda-
tion elaborates that IRBs should consider denying permission on account of
the risks of "legal harm," "financial harm," "moral harm," social "stigma,"
or mental "upset" or "worry," and as in the Belmont Report, this means not
necessarily anything unlawful, but rather merely the possibility that inquiry
or its publication will leave a human subject (or a group of which he is a
143 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM Lim OCTO 315 (III.i.3) (James Brown
Scott ed., Clarendon Books 1934) (1688).
144 Id. at 119 (I.vii.8-9); see also id. at 441 (Ill.vii.9).
145 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at 23,196.
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part) in a worse position legally, financially, socially, or psychologically.146
These are all real harms, but they are often the necessary and highly desir-
able consequences of freedom of speech and the press, and they are there-
fore imperfect to the extent they are caused by a researcher's lack of
generosity or charity in exercising his rights under law. Some of these
harms, moreover, are of a sort not ordinarily recognized as independent
harms at common law precisely because a duty to avoid them would tend to
be unclear and very intrusive on an individual's freedom and moral author-
ity. For example, the government cautions IRBs that "[s]tress and feelings
of guilt or embarrassment may arise simply from thinking or talking about
one's own behavior or attitudes on sensitive topics such as drug use, sexual
preferences, selfishness, and violence."'47 A duty to avoid causing these
harms that might arise from inducing someone to think or talk is imperfect
by any definition.
The Belmont Report concedes that the duties imposed by IRBs rise
above the perfect duties ordinarily imposed by law. The common law tends
to take cognizance of concrete, measurable injuries, and First Amendment
doctrine often protects the freedom of speech and the press by taking a par-
ticularly narrow conception of injury. The Belmont Report, however, justi-
fies its conclusions by reference to the higher principles of "Respect for
Persons," "Beneficence," and "Justice"-the first being drawn primarily
from Immanuel Kant, and the second having much in common with the
theological assumptions of traditional Christian ethics."'4 It is not clear why
146 Nat. Sci. Found., Div. of Institution and Award Support, Frequently Asked Questions and Vi-
gnettes, http://www.nsf.gov/bfa/dias/policy/hsfaqs.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2004).
147 IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, ch. Ill, pt. A.
148 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at 23,193-94. For the most traditional and elegant Catholic
discussion of beneficence, see THOMAS AQUINAS, 3 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 1314 (pt. 2-2, Q.36) (Fathers
of the English Dominican Province ed., Christian Classics 1981). The commission that drafted the Bel-
mont Report acted with the advice of philosophers and at least one theologian and even published their
extended musings with its report. The intellectual context of the time is suggested by Henry Beecher's
famous article on research harms, which begins by observing that "according to Pope Pius XII ... sci-
ence is not the highest value to which all other orders of values ... should be subordinated." Beecher,
supra note 129, at 1354. Similarly, the government guidebook for IRBs specifies that universities
should consider including "Ministers" on IRBs-as if clergy are especially apt licensers to act under
governmental authority in judging what an academic may read, observe, ask, say, print, or publish. IRB
GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. 1, pt. B. Even the government's educational films depict an IRB that
features a clergyman. Videotape: Balancing Society's Mandates: Criteria For Protocol Review (Office
for Protection from Research Risks, National Institute of Health 1986).
According to Robert Levine, "[b]ecause the Commission never articulated its concepts of ethical
theory, the assumptions that follow are my own," but "they are based on my careful reading of all the
Commission's publications as well as my participation in virtually all of the discussions that led to the
writing of its reports." LEVINE, supra note 59, at 11. On this basis, he explains that "[t]he principle of
respect for persons was stated formally by Immanuel Kant." Id. at 15. More generally, Levine notes
that "[t]he Commission did not fail to choose among competing ethical theories." Id. at 11. Rather, be-
ing "' [aiware of Kantian (deontological), utilitarian, and Aristotelian traditions, for instance, the com-
mission nonetheless refrained from relying on any one of them for the legitimacy of its conclusions.
Agreement on a fundamental moral system was not sought or needed."' Id. (citing Morris B. Abram &
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the moral theory of a German idealist or of the Catholic Church is particu-
larly helpful in understanding the practical ethics of American empiricism,
but, more to the point, the Belmont Report self-consciously uses these ele-
vated principles to make imperfect duties legally enforceable. As it ex-
plains about the principle of beneficence:
Persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by respecting their decisions
and protecting them from harm, but also by making efforts to secure their well-
being. Such treatment falls under the principle of beneficence. The term "be-
neficence" is often understood to cover acts of kindness or charity that go be-
yond strict obligation. In this document, beneficence is understood in a
stronger sense, as an obligation. 49
In other words, beneficence is an imperfect duty, but it now would have the
obligation of law as part of the federally-created fiduciary duty of research-
ers.
This imperfect duty of beneficence greatly exceeds the duty of doctors,
for it moves beyond questions of injury to amorphous ideals of securing
well-being. As noted above, the Belmont Report "extend[s]" the "Hippo-
cratic maxim 'do no harm"' from "medical ethics . . . to the realm of re-
search," and this attribution of a high fiduciary duty to persons who never
undertook it is problematic enough. The Belmont Report, however, also re-
casts the Hippocratic principle as a principle of "beneficence," which turns
out to mean something more ambitious than a doctor's Hippocratic duty-
let alone his legal duty. Whereas the Hippocratic duty to a patient is that
the doctor "should not injure," the duty of beneficence to human subjects
turns out to mean that the researcher should "secure their well-being."'5
The heightened moral duties recited by the Belmont Report are irre-
deemably at odds with the pugilistic give and take of academic dispute.
Whether stated in sweeping principles of justice, respect, and beneficence,
or spelled out in admonitions to avoid ethereal sorts of harm, these are im-
perfect duties, and if imposed by law, they are fatal to robust intellectual
and political debate. When a historian interviews a member of the Aryan
Nations, or when a law professor interrogates a corrupt member of a zoning
board, these scholars have a constitutional right to show no respect, to avoid
beneficence, and to seek justice rather than merely do justice; they have a
constitutional right to ask questions that could lead to mental, social, eco-
Susan M. Wolf, Public Involvement in Medical Ethics: A Model for Government Action, 310 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 627, 630 (1984)).
149 BELMONT REPORT, supra note 65, at 23,194.
150 Id. In justification, Levine suggests that "[t]he principle of beneficence is firmly embedded in
the ethical tradition of medicine." As Levine acknowledges, however, "Hippocrates observed.., make
a habit of two things-to help, or at least to do no harm"-which means that although it should be a goal
to help, the basic duty is to avoid harm. Nonetheless, the Belmont Report makes the moral ideal the ba-
sic duty, which under the IRB laws becomes a legal duty: "The principle of beneficence is interpreted
by the Commission as creating an obligation to secure the well-being of individuals." LEVINE, supra
note 59, at 17.
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nomic, and legal harms; indeed, they ordinarily have even a constitutional
right to seek such consequences. These imperfect harms are unavoidable
elements of much empirical inquiry, and accordingly there is no room in
such research for the legal imposition of philosophic, theological, or Hippo-
cratic ideals about avoiding harm-let alone about doing justice, respecting
others, or exercising beneficence.
Even in medical research, the ideals of justice, respect, and beneficence
necessarily come into conflict with the dogged curiosity and pursuit of
knowledge often needed for empirical discoveries. Thus, if government
pursues social ends too vigorously-for example, with an expansive con-
ception of imperfect harms rather than traditional conceptions of legally-
cognizable harms-it will inevitably damage the unfettered, independent
spirit that is essential for serious inquiry and the advancement of knowl-
edge.
In the end, the legal imposition of a researcher's fiduciary duty, includ-
ing even imperfect duties, does not justify the licensing; on the contrary, it
just makes it worse. The fiduciary duty is of questionable constitutionality
because it singles out researchers to be penalized on account of their pursuit
of "generalizable knowledge"-on account of their pursuit of scientific and
thus publishable generalizations.'' The imperfect duties comprised within
the fiduciary duty aggravate the problem because they are a sort of duty that
tends to be incompatible with the freedom of speech and the press.
More generally, the imposition of these fiduciary and imperfect duties
illustrates one of the dangers of licensing. It is notorious that the licensing
of speech and the press can be used to enforce ill-defined substantive duties.
Licensing thus offers a mechanism for enforcing duties of a sort that if
stated and enforced more openly in after-the-fact penalties would run up
against political and constitutional impediments, and this is yet another rea-
son-as if any were necessary-to consider licensing a singularly danger-
ous method of regulating speech or the press.
IV. HARMS
The IRB laws are usually justified as a means of preventing harms.
Human subjects can suffer serious injury, and claims about research harms
have therefore seemed to substantiate arguments that the government has an
interest in preventing research harms. From this perspective, the govern-
ment's interest in preventing the harms can overcome the heavy constitu-
tional presumption against the constitutionality of prior restraints.
It is doubtful, however, whether the government interest in preventing
research harms overrides so heavy a constitutional presumption-a pre-
sumption "heavier ...than that against limits on expression imposed by
151 See Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
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criminal penalties."'' 2 The First Amendment, as seen in Part I, flatly barred
any law licensing speech or the press, without regard to government inter-
ests, and although the Supreme Court has said that a sufficiently strong
government interest can justify a prior restraint, it is improbable that the
government's interest in preventing harms can justify the licensing of ver-
bal language, spoken or printed-especially as there are other means of ad-
dressing the harms that do not abridge the freedom of speech or the press.'53
In fact, rather than support any argument about an overriding govern-
ment interest, an examination of the harms suggests that the argument about
government interest is contaminated with popular prejudice. There never
has been serious empirical evidence that human subjects research is particu-
larly harmful or that IRBs are efficacious in preventing harm-indeed, it is
manifest that IRBs cause more harm than they prevent-and this raises a
sobering question as to whether the federal government adopted its sweep-
ing system of licensing not so much in response to actual harms as in re-
sponse to popular fears and anxieties.
A. The Body Count
The justification for the IRB laws typically comes in the form of a
body count, but the numbers do not quite add up. The grim stories about
human subjects who have died after research went awry are apt to leave one
with a visceral feeling that regulation is needed. The body count of re-
search subjects, however, only examines the losses on one side, and there-
fore the accounting needs to be more complete. On the one hand, the harms
from the research must be considered more systematically; on the other
hand, the harms from licensing need to be taken into account. In the end, it
is difficult to find much empirical evidence that the research is particularly
dangerous, and the greater danger appears to come from the IRBs them-
selves, which suppress essential, often lifesaving research.
152 Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 538, 558-59 (1975).
153 Of course, the harms that a law attempts to prevent are not by themselves the measure of the
government interest that judges consider when evaluating the line between the right of an individual and
the power of government, for the government interest that informs such a decision is a general consid-
eration of the sort of interest government may lawfully pursue-not the need to pursue it in particular
legislation, which, in contrast, is a matter of legislative policy.
The Court's doctrine on government interests is of particularly little help in justifying laws licensing
speech or the press-in the sense of verbal language, spoken or printed-because it is improbable that
any system of licensing speech or the press could ever be narrowly tailored to match even the strongest
government interest in preventing harm. As observed earlier, licensers must judge the potential for harm
before it has occurred, and therefore licensers usually can prevent harm only by barring much innocent
activity. This is particularly a problem in the licensing of speech or the press, for the harms of speech or
the press are apt to be somewhat speculative. Accordingly, any law requiring licensing of speech or the
press is likely to leave much harmless use of speech and the press at risk of being denied permission.
Thus, although a government interest in preventing harm could justify after the fact penalties on actual
harms, no such interest could be narrowly tailored to justify a law licensing speech and the press.
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Deaths from research are not the only measure of harm, but deaths are
a particularly serious harm, and they are the measure most commonly
adopted by advocates of IRBs. The actual rate of death is bound to be
higher than what can be measured, for even when research causes the death
of a human subject, the causation may not be discernable. Nonetheless, the
deaths known to have been caused by human subjects research are a valu-
able measure of the scale of the danger, and this is especially true because
such deaths have been the subject of painstaking scrutiny for at least three
decades. Although the scrutiny applied to such deaths has increased dra-
matically since about 1970, there have been extensive retrospective studies
reaching back to World War II.' Accordingly, even if the rate of death is a
very imperfect measure of the harm to human subjects, it is as good a
measure of the scale of danger as is available.
Of course, to understand the harms from the IRB laws, this calculation
of known deaths must exclude the deaths arising from any testing of drugs
and devices under FDA regulations. The IRB laws under consideration
here are those that impose licensing on human subjects research in general.
In contrast, the FDA regulations that use IRBs to permit tests of otherwise
prohibited drugs and devices do not clearly impose licensing on speech or
the press and therefore are not in question here. Thus, although the harms
from this drug and device testing may be relevant for an evaluation of the
IRB licensing under the FDA regulations, such harms cannot justify the
IRB laws that generally concern research. As it happens, even the FDA-
covered research, when considered overall, is not as risky as might be sup-
posed, but rather than confuse two different regulatory schemes, the calcu-
lation of deaths here excludes the sort of drug and device testing that today
is covered by FDA regulations.
There apparently is no statistical survey of the deaths known to have
been caused by human subjects research, but in an examination of the ex-
tensive literature, it is difficult to find instances in which such research is
known to have caused the death of a human subject more than a handful of
times during each decade over the course of the last half century. 55 It ap-
154 See, e.g., Cold War Era Human Subject Experimentation: Hearing Before the H. Legislation
and Nat 'I Sec. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov. Operations., 103d Cong. (1994); Beecher, supra note
129.
155 Although Beecher notes one instance in which the evidence that the research subject died from
the research "was considered conclusive," his other conclusions about deaths are based on very general
statistical comparisons, and without much more information about the particular studies and the indi-
viduals included in them, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions. Beecher, supra note 129, at 1359.
Beecher's most specific and dramatic case of multiple deaths, his case number 3, illustrates how lit-
tle can be discerned from his cursory descriptions of complex situations. Beecher complains that the
researchers withheld what was known to be an effective treatment, but according to Beecher himself the
researchers did not yet know the long term effectiveness of the drug in question and in fact were at-
tempting to determine the relapse rate. Id. at 1356. His omission of identifying details, moreover,
leaves the impression that the case offers evidence about American research, but in fact it occurred in
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pears, moreover, that the rate of death has remained relatively stable. For
example, there is no evidence of significantly higher death rates in the
1950s and 1960s, when much research was conducted without IRBs, com-
pared to the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when research was increasingly sub-
jected to IRB review. This calculation of known deaths inevitably is rough
and contingent, and it obviously is not a measure of actual deaths, but in
light of all the work that has been done to document the deaths of human
subjects, it is remarkable how few deaths per decade can be shown to have
been caused by human subjects research.'56
On the reasonable assumption that the data nonetheless undercounts
deaths, one could multiply the outer range of known deaths by a factor of
ten, but there still would be no more than five deaths per year. Even if one
were so skeptical of the data as to multiply the known deaths by 100, one
could assume no more than fifty deaths per year. This number would be
tragic, but it is a tiny fraction of the deaths caused by many other mundane
activities, licensed and unlicensed, and it would not seem even remotely
sufficient to justify what otherwise would be a violation of the First
Amendment-let alone a sweeping licensing system reminiscent of the era
of Milton.'
The federal government, in fact, has long acknowledged the harmless-
ness of entire categories of the research licensed under the IRB laws. In
1966, when the government was beginning to develop its IRB requirements,
the Philippines. Pedro T. Lantin, Sr., Alberto Geronimo, & Victorino Calilong, The Problem of Typhoid
Relapse, 78 AM. J. MED. SCI. 293 (1963).
At Tuskegee "[t]he available treatment might have exerted a definitely beneficial effect on the prog-
nosis of only 12.5% of the subjects." See Benedek, supra note 125, at 232. It is not clear, however, to
what degree the failure of the researchers to inform the men about penicillin actually caused any deaths
among the men, particularly as many of them independently sought out penicillin.
156 Edward Pattullo writes:
Despite the handful of horror stories, the record of the professions in protecting their human sub-
jects is remarkably good, in all fields, I believe, though I now address just the behavioral and so-
cial sciences. If one includes survey research, millions upon millions of subjects have been "used"
in this century. Despite intense inquiry (some conducted by individuals whose concern for sub-
jects seems a surrogate for worries about unrelated problems of modem society), it appears the ac-
tual harm done by this vast enterprise is negligible. Thus, any margin of additional protection that
the IRBs provide represents an inconsequential gain.
Edward L. Pattullo, Institutional Review Boards and Social Research, in NIH READINGS ON THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS IN BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH: CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS AND BACKGROUND PAPERS 10, 13-14 (Joan E. Sieber ed., 1984).
157 One can consider a range of other activities, both licensed and unlicensed. The former include
driving, which leads to more than 40,000 deaths each year, and visiting a doctor, which by one estima-
tion leads to "'over 150,000 iatrogenic fatalities annually, more than half of which are due to negli-
gence."' TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 30 (2005); see also id. at 5. More
moderately, bicycling leads to about 700-800 deaths per year, and walking leads to about 4000-5000
deaths per year-merely from traffic crashes. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Traffic
Safety Facts, 2005 Data, for Bicyclists, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/TSF2005/
BicyclistsTSF05.pdf (last viewed on Dec. 10, 2006); for Pedestrians, http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/
nrd-30/NCSAiTSF2005/PedestriansTSF05.pdf (last viewed on Dec. 10, 2006).
Getting Permission
IRBs still were relatively novel and therefore could not have been the ex-
planation for an absence of harm. Yet when the Surgeon General that year
announced that the government would require IRBs not only for federally
funded biomedical research but for "all investigations that involve human
subjects, including investigations in the behavioral and social sciences," he
conceded that "there is a large range of social and behavioral research in
which no personal risk to the subject is involved."'58
It is not even clear that medical research-including the drug and de-
vice testing covered by FDA regulations-is particularly dangerous. E.L.
Pattullo reports in the New England Journal of Medicine that:
Of 2384 research projects surveyed in 1974-1975, 3% were reported to have
caused harmful effects to a total of 158 subjects, with most of the harm charac-
terized as "trivial or only temporarily disabling." Given the size of the re-
search enterprise ($8 billion of heath-related research in 1980) and the number
of subjects involved annually, the incidence of injury appears extremely small.
From this, he concludes that the regulation of harm to human subjects "can-
not be accounted for by the record of injury to subjects."' 59 Robert Levine
reaches similar conclusions. In 1978, he was a Special Consultant to the
National Commission that outlined what eventually became the Common
Rule, and he subsequently wrote a leading text on IRBs. 60 He observes that
"[m]uch of the literature on the ethics of research . . . reflects the widely
held and, until recently, unexamined assumption that playing the role of re-
search subject is a highly perilous business," and as he has good reason to
know, this assumption was "clearly evident in the legislative history" of the
1970s. He finds, however, that "some empirical data have become avail-
able" that "indicate that, in general, it is not particularly hazardous to be a
research subject."'' Writing on the basis of risk studies done up through
1981, when the IRB regime was significantly less intrusive than it became
over the following decades, Levine found that the overall risk of being a re-
search subject was not very high. The evidence further suggested that in
"'therapeutic research' . . . the risk of either disability (temporary or perma-
nent) or of fatality was substantially less than the risk of similar unfortunate
outcomes in other medical settings involving no research." He concludes
that "the role of research subject is not particularly hazardous in general"
and that "arguments for policies designed to restrict research generally be-
158 Bradford H. Gray, The Regulatory Context of Social and Behavioral Research, in ETHICAL
ISSUES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 329, 331 (Tom L. Beauchamp, Ruth R. Faden, R. Jay Wallace, Jr.
& LeRoy Walters eds., 1982).
159 E.L. Pattullo, Institutional Review Boards and the Freedom to Take Risks, 307 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1156, 1156 (1982). Most but not all of the surveyed research projects involved medical research,
and many evidently involved drugs.
160 ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (1981).
161 Id. at 25.
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cause it is hazardous are without warrant."'62 Undoubtedly, particular re-
search projects can be relatively hazardous, and Levine had to work from
studies done after the introduction of IRBs, but the overall risk from re-
search on human subjects appears to be quite mundane.
Nor is there empirical evidence that IRBs significantly reduce the
overall harms from research. It is clear that IRBs sometimes reduce the
harm from particular research projects, but this by itself does not reveal
much about the general efficacy of IRBs in preventing research harms. One
problem is that the very existence of IRBs may lead some researchers to
feel less responsible for protecting their subjects.'63 More generally, the ab-
sence of much change in the known death rate would seem to suggest that
IRBs have not had a discernable effect. In the end, however, the efficacy of
IRBs in preventing research harms remains largely a matter of speculation.
The awkwardness is that the government adopted IRBs without a controlled
study of their efficacy in reducing harms, and the subsequent attempts to
162 Id. at 25-26. He adds: "Equally unsupportable are arguments that, because research is generally
safe, there is no need for any restriction." Id. at 26. In a 1982 survey of the risk of injury, Levine and
Mary Harvey conclude that their "study suggests a low incidence of research-related injuries." Mary
Harvey & Robert J. Levine, Risk of lnjury Associated with Twenty Invasive Procedures Used in Human
Experimentation and Assessment of Reliability of Risk Estimates, in 2 COMPENSATING FOR INJURIES: A
REPORT ON THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PROGRAMS TO REDRESS INJURIES CAUSED BY
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 79 (1982). Although they note deaths, their evidence only
concerns the overall risk of injury, not the cause of any particular deaths, and their evidence includes
reports of drug trials.
A study done for the National Commission that drafted the Belmont Report found that: "Overall,
harm to subjects was reported in three percent of the projects. These harms were generally considered
trivial or only temporarily disabling. Three investigators [out of more than 2000 interviewed] reported
fatal effects; in each of two projects one subject died and in one project three subjects died. Each of
these projects involved cancer research, and in two of the projects some subjects were near terminal
conditions at the time of their participation in the research." NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DHEW PUBLICATION
N. (OS) 78-0008, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS 63 (1978). Such
research probably included drug trials.
Dr. Robert Cooke-Vice Chancellor for Health Sciences at the University of Wisconsin and one of
the members of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research-attempted to remind the Commission about the real risks of therapeutic and
nontherapeutic research:
[T]he thing that we used to call nontherapeutic is not only relatively non-risky, it seems to be safer
to be a subject in nontherapeutic research, than to walk out in the world.
You have less chance of being injured as a subject of what they call nontherapeutic research, than
the ordinary citizen has of being injured in an accident.
And if you want to find risks, the place you find it, is in what they call therapeutic research. Eight
percent of those people died. But if you compare the risk of being a subject in therapeutic re-
search, with the risk of being a patient with the same sort of disease in the same sort of hospital,
you are a heck of a lot safer being a subject in therapeutic research.
National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research,
Transcript of the Meeting Proceedings (26th Meeting), at 2-72 (meeting of Jan. 8, 1977) (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, National Technical Information Service, January 1977).
163 See infra text accompanying note 191.
Getting Permission
examine the question have run into a host of obstacles, such as the secrecy
of IRB proceedings and the difficulty of setting up a control group to meas-
ure the effects of IRBs after these boards came to be required by law. 64
The injured human subjects, however, are only one side of the equa-
tion, for their numbers must be weighed against the sum of all the persons
who died or otherwise suffered because IRBs left them without the benefits
of research. The value of institutions obviously cannot be measured simply
by adding up lives on either side of a metaphorical ledger, but after so many
decades of an entirely one-sided body count, a more balanced form of ac-
counting can at least put the deaths from research in perspective. By licens-
ing inquiry done with intent to learn "generalizable knowledge," by altering
or altogether suppressing inquiries, by denying researchers permission to
ask, say, write down, or publish what seems too "sensitive," and by requir-
ing the destruction of data, IRBs repeatedly interfere with advances in
knowledge. 65 Over 100,000 research proposals are modified by IRBs every
year, and much other research is self-censored, abandoned, or not even
started for fear it will not get approved. Even if most of the modified and
abandoned research would not have created substantial benefits, one only
has to assume that one in 100,000 projects would otherwise have had pro-
found benefits to understand the loss caused by IRBs. A single educational,
epidemiological, or medical study can transform the lives of countless indi-
viduals-whether by giving rise to a lifesaving invention or treatment or by
prompting a new government policy-and if only one such project in
100,000 gets stymied by an IRB, the loss to humanity over the decades al-
most certainly exceeds the loss from the research by a very substantial fac-
tor. Of course, the losses from IRBs are impossible to measure accurately,
but they are probably enormous, and it is therefore tragic that a largely "un-
examined assumption" was used to justify an unconstitutional and deeply
harmful system of licensing.'66
Were IRBs to license only medical research, they would still be worri-
some, for medical progress has often been a story of rebellion against the
narrow morality of majorities. Frequently, what persuades doctors and aca-
demics is not a research proposal, but the demonstration of a successful re-
164 Although it is plausible that research at private companies could be used as a control, even this
may be difficult to the extent the use of IRBs has become the standard of care for human subjects re-
search.
A recent study purports to show that IRBs have reduced deaths in Phase I clinical trials of cancer
drugs. Thomas G. Roberts et al., Trends in the Risks and Benefits to Patients with Cancer Participating
in Phase 1 Clinical Trials, 292 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 2130 (2004). As acknowledged by the author, how-
ever, the data is primarily explained by the decreased toxicity of cancer drugs during the period exam-
ined and by the introduction of better supportive care. In this context, the suggestion that IRBs played a
role in reducing the deaths is purely speculative. Incidentally, such a study-done without a control
group-would not ordinarily meet the standards of scientific method that IRBs themselves impose.
165 For "sensitive," see IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. III, pt. A.
166 LEVINE, supra note 59, at 25.
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suit in the experimental study or treatment of a human being, and it is there-
fore difficult to believe that the introduction of IRBs and their enforcement
of "community attitudes" has not seriously delayed the development of
medical advances.'67 As observed by the chair of the Biological Sciences
IRB at the University of Chicago, "[w]hile we can agree that the develop-
ment of X-rays, heart catheterization, and anesthesia are sentinel [sic]
events in medicine, I reluctantly conclude that the web of institutional and
federal regulations would make it very unlikely that these advances could
be developed in 2005. '6s Of course, medical researchers can be held liable
for negligently inflicting injury, and when dealing with their own patients,
they owe a high fiduciary duty. The advancement of knowledge, however,
needlessly suffers if they are not merely penalized after the fact for causing
legally-cognizable injuries, but are also prejudged by licensing boards that
examine their research for its conformity to a stifling communal morality.'69
Outside medicine, there has been a dramatic decline in entire fields of
empirical research because of IRBs. Educational researchers no can longer
easily observe students in their schools; doctors and social scientists who
want to study what prudish IRBs consider "sensitive" matters, such as mar-
riage or sexuality, must often try to do their research without talking to the
persons they are studying; Ph.D. students in empirical fields now frequently
graduate without having ever done their own empirical research, because
167 For "community attitudes," see 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2005).
168 Jonathan Moss, The 482nd Convocation Address: Could Morton Do It Today, U. CHI. REC., Jan.
5, 2006, at 27. Although a supporter of IRBs, he has
a growing concern about the barriers these regulations impose on new ideas-barriers that can be
so daunting as to discourage innovation. As Institutional Review Board chair, I have seen many of
our own young investigators drift away from clinical research because of these challenges. My
experience is with medical research, but I suspect that the problem of maintaining innovation in an
increasingly regulated environment may well be a more general one.
Id. at 27-28. Although largely speaking of FDA regulated drugs and devices, his point is illustrative of
the broader problem.
169 Perhaps the most poignant medical illustration is the effect on Quality Improvement studies. In
these studies, doctors evaluate treatments in the hope of improving outcomes, and they thereby often
save lives. Not surprisingly, such studies are often done by academic doctors, who thus bring their skills
to bear on medical practice, and who hope to publish any generally applicable knowledge that they may
learn. Now, however, because of the potential for publication, such studies are increasingly treated as
research that requires prior IRB approval, and if a doctor publishes such a study without having earlier
gotten permission, he must worry that the IRB will investigate him and injure his career. Accordingly,
when doctors do Quality Improvement studies without prior permission and come across valuable "gen-
eralizable knowledge," they now have incentives to leave this information unpublished. The danger is
all the greater because, even more than most types of research, Quality Improvement studies are difficult
to get through IRBs-the reason being that they require continual tinkering and thus are not easily re-
duced to the formal research proposals required by IRBs. Academic doctors therefore have reason not
only to avoid publishing the results but also to avoid doing the studies in the first place, for they tradi-
tionally had done such work on account of the potential to publish, but now if they hope to publish, they
first must undergo the burden of getting approval for the study-even though they will not know until
afterward whether it will lead to a publication. This issue has been pointed out to me by various doctors
and researchers whom I cannot cite.
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they cannot satisfy IRB requirements within the time necessary to complete
their coursework; geneticists sometimes forgo learning about the diseases
recorded in tissue banks, lest they spend most of their research time satisfy-
ing the requirements of an IRB.' 7°  The situation is well summed up by
Margaret Blanchard-a distinguished professor of journalism-who wrote
in 2002 that she was "leaving the contemporary period behind. It is far
safer in the nineteenth century .... [Y]ou do not have to worry about the
IRB when you work in the nineteenth century.'' One professor in her de-
partment says "he now limits his class projects to 'bland topics and ar-
chived records.""172  Blanchard notes, "I have seen students alter research
projects to avoid IRB contact. I have seen some give up projects because of
the red tape involved. I have heard words such as 'thought control' used far
too often.' 1 73  She concludes: "A better formula for stultifying research is
beyond contemplation."' 74
In the course of stifling empirical inquiry, the government does par-
ticular harm by barring empirical critiques of government policies and pro-
grams. Although current theories of the First Amendment focus on mere
opinion, political debates can be all the more effective when based on the
scientific knowledge acquired through empirical inquiry. Over the past
several centuries, the study of politics has tended toward empiricism-
toward the study of the world as it is, rather than as it should be-and in an
era of expanded federal power, the empirical study of federal programs is of
particular importance. Only with the knowledge acquired through empirical
inquiry can individuals efficaciously criticize or advocate such programs.
Yet in the 1960s and 1970s, when the federal government dramatically ex-
panded its reach into the lives of Americans, it also established the IRB li-
censing system, and it thus squelched a wide range of inquiry into the actual
170 Even merely the loss in time for scholars who must comply with IRBs diminishes research, for
many scholars and students find the delay, obstacles, and interference so annoying that they simply
abandon the study of human subjects and pursue other inquiries.
The delays and burden of paperwork prevents students from doing their own empirical work in their
courses, and the consequences for the transmission of empirical skills to a new generation of scholars
can be illustrated by the decision by the Journalism Department at the University of Missouri at Colum-
bia that it "will no longer require scientific research for masters candidates." University of Missouri
Amends Research Paper Policy, STUDENT PRESS L. CENTER REP., Spring 2002, at 17, available at
http://www.splc.org/report-detail.asp?id=818&edition=21. In a less formal way, this is a tendency at
almost all universities. This conclusion comes from personal conversations I have had with teachers and
students from various institutions.
171 Should All Disciplines Be Subject to the Common Rule?, ACADEME, May-June 2002, at 62, 68.
(comments of Margaret Blanchard).
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. Of course, outside journalism departments, journalists every day ask questions that cause
very serious legal, economic, reputational, and emotional harm-as can be illustrated by the suicides
triggered by journalistic inquiry. For a recent example arising from a television interview, see Travis
Reed, Mother of Missing Boy Commits Suicide, Assoc. PRESS, Sept. 13, 2006.
101:405 (2007)
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
effects of federal programs. For example, whereas anthropologists, soci-
ologists, psychiatrists, and political scientists once did detailed field studies
on poverty, sex, education, and health and thereby led the way in demand-
ing, critiquing, and shaping government programs on these matters, aca-
demics can no longer do such studies without first getting an IRB's
permission. They thus can challenge the government only by getting their
research pre-approved by the government's licensers, and they thus learn to
tame their questions, to use methods that conform to the taste of the IRBs,
and to avoid the sort of identifying detail that made earlier empirical studies
so persuasive. After three decades of thus submitting to the authority of
government, many human subjects researchers appear to have accepted that
they lack any independent authority to study government programs, and
certainly academic field work now has much less of the radicalism or sig-
nificance it once had.
The propensity of IRBs to do more harm than they prevent is not sur-
prising, for licensing systems tend to be disproportionately severe when
used to eliminate harms. Rather than establish a rule against an injury and
leave individuals to avoid it, licensing prohibits an entire category of con-
duct and then gives administrative boards authority to permit the conduct,
depending on their assessment of the potential for harm. Licensing boards
thus must judge the risk of harm before it occurs, and they therefore can be
confident of preventing all harm only at the cost of barring much activity
that will turn out to be utterly harmless. Of course, many licensing
schemes, such as those concerning marriage or driving, do not dispropor-
tionately stand in the way of harmless activity, for rather than attempt to
prevent the full range of harms, they merely aim to bar some particularly
obvious risks, such as drivers who are underage or who cannot complete a
simple driving test. 75 Yet when licensing schemes attempt to prevent all
relevant harms, they are apt to bar much harmless activity. This is not too
high a price to pay where the probability or degree of harm is peculiarly
great-such as in the licensing of nuclear power plants. Yet when govern-
ment licenses ordinary acts, for which both the probability and the degree of
harm are mundane, with the goal of thoroughly preventing the harms, there
is much reason to fear the usual dynamic-that in their efforts to prevent
ordinary harm, licensers will disproportionately prevent conduct that is
harmless and highly beneficial.
In short, IRBs are far more dangerous than the research they review.
Although a single IRB can usefully prevent harm in a particular research
project, the policy of imposing IRBs must be considered as a whole, with
respect to human subjects research in general, and this reveals that IRBs
cause much more harm than they prevent. When both sides of the ledger
175 Another exception is when the licensed conduct itself is directly injurious, for in such instances
licensers can anticipate with certainty when harm will ensue. In most licensing schemes, however, the
ensuing injury is only a matter of probability.
Getting Permission
are counted, the harm to human subjects pales in comparison to the harm to
all those who might have benefited from the lost research, and this raises a
question as to how the government came to consider human subjects re-
searchers so dangerous.
B. Human Subjects and Inhuman Researchers
In the absence of much empirical evidence of harm, it must be won-
dered how the government came to believe human subjects research needed
to be licensed, and the answer can be observed in the government's distinc-
tion between researchers and their human subjects. At the time the gov-
ernment adopted the IRB laws, the distinction between researchers and
human subjects seemed to support the need for IRBs, but in retrospect, the
distinction reveals the degree to which the government adopted its percep-
tion of harms in response to unsupported presuppositions-indeed, in re-
sponse to popular fears and prejudices.
The literature on IRBs repeatedly emphasizes that researchers have the
potential to follow in the footsteps of the doctors at Auschwitz, and that
those whom they study become mere subjects-the passive objects of their
unrestrained curiosity.'76 It is as if a researcher could become Dr. Franken-
stein, and his subjects, his helpless victims. In this nightmare vision, re-
searchers are transformed by their curiosity into potential monsters, and
their subjects, upon contact with researchers, are rendered too supine to pro-
tect themselves. 177
The labels contribute to the sense of anxiety. The word "researcher"
lumps together a Mengele and a Milgram, thus suggesting that each is
equally a researcher who endangers the dignity of his subjects and so needs
government regulation.7 1 Similarly, the phrase "human subjects" includes
both a concentration camp victim and a town official in Poughkeepsie who
176 Almost all accounts of how IRBs are needed to prevent the dangers of human subjects research
begin with the experiments in Nazi concentration camps, and this is true not only of popular studies but
also supposedly sober academic accounts. Nuremberg, for example, is the opening example in the Bel-
mont Report. See supra note 138.
177 Patients often become passive in hospital settings or in the hands of their doctors, and perhaps
subjects who are not patients adopt a similar attitude when studied in a hospital or by a doctor, for they
may be under the impression that in these situations they are owed a fiduciary duty. Such passivity,
however, does not appear to extend outside these circumstances, as can be illustrated by the low re-
sponse rates to surveys.
178 This lumping together of Milgram with Mengele and his colleagues becomes explicit in the gov-
ernment education films, such as Evolving Concern: Protections for Human Subjects, which, as Richard
O'Brien observes, "opens with a collage of four picturei showing (1) Nazi researchers at Nuremberg, (2)
the Tuskegee Study, (3) the Wichita Jury Study, and (4) Stanley Milgram's (1974) obedience research."
O'Brien, supra note 112, at 33. O'Brien comments: "While there is some disagreement on the ethics of
Milgram's experiment, would anyone group his work with that of the physicians at Tuskegee or the Na-
zis tried at Nuremberg?" Id.
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is interviewed by a local student. 79 Yet when a mere colloquy gets charac-
terized as "human subjects research," or when a mere reading project or
written survey becomes an "experiment," does the researcher really become
a nascent predator, and his "human subjects," potential victims?
This tendency to generalize about researchers and human subjects is
profoundly dangerous, for it lends credence to laws that treat researchers
and subjects as incapable of exercising individual authority. Researchers
come to seem incapable of responsibility toward others, and their subjects
come to seem incapable of responsibility for themselves-thus making it
necessary for IRBs to license the researchers in their curiosity and the sub-
jects in their consent. For example, the commission that established the
foundations for what became the Common Rule argued that "investigators"
must be deprived of their individual authority on account of their curiosity:
[I]nvestigators should not have sole responsibility for determining whether re-
search involving human subjects fulfills ethical standards. Others, who are in-
dependent of the research, must share this responsibility, because investigators
are always in positions of potential conflicts by virtue of their concern with the
pursuit of knowledge as well as the welfare of the human subjects of their re-
search. 0
From this perspective, the entire class of "investigators" is without suffi-
cient capacity to make responsible individual judgments about their con-
179 Although the Common Rule offers an exemption that might initially seem to cover the interview
with the politician, it is not much of an exemption. The Common Rule exempts
[r]esearch involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement),
survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of public behavior that is not exempt un-
der paragraph (b)(2) of this section, if: (i) the human subjects are elected or appointed public offi-
cials or candidates for public office; or (ii) federal statute(s) require(s) without exception that the
confidentiality of the personally identifiable information will be maintained throughout the re-
search and thereafter.
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(3) (2005). As it happens, "public officials" is understood to mean only those who
are public figures, and the phrase thus does not cover most local politicians. Hamburger, supra note 6,
at 299-300. Some IRBs, moreover, have not even exempted the study of major figures, such as Ronald
Reagan and federal judges. The meaning of the phrase, however, is beside the point because the gov-
ernment expects even exempt research to get prior IRB permission. See supra notes 53-54.
180 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, supra note 162, at 1.
The government is so eager to prevent individuals from reaching their own decisions about their
conformity to law that it not only requires IRB licensing but also uses its site visits to encourage univer-
sities to establish additional committees to pre-review proposals "to determine in advance whether a par-
ticular intervention involves human subject research and should be conducted under an IRB-approved
protocol." Letter from Kristina C. Borror, Compliance Oversight Coordinator, Div. of Human Subjects
Protections, Dep't of Health and Human Servs., to Daniel R. Masys, Institutional Official for Human
Subjects, Univ. of Cal., San Diego (Jan. 8, 2002). In pursuit of this policy, OHRP even asked some uni-
versities, such as the University of Chicago, to provide an assurance that their researchers will get per-
mission to treat their research as exempt. Univ. of Chicago, Multiple Project Assurance of Compliance
with DHHS Regulations for Protection of Human Research Subjects, at pt. III.B (on file with author).
For details, see supra note 108. The government is clearly seeking an additional layer of licensing to
decide what requires licensing.
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formity to law or morals, because they have a "concern with the pursuit of
knowledge"-because they have curiosity. The Commission did not ex-
plain why curiosity corrupts individual judgment more than other forms of
self-interest. Certainly, what is far more dangerous than curiosity is for
government to single out persons on account of their curiosity-on account
of their attempts to learn "generalizable knowledge"--and to require them
to get permission before they begin their inquiries, before they talk to any-
one, and before they share or otherwise publish what they learn.
Although the government in the 1970s found a political opening for the
adoption of IRB laws in the public reaction to the Tuskegee study, the gov-
ernment adopted its sweeping licensing of human subjects researchers in re-
sponse to deeper public anxieties about scientific inquiry and modernity.
As observed by one contemporary, some of the "intense inquiry" about
harm to human subjects was "conducted by individuals whose concern for
subjects seems a surrogate for worries about unrelated problems of modem
society."'' In an era in which scientists, not unlike Dr. Frankenstein,
seemed to have so much power over life and death as to be able to remake
humanity, Americans came to fear human subjects researchers.8 2 Recog-
nizing the role of these fears, some commentators explain that the govem-
ment needed to adopt the IRB laws to overcome the popular fears of
research that left many individuals reluctant to participate as human sub-
jects. Yet to assuage popular fears about those who seek scientific gener-
alizations by imposing licensing hardly overcomes the First Amendment
objections.
In light of the popular anxieties about human subjects researchers, it is
no surprise that the government has ended up cordoning off these research-
ers from the rest of society. Treating them as peculiarly dangerous on ac-
count of their desire for generalizable knowledge, the government separates
them from those with whom they would engage, even if only to talk, and
thus isolates the researchers-not physically, with barbed wire, but legally,
with rules that deny the researchers, on account of their curiosity, the free-
dom to engage in otherwise lawful interactions with their fellow human be-
ings. Any other individual can decide for himself how to interact with other
persons, whether when talking with them or sticking foreign objects into
them, and the risk of a legal remedy is usually more than enough to per-
suade Americans to interact with one another with appropriate care. For
example, if a diabetic is too squeamish to inject himself with insulin, a
181 Pattullo, supra note 156, at 11. Pattullo observes that "memories of Nazi atrocities were fresh,"
but "[e]ven more important ... America's long love affair with science (like all grand passions) was be-
ginning to cool." Id.
182 For a brief survey of post-War newspaper responses to human subjects research, see Memoran-
dum from Rebecca Lowen to Members of the Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments
Re: Representation of Experiments Using Human Subjects in Newspapers and Periodicals, 1946-1981
(Apr. 4, 1995), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/conmeet/meet3/briefl3/tab-d/
brl3d2.txt.
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neighbor can volunteer to do it, and ordinarily will do it well, without need-
ing permission from a neighborhood review board. Some Americans, how-
ever, cannot interact with their fellow human beings without first asking an
IRB, for they interact with intent to learn-indeed, with intent to learn sci-
entific generalizations-and they thus cannot be trusted to decide for them-
selves whether and how they should have contact with others.
This isolation of researchers can seem very satisfying if one shares
popular anxieties about them, for it places this dangerous class and their
dangerous enterprise in a box from which they cannot escape without prior
permission. In the end, however, Pandora can no more be confined in a box
than what she desires to know, and even if worldly knowledge is a mixed
blessing, the greatest danger lies in crude attempts to restrict such knowl-
edge and those who seek it. Of course, the use of licensing of speech and
the press to confine the curious in their pursuit of generalizable knowledge
surely prevents some real harm. Yet particularly in the absence of empiri-
cal evidence of wide-scale harm, the licensing more clearly circumscribes
research within popular fears.
V. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Although the First Amendment bars licensing of speech or the press
without regard to subject matter, the twentieth-century expansion of the
freedom of speech and the press leaves the impression that this freedom
centers on political opinion, and this may seem to suggest that the IRB
laws, which merely regulate the pursuit of scientific knowledge, are not par-
ticularly worrisome or unconstitutional. Licensing of speech or the press,
however, is dangerous as to many sorts of opinion or knowledge, including
scientific knowledge. Unable to forget this point, the ghost of Galileo lin-
gers near the offices of IRBs--once again waiting for permission-and
those who pause to listen can hear him whisper what all too long has been
forgotten: that scientific knowledge has a political, social, and individual
significance that reaches up to heights unmeasurable by any licenser, and
that because the licensing of speech or the press deprives individuals of
their authority to pursue this "generalizable knowledge," it is no less dan-
gerous than in the past.1
83
A. The Political, Social, and Individual Dangers ofLicensing
Licensing of speech or the press undermines individual authority in
ways that can have political, social, and individual dangers. In different pe-
riods of human history, this range of dangers can be observed as to different
sorts of opinion and knowledge, but in modern times it is especially clear as
to scientific knowledge.
183 Galileo had to get a license to print his Dialogues, and after having this license in effect revoked
in 1633, he had to worry about how to get his new writing in print. For details, see infra note 188.
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It has been seen that a law that requires one to get permission for the
use of language, whether spoken or printed, undermines the authority of in-
dividuals and thus of the people in relation to government, and this political
danger can arise from licensing of speech or the press in many fields of
opinion and knowledge, including scientific knowledge. The danger
reaches beyond political opinion because political opinion or knowledge
cannot easily be segregated from opinion or knowledge in other fields. For
example, although some individuals prefer to understand society and its
politics on the basis of their religious insights, others prefer an understand-
ing based on secular moral ideals or on scientific knowledge. Licensing
therefore can threaten the authority of individuals and the people in relation
to government not merely by focusing on political opinion, but also more
deeply, if less immediately, by concentrating on the knowledge underlying
society and its politics. Especially because scientific knowledge has con-
tributed so much to modern society and its politics, the licensing of speech
or the press in the pursuit of scientific knowledge can invert the authority of
individuals and the people in their relation to government.
More generally, the application of licensing of speech or the press to
scientific knowledge threatens the very success of modern society, quite
apart from its politics. Like the pursuit of truth in many fields, the pursuit
of scientific knowledge depends upon the authority of individuals to ex-
plore their divergent, idiosyncratic theories or generalizations, and therefore
when licensing of speech or the press undermines the authority of individu-
als in their pursuit of scientific theories or generalizations, it weakens the
sort of knowledge that has shaped modern society and has given it so much
of its strength. Although no society can exist on scientific knowledge
alone--or any other single sort of knowledge-modern American society is
peculiarly dependent upon this "generalizable knowledge."
In addition to these political and social dangers is a more individual
danger-the peril of licensing for the individual pursuit of truth. Govern-
ment is established for the preservation of individual freedom, including,
perhaps most fundamentally, the freedom of individuals to discern truth as
best they can. Of course, they submit to government to get its protection,
and they therefore cannot claim a freedom to pursue knowledge contrary to
law, which includes a wide range of after-the-fact penalties on speech and
the press. Nonetheless, the First Amendment preserves their freedom from
laws requiring licensing of speech or the press, and individuals can thus re-
tain a sense of their own authority to use verbal language, spoken or
printed, in the pursuit of knowledge.184 This sense of personal authority, in-
184 There obviously is nothing new about the assumption that individuals do not sacrifice all of their
freedom to government or that the freedom they reserve includes a freedom to pursue the truth within
the laws punishing injurious conduct. Two examples from 1784 can illustrate the point. Jefferson
wrote:
[l]n France the emetic was once forbidden as a medicine, and the potatoe as an article of food.
Government is just as infallible too when it fixes systems in physics. Galileo was sent to the In-
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dependent of government, is the foundation of an individual's capacity to
reach his own judgments-so that, however erroneous, they are at least his
quisition for affirming that the earth was a sphere: the government had declared it to be as flat as a
trencher, and Galileo was obliged to abjure his error. This error however at length prevailed, the
earth became a globe, and Descartes declared it was whirled round its axis by a vortex. The gov-
ernment in which he lived was wise enough to see that this was no question of civil jurisdiction, or
we should all have been involved by authority in vortices. In fact, the vortices have been ex-
ploded, and the Newtonian principle of gravitation is now more firmly established, on the basis of
reason, than it would be were the government to step in, and to make it an article of necessary
faith. Reason and experiment have been indulged, and error has fled before them. It is error alone
which needs the support of government. Truth can stand by itself.
THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, in THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 187, 275-76 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., 1944) (1784).
In 1784, Richard Price more moderately observed that generalizations about truth-religious or sci-
entific-were beyond the jurisdiction of government:
When men associate for the purpose of civil government, they do it not to defend truth, or to sup-
port formularies of faith and speculative opinions; but to defend their civil rights, and protect one
another in the free exercise of their mental and corporeal powers. The interference, therefore of
the civil authority in such cases is directly contrary to the end of its institution. The way in which
it can best promote the interest and dignity of mankind (as far as they can be promoted by the dis-
covery of truth) is, by encouraging them to search for truth wherever they can find it; and by pro-
tecting them in doing this against the attacks of malevolence and bigotry.
RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, AND THE MEANS OF MAKING IT A
BENEFIT TO THE WORLD 25-26 (1784). Price wrote this in the hope that Americans would leave the
pursuit of knowledge-religious or scientific-to individuals, who, being free from interference, would
make "[m]any ... discoveries" that "will give new directions to human affairs." Id. at 110. More con-
crete legal arguments about the freedom the people reserved from government were commonplace-as
when James Wilson influentially argued for ratification of the U.S. Constitution, even without a Bill of
Rights, on the ground that the Constitution did not give Congress any power over speech or the press.
James Wilson, Speech in State House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 168 (1976). Nonetheless, Americans adopted the First Amend-
ment to ensure that even if Congress could use its powers to regulate speech or the press, any such regu-
lation-at least in the form of licensing-would be unconstitutional.
If the pursuit of the truth transcended distinctions among political, religious, scientific, and other
subject matters-let alone between opinion and knowledge-then the religion clauses of American con-
stitutions protected the religious aspect of this freedom and the speech and press clauses protected an-
other aspect, which was not so narrowly confined to a single subject. The underlying point about the
indivisibility of inquiry was commonplace, but Jefferson and Price took a particular interest in it because
of their shared Unitarianism. Price, for example, began by considering religious doctrines and quickly
expanded out to scientific doctrines, taking the deeper question to be the pursuit of any doctrine or the-
ory, regardless of whether it focused on higher or lower things:
Anaxogoras was tried and condemned in Greece for teaching that the sun and stars were not Dei-
ties, but masses of corruptible matter. Accusations of a like kind contributed to the death of Soc-
rates.... Galileo was obliged to renounce the doctrine of the motion of the earth, and suffered a
year's imprisonment for having asserted it. And so lately as the year 1742, the best commentary
on the first production of human genius (Newton's Principia) was not allowed to be printed at
Rome, because it asserted this doctrine.
PRICE, supra, at 24-25. These doctrines were the theories or statements that the federal government
calls "generalizable knowledge," and although in religion and politics they tend to be called opinions
and in science they more cautiously are called hypotheses or theories, they are the statements with which
men for thousands of years have asserted and thereby tested new understandings of themselves and their
circumstances.
Incidentally, Price's Observations not only were addressed to Americans but also were reprinted
here. Indeed, the passages quoted here were selected for publication in American newspapers.
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own-and although this is peculiarly essential in religion, it is also impor-
tant in science and all of the other matters in which individuals seek to un-
derstand themselves and their world.
B. The New Philosophy
The dangers of licensing the pursuit of "generalizable knowledge" are
evident from the history of licensing speech or the press in scientific in-
quiry. The pursuit of generalizable knowledge through empirical inquiry
was the foundation of the new, scientific philosophy with which men cre-
ated the modem world. When no longer satisfied with certitudes about their
creator and his place in another world, they came to examine themselves
and their place in their world, and they did this by testing hypotheses or
general statements against empirical observations. They thereby trans-
formed their society and established a new era, in which men reshaped
every field of human endeavor, from medicine to politics. Yet as typified
by Galileo, they soon found that their new, scientific, "generalizable knowl-
edge" was as vulnerable to the licensing of speech and the press as any
older form of knowledge, and as both Galileo and his adversaries under-
stood, neither the new philosophy nor the licensing of it was without
broader consequence. Although the sort of knowledge imperiled by licens-
ing was changing, the danger for all that rested upon knowledge remained
undiminished.
An older sort of knowledge had been pursued by Socrates in the groves
of the Athenian academy. He there examined his "human subjects" through
a sort of colloquy or elenctic inquiry designed to reveal the nature of hu-
manity and the human good. In his study of his human subjects, Socrates
often left them feeling angry or at least perturbed, but he did so because it
was essential to his inquiry to provoke them into reconsidering their deepest
assumptions. He thereby sometimes diminished their reputations-so ef-
fectively that even today some of his human subjects remain objects of con-
tempt among students. The goal of the old philosophy, however-as
expounded by Socrates and especially his student Plato-was to discern a
truth that rose above the particulars of this world, and it was in pursuit of
this higher knowledge that both the real and the Platonic Socrates troubled
their human subjects.
Aristotle later turned toward a study of worldly phenomena, but rather
than seek testable generalizations about human beings and their material
circumstances, he discerned a natural hierarchy of creatures in a "meta-
physical hieararchy." His thought therefore, together with the rest of the
old philosophy, long was popular among Christian theologians, who relied
upon it to expound otherworldly truths about this world and its maker.
Eventually, however, their verities were disturbed by the new philosophy.
The new philosophy and its attempt to develop testable generalizations
has reshaped human life during the past five hundred years. Copernicus
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and, increasingly, others, including Galileo, worried that their observations
of the planets could not easily be reconciled with the Aristotelian and
Ptolemaic vision of an earth-centered universe, and on the basis of growing
empirical observations, the new astronomers eventually persuaded their
contemporaries that the planets, including the earth, revolved around the
sun. By dislodging the heavens, these astronomers encouraged others to fo-
cus their attention on the earth and its inhabitants, and in this spirit Francis
Bacon boldly declared that empirical study-the testing of generalizations
for error against worldly observations-would create a new age of scientific
knowledge, in which scholars would no longer merely speculate about the
next world, but would examine human beings and the material world in
which they live. Rejecting theories ungrounded in the material realities of
the physical universe, men would examine themselves and their circum-
stances for verifiable generalizations that could transform their lives. Ba-
con even foresaw how this active, empirical examination of human beings
and their surroundings would allow mankind to master nature and so attain
an unexpected longevity, comfort, and happiness.'85
A contemporary, John Donne, recognized the transformative conse-
quences of the new empiricism in the heavens and on earth. In particular,
he understood that this new philosophy was displacing medieval verities
about the elements with empirical evidence of other worlds and the frangi-
ble character of this one:
And new Philosophy calls all in doubt,
The Element of fire is quite put out;
The Sun is lost, and th'earth, and no mans wit
Can well direct him where to looke for it.
And freely men confesse that this world's spent,
When in the Planets, and the Firmament
They seeke so many new; then see that this
Is crumbled out againe to his Atomies.
In breaking up the Aristotelian order of the universe, the new philosophy
pulled down the old political and theological hierarchy and elevated man-
to be precise, the individual:
'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence gone;
All just supply, and all Relation:
Prince, Subject, Father, Sonne, are things forgot,
For every man alone thinkes he hath got
To be a Phoenix, and that then can bee
None of that kinde, of which he is, but hee.
186This is the worlds condition now ....
185 PEREZ ZAGORIN, FRANCIS BACON 127-28 (1998).
186 An Anatomy of the World: The First Anniversary (1611), in THE COMPLETE POETRY AND
SELECTED PROSE OF JOHN DONNE 198-99 (Charles M. Coffin ed., 2001).
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Such were the consequences of the new philosophy, and nowhere has it
more substantially altered human life than in America. Here more than
anywhere, the new, human-centered philosophy and its focus on the direct
study of humanity has created a world based on empirical knowledge about
men and their circumstances.
Like the old philosophy, the new one has come to be licensed, and this
has meant that the licensing has had to be reoriented from God to men. It
might be assumed that sixteenth- and seventeenth-century licensing only
concerned political opinion, but in fact it covered speculation about the en-
tire divine order of the universe, from the heavens to the earth. The medie-
val Catholic Church licensed theological manuscripts on account of their
speculation concerning knowledge of God, and it eventually adapted the
system for the licensing of printed books-this being the model for what
became the English licensing system.'87 As the old philosophy at this pe-
riod largely consisted of verbal speculation about God and all that was im-
bued with his authority, including government, the licensing of manuscripts
and books sufficed to protect society from the pursuit of higher knowledge.
This theologically oriented licensing, however, also had to suffice against
the early pursuit of the new philosophy. The Church thus tried Galileo in
1633 and denied him further permission to print his work, not because of
the implications for humanity, but because Galileo's study of the heavens
had disturbing implications about God-because in moving the center of
the solar system from the earth to the sun, his research shifted the center of
the moral universe from God to man.'
Today, licensing has been revived, but being a response to anxieties
about the new philosophy and its worldly focus, it licenses scientific rather
187 FREDRICK SEATON SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND, 1476-1776, at 41-63 (1952);
Hamburger, supra note 15, at 671-72. Thus, not only in Italy but also in England, the licensing began as
largely theological and then became more general-it being understood that the political, the ecclesiasti-
cal, and the academic were inextricably linked.
188 A central charge against Galileo was that he had obtained a license under something like false
pretenses. Although Galileo had been warned by Bellarmine not to advocate his ideas, Galileo in 1630
sought a license to print his Dialogue. Galileo wrote the book in such a way that he thought he could
claim it did not violate Bellarmine's warning, and Galileo therefore "did not judge it necessary" to men-
tion the warning to the licensing official. Galileo's First Deposition (Apr. 12, 1633), in THE GALILEO
AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 261 (Maurice A. Finocchiaro trans., 1989) [hereinafter GALILEO
AFFAIR]. The Inquisition, however, condemned him, saying that "you asked for permission to print it
without explaining to those that gave you such permission that you were under the injunction of not
holding, defending, or teaching such a doctrine in any way whatever." The Inquisition therefore de-
manded his abjuration and imprisonment and ordered the book to be "prohibited by public edict." Sen-
tence (June 22, 1633), in GALILEO AFFAIR, supra, at 289, 291.
Religious sensibilities remain evident in the IRB licensing. Religious ethicists played an important
role in the adoption of the IRB laws-not least in advising the commission that adopted the Belmont Re-
port-and their heightened understanding of moral duties pervades that document. See supra note 148.
The government, moreover, urges institutions that "[t]he nonaffiliated member of the IRB should be
drawn from the local community-at-large. Ministers, teachers, attorneys, business persons, or home-
makers are possible candidates." IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. 1, pt. B.
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than speculative study and seeks to protect not the dignity of God, but of
men.'89 The licensing of the new philosophy therefore reaches deeper than
the licensing of the old philosophy. Whereas the licensing of printing was
largely adequate to confine the old speculation about God and the reach of
his authority down to mankind, a licensing of more than the press is neces-
sary to confine the new philosophy, which works up from empirical obser-
vations about men and their circumstances. This was the generalizable
knowledge introduced by Bacon and Galileo and that seemed so disturbing
to Donne, and to tame the anxieties caused by the pursuit of this sort of
knowledge, the federal government has had to introduce not merely licens-
ing of printing, but also the licensing of what is said, asked, observed, re-
corded, and published.
As with the old philosophy, so with the new, licensing threatens more
than political opinion, for it also limits the knowledge that tends to underlie
politics, society, and individual judgment. It has become commonplace to
assume that the First Amendment primarily protects political opinion. Yet
just as the dialectical logic of scholasticism provided a foundation for me-
dieval politics, society, and individual inquiry, so too "generalizable knowl-
edge" or scientific hypotheses underlie much of modem politics, society,
and inquiry, and thus all the political, social, and personal developments
that rest upon such knowledge remain as vulnerable to the licensing of
speech and the press as what once depended upon the old philosophy. The
range of political, social, and individual dangers from the licensing of the
new philosophy was already becoming clear when Galileo struggled to get a
license to publish his research, and today the licensing conducted by IRBs
has equally broad consequences. 190
Thus, although the type of knowledge that dominates society has
changed, the danger of regulating it through licensing of speech and the
press remains undiminished. Both in recent times and in the past, the
dominant type of knowledge has consisted of what could be written and
said, but whereas government once licensed the political, scientific, and
theological study that was expected to derive truths from the creator and his
world, it now licenses scientific study of this world and those who remake
189 Indeed, IRBs are sometimes justified as protecting the "dignity" of human subjects, and among
the harms they are supposed to prevent are "dignitary harms." See, e.g., Hamburger, supra note 6, at
325 n.129.
190 For a brief summary of Galileo's difficulties in getting a license for his Dialogue in 1630 and
163 1, see Special Commission Report on the Dialogue (Sept. 1632), in GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note
188, at 218-19. Like modem scholars who deal with IRBs, Galileo faced repeated delays and requests
for modifications, and he had to make clear "with how much humility and reverent submission I defer to
the authority of superiors." Letter from Galileo to the Tuscan Secretary of State (Mar. 7, 1631), in
GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 188, at 208. Yet "[iun the meantime the work stays in a comer, and my life
is wasted." Id. Similarly, see Letter from Galileo to the Tuscan Secretary of State (May 3, 1631), in
GALILEO AFFAIR, supra note 188, at 211.
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it. The licensing thus has simply shifted focus from the knowledge that
mattered then to the knowledge that seems to matter now.
In sum, by licensing attempts to develop "generalizable knowledge,"
the federal government expressly licenses the use of language in the pursuit
of modem, scientific knowledge-indeed, in its central application, to hu-
man beings-and the government thereby penalizes precisely the sort of
empirical inquiry that displaced the old philosophy with the new and that
refocused knowledge away from abstract speculation about men as they
might be in a better world and toward the empirical study of human beings
as they are in this one. The IRB laws thus target the empirical conception
of knowledge that disrupts traditional verities and that continues to create
the modem self, modem society, and modem politics. As Galileo's ghost
surely understands, this licensing of speech and the press is not the less
dangerous because it concerns the new philosophy rather than the old.
C. Individual Authority in Pursuing Scientific Knowledge
This licensing poses such a threat to scientific knowledge and all that
rests on it because it undermines individual authority in the pursuit of sci-
ence. The generalizable knowledge at which the IRB laws take aim is that
which, as has been seen, consists of hypotheses, theories, and other testable
general statements, and especially as applied to human beings, it is the basis
of the modem world-including not only its politics but also its social rela-
tions and its veneration of the individual. This knowledge has had such
success, both in explaining the world and in altering it, precisely because it
does not come from any central, unifying authority, but rather arises from
the divergent insights and judgments of myriad individuals, each of whom
explores generalizable knowledge on his own authority.
The diffused, individual authority required for the advancement of sci-
entific knowledge is evident from the dependence of this knowledge on
testable generalizations. Rather than assume that any person or government
has authority to declare knowledge or its limits, the modem, scientific
method aspires only to hypotheses, theories, or other generalizations, which
get published so that they can be tested-that is, so that they can be ques-
tioned, challenged, and refuted. Proving error thus becomes the avenue to-
ward a truth that always lies ahead, in wait of further attempts at
generalization and further publication and testing. The success of this proc-
ess of repeated experimentation and error depends on the authority of indi-
viduals to challenge old generalizations and to propose new ones,
notwithstanding the views of government, a majority, or any local commu-
nity, and this individual authority cannot easily survive under laws that re-
quire individuals to get permission-to submit to the authority of others-
before attempting to develop their scientific generalizations.
Incidentally, this individual authority is desirable among researchers
not only for the development of scientific knowledge but also as a means of
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limiting research injuries. Although it cannot be expected that all research-
ers will accurately judge their legal and moral duties, no government or
university can adequately oversee and direct individuals in all aspects of
their research. It is therefore inevitable that the safety of human subjects
will rest primarily on the judgment of researchers. According to Levine,
"the most important reason that the record is so good and that there have
been so few injuries is that most researchers are keenly aware of the poten-
tial for injury and take great care to avoid it."' 9' In fact, scholars and stu-
dents in all fields of research recite stories of how they have protected their
subjects from their IRB-whether it be an anthropologist who abandoned
his research because the IRB required informed consent documentation that
would have gotten his subjects killed, or a neuroscientist who less prudently
misinformed the IRB about the phone numbers of human subjects because
the IRB had repeatedly failed to keep such numbers confidential.'92 This
individual responsibility--even at a high cost to the researcher-tends to
rest on a deep sense of individual authority, which is bolstered by after-the-
fact penalties, such as those imposed under the law of negligence. IRBs, in
contrast, through their licensing, implicitly question the authority of re-
searchers to make judgments for themselves about law or morals, and IRBs
thus undermine the authority and responsibility of the very individuals who
are in the best position to protect human subjects.
The danger thus is not merely the modification of over 100,000 re-
search proposals every year, but the tendency of researchers to internalize
the message that they lack the individual authority to exercise their own
judgment in their pursuit of scientific knowledge. When a teacher or stu-
dent seeks to learn by studying human subjects-often merely by talking
with them or reading about them-he usually must first must submit to the
authority of the IRB, and in thus bowing to the government's requirement
that he get permission, he learns that he lacks the authority to exercise his
own judgment about his pursuit of generalizable knowledge. He must defer
to the IRB's "community" pre-judgment not only about safety but also
about the morality of his research, about the scientific "quality" of his
method, and about "the importance of the knowledge" he eventually will
publish.'93 Rather than choose what he considers a lawful, moral, effica-
191 LEVINE, supra note 59, at 26.
192 The dramatic details and source of the first story obviously cannot be identified here, and, in-
deed, most researchers are reluctant to allow their stories to be repeated in print, lest their IRBs prevent
them from doing further research or get them fired. The details and sources of the second story can be
repeated because the IRB forced it into the public realm. It is the story told by Justine Sergent in her
final publication. No End to Our Nightmare in Sight, Suicide Note Says, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Nov. 24,
1994, at A4 (with thanks to John Mueller for drawing my attention to this story). Of course, IRBs oper-
ate under a different system of law in Canada than in the United States, but Sergent's story at least is one
that can be discussed without fear of causing further harm to the researcher.
193 For "community" attitudes, see supra notes 55, 113-15 and accompanying text. For "quality" of
methods, see Uniform FDA Standards for Institutional Review Boards, 43 Fed. Reg. 35,188 (Aug. 8,
1978) (regarding NIH's requirements for IRBs); IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. I, pt. B; Ham-
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cious scientific method, the individual learns that such judgments do not be-
long to him-not even in the first instance-and he thus learns that when
pursuing "generalizable knowledge"-when seeking scientific generaliza-
tions-he must give up his independent, individual authority. 94
By undermining the authority of individuals to make their own judg-
ments in the pursuit of scientific knowledge, the licensing puts the very
success of modernity at risk. The advancement of modem science and all it
has produced depends on the idiosyncratic scientific judgments of countless
individuals, who enjoy not merely the freedom to make such judgments but
also the sense of their own authority to do so, regardless of whether they
thus depart from familiar conventions that may seem comforting to a major-
ity or its licensers. This authority of each individual to seek generalizable
knowledge in accord with his own scientific judgment has been the preemi-
nent instrument of modernity, whether in medicine, business, the arts, mor-
als, or politics. Accordingly, if the licensing of Socrates in his pursuit of
the old philosophy would endanger individual authority and stultify the ex-
ploration of knowledge, so too does the licensing of Galileo and his intel-
lectual heirs in their pursuit of the new philosophy.'95
The point, of course, is not that the United States seeks to impede
modem science, but rather that the demos, as in the past, distrusts the unset-
tling inquiries made in pursuit of knowledge. The United States, being a
republican system of government, is almost as responsive to this popular
anxiety as the democratic system of Athens, and as in the era of Galileo and
burger, supra note 6, at 309-10, 346. For "the importance of the knowledge," see 45 C.F.R. §
46.111 (a)(2) (2005).
194 According to one study, 25% of biomedical researchers, 38% of behavioral and social sciences
researchers, and 23% of other researchers who did IRB-reviewed research felt that "[t]he review proce-
dure is an unwarranted intrusion on an investigator's autonomy-at least to some extent." National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, supra note
162, at 75. Of course, much lower percentages of IRB members thought there was an unwarranted in-
trusion on an investigator's autonomy. Id.
As for the government funding that underlies much modem science, it was aptly said by Donald S.
Fredrickson-a former Director of NIH-that "[t]he creative engines can be fueled by governments, but
they cannot be ignited by them." The Public Governance of Science: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Health and Scientific Research of the Sen. Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 315, 322 (1977)
(testimony of Donald S. Fredrickson).
195 Although the danger of licensing in science is not clear from the opinions of the Supreme Court,
it has long been evident to those who have paid attention to licensing. In his Areopagitica, John Milton
protested that the English licensing system was "the greatest discouragement and affront, that can be of-
fer'd to learning, and to learned men." MILTON, supra note 1, at 20. As Milton was worried that some
would not believe this-that they would think "these arguments of learned men[']s discouragement...
are meer flourishes, and not reall"--Milton recited how he "visited the famous Galileo," who had
"grown old, a pris[o]ner to the Inquisition, for thinking in Astronomy otherwise than the Franciscan and
Dominican licencers thought." On account of this "undeserved thraldom upon le[a]ring," the scholars
Milton met abroad "did nothing but bemoan the servile condition into which learning amongst them was
brought." Id. at 24-25. For an appreciation of Milton's contributions, although not with the focus taken
here, see Vincent Blasi, Milton's Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, 4 IDEAS 6 (1996).
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Milton, licensing seems to offer the surest protection against those who
seek knowledge. IRB licensing thus combines the worst of ancient Athens
and early-modem Rome-democratic fears and an authoritarian method of
control-and IRBs thereby profoundly threaten the authority of individuals
to pursue the knowledge that underlies modernity.
The anxiety that individuals might take scientific inquiry too far has
changed little over the centuries-except that whereas science once seemed
to disturb an order derived from divine ideals, it now seems to threaten an
order built upon the empirical study of men. There was a time, during the
Enlightenment, when it was commonplace to assume that scientific study
was entirely compatible with religion, and in this spirit the American as-
tronomer David Rittenhouse in 1775 dismissed the old fear that an astro-
nomical discovery could be of a "dangerous tendency with respect to the
interests of religion," for "truth is always consistent with itself." He could
therefore playfully address the American Philosophical Society with a pro-
posal to bar scientific discoveries, lest they disrupt heavenly ideals:
How far indeed the inhabitants of the other planets may resemble man, we
cannot pretend to say. If like him they were created liable to fall, yet some, if
not all of them, may still retain their original rectitude. We will hope they do:
The thought is comfortable.-Cease Galileo to improve thy optic tube. And
thou great Newton, forbear thy ardent search into the distant mysteries of na-
ture; lest ye make unwelcome discoveries. Deprive us not of the pleasure of
believing that yonder radient orbs, are the peaceful seats of innocence and
bliss. Where neither natural nor moral evil has ever yet intruded .... ,1
96
This sort of easy reconciliation of science and religion-replete with a
lighthearted admonition to Galileo-was only a interlude. In the prior cen-
tury, Galileo had difficulty getting a license, lest his research interfere with
comfortable thoughts about God. Today, licensing has reappeared, but this
time the research that seems dangerous is that which deprives men of their
comfortable thoughts about themselves.
The new philosophy and the world it established stimulate new fears
almost every day-in medicine, the environment, morals, social relations,
and politics-but it is profoundly dangerous for government to respond
with laws licensing speech or the press, for such laws supplant the authority
of individuals in their scientific inquiries. '97 The government thereby in-
verts the relation of the people to government, it deprives them of the bene-
fits of the knowledge that continually reshapes modem society, and it
undermines the capacity of individuals to pursue truth in accord with their
own judgments.
196 DAVID RITTENHOUSE, AN ORATION 18-19 (1775).
197 One need only consider questions about stem cells, genetic testing, sexuality, and various modes
of contraception and abortion to recognize the intense personal and political fears stimulated by re-
search.
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D. Socrates in America
Imagine Socrates in America. The same face, the same beard, the
same inquisitive, questioning mind, but the pallium laid aside for scruffy
tweed. This American Socrates, like his forebear, interrogates his subjects
to explore his theories about the nature of human beings. In the manner of
the Socrates of old, he presses his subjects with questions they find annoy-
ing, invasive, disturbing, insensitive, and embarrassing. This new Socrates,
however, exposes their inadequacies in pursuit of the new philosophy-in
pursuit of its empirical, generalizable knowledge and its utterly material vi-
sion of the good life. Much therefore has changed in the shift from the
Athenian academy to the American. Yet even in exchanging the old phi-
losophy for the new, Socrates would find the threat to inquiry all too famil-
iar. Today, the inquiry that disturbs the public is empirical rather than
elenctic, but still the academic must answer to the demos.
Yet whereas the original Socrates faced trial after his inquiries pro-
voked popular anxiety, the empirically-minded American Socrates faces
trial beforehand. He never even gets to ask all his questions, for prior to
initiating his dialogues, he has to prepare a research proposal-with a writ-
ten transcript of his questions-and submit it to the IRB, which will deny
him permission until he tones down his questions in accord with its under-
standing of communal standards. Outside the groves of the academy,
Americans are breaking all communal boundaries in what they say, print,
and do, but within the academy-whether in asking about medical, politi-
cal, sociological, historical, literary, religious, or other matters-the new
Socrates must submit to the decision of the demos before he puts even a
single question to his human subjects.
What do the dialogues of Socrates look like after an IRB has had its
way? In the Athenian academy, the original Socrates was at least able to
press his inquiries and then pay the price. Today, in the American acad-
emy, the empirically-minded Socrates must begin each dialogue by asking
participants to read and sign written informed consent documents. Upon
learning that they will be asked sensitive questions that might embarrass
them or injure their reputation, many participants hesitate to sign, barring
Socrates from even initiating the conversations. This forces Socrates to
abandon several of his early dialogues. He then softens his questions in the
hope that he can get permission to use less formidable consent forms. Even
so, some of his milquetoast questions are removed or rewritten by the IRB
to ensure that he does not provoke his subjects to think in a way the IRB
considers harmful to their emotional condition. Of course, when asking his
pre-approved questions, Socrates finds the dialogue rather stilted, for he is
not accustomed to reducing any part of his colloquies to writing-before or
after they occur. He is a man of his word, and he therefore does not depart
from the script approved by the IRB, but he increasingly doubts whether he
should bother with his dialogues if they must first get censored by the
demos.
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The publication of Socrates' dialogues is equally troubling, for the IRB
denies him permission to reveal the names of his subjects or any other iden-
tifying information about them or those whom they mention. Indeed, be-
fore his student and successor Plato can get hold of Socrates' recordings of
his dialogues to study, edit, and publish them, Plato needs additional ap-
proval from an IRB. Unfortunately, the initial IRB approval for most of
Socrates' inquiries required him to destroy his data-in this case, the re-
cordings-within three years of the conversations. Even for the recordings
that survive, however, the additional approval that Plato gets from the IRB
requires him to remove the portions of the dialogues that might allow a
reader to identify the participants. Last but not least, to publish the dia-
logues in a reputable journal, Plato needs to assure the editors that they can
print an imprimatur, stating that the dialogues received IRB approval.
Not unlike the jury that tried and condemned the ancient Socrates, the
IRB has community representation and is chosen for its "sensitivity to ...
community attitudes."'98 Just as the old Socrates was tried for questioning
the theological values of the Athenian state-for "denying the gods recog-
nized by the state and introducing new divinities"-so today the new Socra-
tes is tried for departing from the pieties of the federal government about
"Justice," "Respect for Persons," and "Beneficence."'
199
Of course, the IRB does not demand that Socrates commit suicide. At
least one modern Socrates-the Canadian neurological scholar Justine Ser-
gent-resorted to suicide after being publicly condemned before the
demos."' A modern Socrates, however, usually has no need to terminate
his life after trial, for the IRB trial occurs prior to the inquiry and simply
terminates the offensive pursuit of knowledge. If, however, Socrates con-
ducts his research and publishes it without permission, the IRB (apparently
following "quality assurance" practices encouraged by the federal govern-
ment) will notice the offending publication and call him to account. If it
deems him "uncooperative," it can review his work more severely in the fu-
ture, and it can even pressure him to resign from the academy.2"' Whereas
in the era of the Athenian academy the old philosophy gave offense, in the
era of the American academy the new philosophy gives offense, and there-
fore although Socrates finally can do his old philosophy without retribution,
he can do the new philosophy only if he first submits to the government's
intellectual fetters.
Stanley Milgram discovered the consequences of giving offense to the
modern demos. The sense of outrage against him still is such that one
198 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a) (2005). For the membership requirement, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(d). See
also IRB GUIDEBOOK, supra note 49, at ch. 1, pt. B.
199 This language appears in a translation of Socrates' Apology, as quoted in Percy M. Dawson,
University Ideals and their Limitations, 47 SCI. 547, 549 (1918).
200 No End to Our Nightmare in Sight, Suicide Note Says, supra note 192, at A4.
201 See supra notes 59, 78.
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might suppose he had electrocuted his subjects. In fact, he asked his sub-
jects to electrocute persons pretending to be subjects, and more than sixty
percent of the real subjects followed their instructions in turning up the
voltage higher and higher-notwithstanding ever more anguished sounds
from the persons pretending to be subjects. Milgram began his experiments
in 1961, during Adolf Eichmann's trial, to understand the depths of human
nature, and, being an empirically-oriented Socrates, he ended up revealing
to his subjects that they were of poor character-thus causing some of them
various degrees of remorse and anxiety."2 Like Socrates, Milgram placed
his subjects in circumstances of moral discomfort to reveal disturbing fea-
tures of human nature, and although he could have employed the old phi-
losophy without troubling the demos, he employed the new philosophy and
was therefore condemned.2"3
Academic inquiry and political debate must often begin with a sense of
rebellion against familiar truths, and rather than respect society's conven-
tional sense of order, they create new conventions and different conceptions
of orderliness. Arguably, therefore, a sense of freedom-a sense that one
does not need prior permission-will eventually promote the interests of
American society much further than even the best conceptions of social
202 THOMAS BLASS, THE MAN WHO SHOCKED THE WORLD: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF STANLEY
MILGRAM, at ch. 5-6 (2004); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. OF ABNORMAL
AND SOC. PSYCH. 371, 375-76 (1963). In fact, Milgram appears to have emphasized the emotional re-
sponse of his subjects for effect, and "the results of the post-experimental psychological studies ... re-
ported 'no evidence of any traumatic reactions."' [an Parker, Obedience, in GRANTA 71: SHRINKS, at
101, 116 (2000). Although his studies became "a minor building block of Western thought," the stan-
dards enforced by IRBs would "prevent the obedience studies from being repeated today." Id. Simi-
larly, it has been noted that Milgram's experiments "almost certainly" could not "be conducted in the
United States today," although "'[p]erhaps more than any other empirical contributions in the history of
social science, they have become part of our society's shared intellectual legacy."' BLASS, supra, at
281, 283. Incidentally, Milgram thought that "the 'erection of a superstructure of control [by the federal
government] on sociopsychological experimentation is a very impressive solution to a nonproblem."'
Id. at 281.
203 For example, he was denigrated as "the mad doctor," and Bruno Bettelheim said that Milgram's
study was "in line with the human experiments of the Nazis." Ian Parker, Obedience, GRANTA, Autumn
2000, at 101, 116-17 (2000); see ARTHUR G. MILLER, THE OBEDIENCE EXPERIMENTS: A CASE STUDY
OF CONTROVERSY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 124 (1986). So strong was the condemnation that "it may have
contributed to his premature death." Parker, supra note 202, at 116.
Milgram noted that some of the criticism was "based as much on the unanticipated findings as on the
method" and that if "every one of the subjects had broken off at 'slight shock,' or at the first sign of...
discomfort, the results would have been pleasant, and reassuring, and who would protest?" MILLER, su-
pra, at 110 (quoting Milgram). This complaint was later tested in a study by Bickman and Zarantonello,
who concluded:
One may wonder if the Milgram study would have been the subject of public outrage if the results
had turned out differently. These data suggest that if most of Milgram's subjects had disobeyed,
his experiment would have not received as much condemnation.... Critics may be responding to
the unflattering portrayal of human nature discovered using deceptive methodologies rather than
the act of deception itself.
Id. at Ill.
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good or orderliness that prevail at any one moment in the nation's history.
This, however, cannot be known ahead of time, and therefore the First
Amendment's rejection of licensing, like so much of American freedom, is
a sort of wager on human nature-a calculated gamble on the capacity of
Americans to make better use of their freedom than the experience of the
rest of the world has given them reason to think possible. Perhaps the gam-
ble on individual authority is mistaken, but this fragmented authority is the
very foundation of the knowledge that has created modem America-its
politics, its society, and its individualistic people. Accordingly, although
the risks of leaving Socrates unlicensed may sometimes seem dangerously
unknown, the risks of requiring him to get permission before he even begins
his inquiry are all too clear.
CONCLUSION
By now it should be evident that the IRB laws regulate research by im-
posing licensing on speech and the press. These laws require individuals,
on account of their desire for generalizable knowledge, to get permission
before pursuing such knowledge-indeed, to get permission before merely
observing, asking, speaking, writing, printing, recording, keeping informa-
tion, sharing information, or otherwise publishing. These licensing laws
thus violate the First Amendment, and although licensing has lost its
prominence in First Amendment doctrine, the danger to individual authority
and the consequences for individuals, society, and politics reveal that the li-
censing of speech or the press remains a profound threat to freedom.
It is shocking almost beyond belief that academics are prohibited from
doing without prior permission what other Americans can do without con-
cem, let alone permission. It is shocking that they are penalized merely be-
cause they belong to an inquisitive and publishing class and because they
have the curiosity to seek generalizable knowledge-in other words, not for
any discemable, legally punishable injury that already has occurred, but
rather for being eggheads, for having curiosity, for inquiring with intent to
learn, in particular for seeking the knowledge that underlies modernity. It is
shocking that they are cordoned off from the rest of society and not allowed
out of their intellectual confines, unless on a leash held by community li-
censers on behalf of the federal government.
Of course, this is not to say that the Constitution stands in the way of
laws penalizing injury, including such injury as occurs in research. If Soc-
rates or Milgram actually causes harm of a sort punishable when done by
other types of Americans, he is vulnerable to a legal remedy for the actual
harm. Yet neither Socrates nor Milgram can be subject to licensing or other
constraints on speech or the press on account of his being an academic--on
account of his being of the class that congregates in universities and other
research institutions. Nor can such persons be singled out for licensing be-
cause they are curious about their fellow men and wish to study them by
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asking questions and engaging in conduct that is otherwise entirely lawful.
To be a member of the class academicus or to engage in the systematic pur-
suit of generalizable knowledge is not a risk, let alone an injury, and even if
there were a greater risk than from the rest of population or from conduct
done without scientific curiosity, the risk is not of the sort that can safely be
left to the cognizance of law. Although the pursuit of generalizable knowl-
edge by academics may appear harmful in the anxious imagination of the
demos, it still is protected by the Constitution from laws requiring the li-
censing of speech or the press.
Government could just as well impose licensing on scholars who en-
gage in elenctic dialogue about the nature of man, for this too puts human
subjects at risk. If the licensing of Socratic inquiry or those who pursue it
would violate the First Amendment, so too does the licensing of the pursuit
of generalizable knowledge through the study of human subjects.
The IRB laws can be no more constitutional than NRB laws-the hy-
pothetical laws establishing Newspaper Review Boards. A newspaper re-
porter can question Klansmen, he can even join the Klan to observe their
prejudices all the better, and although he can publish all sorts of personal
details about them, he cannot be subjected to licensing on account of his be-
ing a reporter or on account of his desire for knowledge that can be stated in
verbal language-whether the knowledge is particularizable, generalizable,
or publishable. Before the reporter does his research, it cannot be known
whether his inquiry will do any injury, and even afterward, if his publica-
tion causes harm to a Klansman, the reporter cannot be punished, except
under general laws. Perhaps in some sense researchers as a class, like re-
porters, are dangerous, and perhaps their curiosity carries perils, but they
cannot constitutionally be constrained by law, especially not by licensing
laws, on account of their desire for generalizable knowledge or their mem-
bership in an inquisitive class.
Ultimately, the problem is not so much the IRB laws as the doctrines
of the Supreme Court. The doctrines that the Court developed while ex-
panding the freedom of speech and the press may have been useful to define
and thus delimit the periphery, but they have cut deeply into the core, and
this has emboldened the government to impose licensing and has left aca-
demics and students without the confidence to object. In particular, the
Court's doctrines have impressed Americans with the debilitating belief that
government interests can overcome any part of the freedom of speech and
the press and that in any case the government can spend its way around the
freedom. The Court's doctrines have thereby given legitimacy to what the
Constitution once clearly forbade, and thus rather than preserve liberty, the
Court has actually subverted it.
The result is an almost surreal contrast between the justices' concep-
tion of their doctrines and the grim reality.2" The justices have repeatedly
204 See also Hamburger, supra note 6, at 277-81, 351-54.
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revealed their belief that their doctrines protect freedom of expression in the
academy. For example, they talk about the importance of freedom of
speech and the press "particularly in the academic community" and say that
"academic freedom" is "a special concern of the First Amendment.""2 5 The
justices in such cases sound as if they are endorsing a freedom within the
academy that rises above the freedom enjoyed outside. In reality, however,
the Court's doctrines have legitimized the imposition of seventeenth-
century style licensing on academics and students and have thus deprived
them of a freedom that other Americans exercise every day without im-
pediment. The Court's doctrines, in fact, have left academics so uncertain
of their rights that for over three decades they have not challenged the li-
censing laws." 6 In these circumstances, what is needed from the Court is
not a special right of research or any other academic privilege, but rather
merely a clear acknowledgment of the old-fashioned First Amendment
freedom from licensing.
205 Keyishian v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957).
206 For the fearfulness of academics, see supra note 58 and Hamburger, supra note 6, at 304-05,
352-54. The effect of Supreme Court doctrine in undermining opposition to the licensing was candidly
acknowledged by a lawyer who had been a Special Consultant to the Commission that drafted the Bel-
mont Report. He observed about the government's use of conditions to obtain IRBs: "Neither scientists
nor institutions have challenged in court the power of Congress to impose such conditions, perhaps be-
cause the Supreme Court, if ever faced with the question, is likely to construe Congress's conditional
spending power broadly and to approve such conditions." John A. Robertson, The Social Scientist's
Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 361
(Tom L. Beauchamp et al. eds., 1982).
